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ABSTRACT 
Offshore oil and gas exploitation is principally conducted using dry or wet tree 
systems, otherwise called the subsea Xmas tree system. Due to the shift to 
deeper waters, subsea production system (SPS) has come to be a preferred 
technology with attendant economic benefits. At the centre of the SPS is the 
subsea control module (SCM), responsible for the proper functioning and 
monitoring of the entire system. With increasing search for hydrocarbons in 
deep and ultra-deepwaters, the SCM system faces important environmental, 
safety and reliability challenges and little research has been done in this area. 
Analysis of the SCM reliability then becomes very fundamental due to the huge 
cost associated with failure. Several tools are available for this analysis, but the 
FMECA stands out due to its ability to not only provide failure data, but also 
showcase the system’s failure modes and mechanisms associated with the 
subsystems and components being evaluated. However, the technique has 
been heavily challenged in various literatures for several reasons. To close this 
gap, a novel multi-criteria approach is developed for the analysis and ranking of 
the SCM failures modes. 
This research specifically focusses on subsea tree-mounted electro-hydraulic 
(E-H) SCM responsible for the underwater control of oil and gas production. A 
risk identification of the subsea control module is conducted using industry 
experts. This is followed by a comprehensive component based FMECA 
analysis of the SCM conducted with the conventional RPN technique, which 
reveals the most critical failure modes for the SCM. A novel framework is 
developed using multi-criteria fuzzy TOPSIS methodology and applied to the 
most critical failure modes obtained from the FMECA evaluation using 
unconventional parameters. Finally, a validation of these results is performed 
using a stochastic input evaluation and SCM failure data obtained from the 
offshore industry standard reliability database, OREDA. 
Keywords: Reliability Assessment, SCM, API 17N, FMECA, Risk priority 
Number (RPN), Fuzzy TOPSIS, SPS.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the research 
The easy oil has been found! Hydrocarbon search is witnessing a dramatic 
drive into remote, deep and ultra-Deepwater arena with attendant safety, 
environmental and reliability challenges (Mahler 2014). Deepwater conditions 
inherently dictate the development of oil and gas fields by means of subsea 
production systems (SPS), since traditional surface facilities such as steel-piled 
jacket are either technically unfeasible or uneconomical due to the water depth. 
According to the Douglas-Westwood (DW) forecasts, the total global subsea 
hardware Capex is $117 billion (bn) between 2014 and 2018. Compared to the 
previous period five years period, this represents a growth of more than 80% 
(See figure 1). The figure also shows a worldwide statistics for offshore 
production facilities ranging from floaters, fixed platforms to subsea wells with 
four thousand five hundred and four (4,504) subsea wells operational today, 
four hundred and six (406) under development and over six thousand being 
planned for 2014 onwards (Morgan 2014). 
 
(a)        (b) 
Figure 1 – (a) Subsea market forecast 2014 to 2018, (Douglass Westwood 2014). 
(b) Statistic of Offshore production systems worldwide operational and 2014 onwards 
(Morgan 2014). 
The shift to Deepwater presents a huge challenge to the subsea systems 
demanding reliability at its best. This calls for a need for a reliability assessment 
of the subsea control module (SCM), being the heart of a typical SPS, 
considering the high cost associated with failure. 
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A subsea production system (SPS) comprises a wellhead, valve tree (‘x-mas 
tree’) equipment, pipelines, structures and a piping system, etc., and, in many 
instances, a number of wellheads have to be controlled from a single location 
(Haritonov 2009, Wang 2012). It ranges in complexity from a single satellite well 
with a flowline linked to a fixed platform, FPSO or an onshore installation, to 
several wells on a cluster or template on a tie-back to fixed or floating systems 
piped directly to an onshore facility. Figure 1 is a typical subsea field 
development layout on a tie-back to an FPSO.   
 
Figure 2  Subsea development field layout (Pedram 2008) 
A subsea control module (SCM) is the main ‘’brain’’ of a typical electro-hydraulic 
SPS. Normally mounted on the system to be controlled (tree, manifold, 
SDU…etc), it delivers multiplexed control power to the appropriate system unit. 
A tree-mounted SCM (see figure 3) is responsible for the control of all tree 
valves and sensors including the downhole intelligent valves and their 
instrumentation. It is also responsible for relaying all signals from the topside to 
the appropriate units and vice versa for efficient condition monitoring of the 
entire SPS. Common functions of a tree-mounted SCM are as follows: 
• Control of subsea tree valves 
• Control of chemical injection valves 
• Monitoring of the tree system functions 
• Control of the SCSSV 
• Control of the intelligent control valves 
• Monitoring of downhole instrumentation 
 3 
 
Figure 3 E-H multiplexed SPS showing a tree-mounted SCM, self-addition 
 The above functions are so critical to a subsea production system (SPS) and 
normally require embedded redundancy as failure or loss in any of those will 
typically lead to very severe consequences. Common failures typical 
experienced in the SCM during offshore oil and gas production offshores are 
(Mamman 2009, Broadbent 2010): 
• Leakages in the different valve units in the SCM 
• Inability to operate the SCM valve units from their last position 
• Loss of signal from the SCM unit 
• Loss of power from the its SEM unit 
• Water ingress into in to the SCM housing 
The failure consequences are further amplified by environment and increased 
water depth as a well support vessel (WSV) and a remote operated vehicle (see 
figure 4) at very exorbitant cost are normally required for the SCM retrieval, 
repair and replacement.  
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Figure 4  ROV during a subsea operation on a Xmas Tree, courtesy of Oceaneering. 
The obvious gap associated in the operation of the SCM in an SPS for offshore 
oil and gas exploitation and the limited associated research demands a study 
into this area.  
 
1.2 Motivation for the Project 
The brain of a typical subsea control system (SCS) in an SPS is the subsea 
control module (SCM). It is controlled by the master control station (MCS) 
located topside on a platform or floating vessel. Usually mounted in an Xmas 
tree, manifold or SDU, the SCM contains electronics, instrumentation, and 
hydraulics for safe and efficient operation of subsea valves, chokes and also 
provides condition monitoring functions. Figure 5 shows the various parts of 
the SCM.   
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. 
Figure 5  Subsea Control module (SCM), courtesy of Aker 
It is no secret in the industry that the SCM is one of the systems with the 
biggest reliability challenges (Brandt 2001). A recent industry study by a top oil 
and gas producer firm (name withheld, for confidentiality reasons) shows that 
the SCM as being responsible for the highest production loss in the SPS (See 
figure 6). The study showed the SCM as being responsible for 30.4% of 
production loss, far above any other system in the SPS. This, at the least is very 
alarming and deserves the highest attention possible to reduce such a rate 
system malfunction.  
Today, the SCM is required to provide controls at tieback distances as much 
as a 100km, water depths of 3000m with a pressure rating at 15,000psi. This 
requires more complex systems, accurate data collection, fast response time 
and overall improved performance posing unprecedented challenges to the 
module. Well interventions in subsea deepwater wells cost over $200,000 per 
day, with a typical cost of $10,000,000 per intervention including operations 
usually being conducted by a floating deepwater drilling rig (Pedram 2008). 
Failure of this system leads to a huge loss in production, environmental issues 
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and may lead to an uneconomical field development with significant safety 
concerns.  
 
Figure 6  Main causes of production Loss divided in the SPS 
The sensitivity, remoteness and high cost of intervention, repair and 
maintenance makes the reliability of subsea control module (SCM) a priority in 
the offshore oil and gas industry. However, little research has been done in this 
area.  
This PhD research is focussed on risk-based reliability assessment of the 
subsea control module (SCM) used for the production of hydrocarbons in 
subsea oil and gas production. A review of the challenges in deepwater water 
oil and gas development is conducted. Also in the thesis, the features, merits 
and limitations of various techniques used in reliability assessment are being 
explored with a focus on failure mode and effect criticality analysis (FMECA). 
FMECA is known to be one of the widely used engineering tools for analysing 
systems reliability (Hekmatpanah 2011). An FMECA with a thorough risk 
identification analysis of the subsea control module (SCM) is being analysed in 
this report. A criticality assessment of its failure modes is then performed using 
the RPN methodology. Considering some limitations associated with the RPN 
1.54%
3.02%
11.46%
3.60%
3.57%
1.99%
3.97%
4.08%
6.54%
7.26%
9.01%
9.09%
30.64%
2.50%
1.73%
Xmas tree Hydraulic Power Unit Static Umbilical Flow Control Module
Gas Lift Package Electrical Power Unit Master Control Station Riser
Flowline Wellhead Dynamic Umbilical Tubing Hanger
Subsea Control Module Others Manifold
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methodology, a novel multi-criteria fuzzy TOPSIS evaluation of the SCM failure 
modes is conducted using unconventional parameters, derived from expanding 
the criterion used in the conventional RPN. A sensitivity analysis based on the 
elimination of one risk factor at a time is also conducted. A validation of the 
results is performed using a stochastic evaluation and analysis of data obtained 
from the industry (OREDA database). In line with recent developments in 
subsea controls, a comparative analysis of the electro-hydraulic and all-electric 
SCM is performed using the fuzzy TOPSIS methodology. This study highlights 
the prospect of the all-electric system as a possible replacement technology for 
the electro-hydraulic (EH) system considering its attendant merits. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives of the Research 
The subsea control system constitutes a vital part of the overall subsea 
production equipment, and its reliability is paramount in order to achieve safe 
and undisturbed production (Grude 1994). The overall aim of this project is to 
develop an effective methodology for assessing the reliability of subsea 
control modules (SCM) in deepwater oil and gas production systems.  
The project has the following objectives: 
• To conduct a critical literature review on reliability assessment with a 
focus on the subsea offshore industry in order to find knowledge gaps. 
• Perform comprehensive failure mode and effect criticality analysis 
(FMECA) for the SCM to establish the effect of the failures and here 
identify risks 
• To conduct a study on possible causes of failures in SCM with a focus 
on deep waters and the results validated with data collected from the 
field or expert opinions. 
• To develop a novel method for assessing SCM reliability using 
relevant multi-criteria decision making methods. 
• Perform a sensitivity analysis and validation of the model obtained. 
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1.4 Research Methodology 
An overview of the methodology being used in this study, highlighting the main 
stages is shown in figure 7. The first step in this methodology is a full 
description of the subsea production system (SPS). Here, a high-level 
description of the SPS and the subsea control system (SCS) is provided 
showing the different sections and the position of the subsea control module 
(SCM), which is the heart of the SCS. 
In stage 2, the SCM full identity including its functionality and boundary in the 
SCS will be provided. The material, operational and environmental 
characteristics of the SCM will also be provided. 
Stage 3 of this study consists of a clear identification of all failure modes and 
failure mechanisms associated with the failure of the SCM. This stage involves 
developing of an understanding of failure modes characteristics of the SCM. 
Failure Modes Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) technique will be used 
for this. The worksheet to be used in this analysis will consist of the following 
categories: 
• Component Identification and classification 
• Failure Causes 
• Failure Effects 
• Failure Modes 
A failure influencing diagram will be derived showing the effect of each of the 
failure mechanisms.  
Criticality assessment of the subsea control module will be performed in stage 4 
considering the system features, failures modes, causes, effects and ranking 
based on conventional and enhanced methodologies. Modelling the reliability of 
the SCM requires consideration of a complex set of underlying mechanism and 
processes in relation to its components, operation and the environment.  
In stage 5, a survey is conducted using subsea experts is conducted to access 
the importance of risk factors that influence the reliability of the subsea control 
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module. A questionnaire is designed with two sections. The first section 
evaluates the importance of the risk factors in SCM reliability while the second 
rates the risk factors against the SCM failure modes. The results obtained feeds 
the multi-criteria evaluation performed in stage6. A deep multi-criteria evaluation 
of the criticality model is performed by expanding the conventional FMECA risk 
factors from three to ten.  
 
Figure 7  Research Methodology 
In stage 7, the SCM reliability model testing, sensitivity analysis and validation 
will be performed. The main objective of the model testing will be to assess the 
reliability characteristic of the SCM for the extraction of hydrocarbon in 
Deepwater as the available technologies approach their threshold.  
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A considerable amount of data is needed to complete these analyses. When 
searching for data, several databases and papers were reviewed. Ocean 
properties data have also been obtained from the industry including failure 
rates. A vast amount of data was also obtained from the offshore Reliability 
database (OREDA), which contains key information for the reliability analysis 
performed, such as probability of failure and time to repair. OREDA compiles 
offshore equipment data from several petroleum companies through 20years 
(Osteb0 2001, OREDA 2009). Additional data is also obtained through expert 
elicitation by conducting a survey using key specialists in the industry covering 
the operators group, equipment manufacturers including controls engineering 
and consulting firms. 
The reliability data considered in this study are those of the subsea control 
module (SCM) installed on subsea Xmas tree for the purpose of well control for 
the production of oil and gas. A horizontal tree (HT) control is being assumed 
though the functionality is similar to those employed for the vertical tree system. 
Controls used for subsea pipelines, SDU and manifolds are outside the scope 
of this report. A semi-quantitative approach is adopted in this research, 
capturing data through expert elicitation and those from recognised industry 
databases.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter one of this report commences with a general background to the 
research project. It defines subsea production system (SPS) and explains the 
role of the subsea control module (SCM) in an SPS for oil and gas production. 
The common function of the SCM and a high-level list of common failures in the 
SCM is also provided. The justification for carrying out the research is clearly 
explained highlighting the significance of the SCM in an SPS as a chosen 
technology. Aims and objectives including the study methodology are also 
provided in this chapter.  
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Chapter two looks into risks assessment in the subsea industry. It commences 
with a review on the attendant risks associated with offshore oil and gas 
production in the face of increasing water depth. Deepwater subsea controls is 
discussed next along with subsea challenges and risks. The classification of 
water depth into shallow, deepwater and ultra-deepwater is also showcased. 
The industry standard for managing risk, API17N, is also explained along with 
equipment qualification, a requirement for unproven systems and components 
deployment in the subsea industry. This chapter highlights the first principle of 
reliability and mentions the need for a study into SCM reliability. The chapter 
also looks into common flow assurance challenges in the offshore subsea 
industry including subsea and equipment qualification. Uncertainty as a key bsis 
for risk is discussed along with systems reliability. A comprehensive review of 
reliability assessment techniques is then performed from the high-level full 
probabilistic approach to the component –based techniques like FTA, RBD and 
FMECA. A section in this chapter is dedicated to subsea production system 
(SPS) including subsea control system (SCS). Subsea Xmas tree, which is the 
heart of an SPS, is explained showing the breakdown of different types and 
features. The different types of subsea control systems including the all-electric 
SCS are also explained and tabularised  
Chapter three focuses on the subsea control module (SCM) and associated risk 
for its operability. The chapter commences with a historical background of the 
SCM, explains the SCM system architecture including its function in subsea oil 
and gas production. Parts of the SCM are also listed and classified. The chapter 
explains the principle and application of FMEA along with its criticality analysis 
(FMECA). A comprehensive Failure modes and effect criticality analysis 
(FMECA) for SCM is performed. Finally, the inherent gaps in FMECA 
methodology are highlighted.  
Considering the gaps inherent in the application of FMECA, chapter four looks 
at the framework for multi-criteria assessment of SCM reliability. Various 
methods for bridging the gap are mentioned. A recommendation for the fuzzy 
TOPSIS methodology for criticality assessment is explained. Data gathering 
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strategy and the survey conducted for this study is explained along with a 
characterisation of the experts that participated. A novel fuzzy TOPSIS analysis 
of the SCM failure modes is implemented using unconventional parameters and 
a sensitivity analysis performed. 
In chapter five, a stochastic modelling of the subsea control module failure 
modes is performed. The analysis reveals the ten most critical failures modes in 
the SCM.  
Chapter six discusses the comparative analysis between the commonly used 
electro-hydraulic (EH) SCM and the new all-electric SCM, with the industry 
struggling to make a switch to this promising technology. Parameters such as 
technology, OPEX, CAPEX, technology and schedule for delivery are used in 
the analysis. 
In chapter seven, a discussion of all the analysis conducted in this research is 
performed. Results from the SCM FMECA criticality analysis, stochastic input 
modelling are all discussed and the validation explained regarding those 
obtained from the fuzzy TOPSIS methodology. A realistic comparison of the 
results obtained is also compared to those from the industry de-factor reliability 
database OREDA for the validation of the results. Finally, a case with on a 
subsea control module (SCM) for a given deployment condition is presented. 
The inter-relation between system component and failure modes is also 
discussed. The study highlights how the failure in one component could lead to 
the failure of an inter-related component eventually leading to a total failure of 
the entire SCM system and a loss in production with huge OPEX. 
Conclusion, novelty/contribution of this study, recommendation and a listing of 
possible further work emanating from the research is provided in chapter eight. 
Figure 8 is a diagrammatic representation of the analysis conducted in this 
research project.   
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Figure 8 – Diagrammatic representation all the project analysis and flow.
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2 Risk Assessment in the Subsea Industry 
2.1 Field development concepts, Equipment and Effects of 
water depth 
Though offshore fields present opportunities for increasing oil reserves, they 
present huge technological and economic challenges. Reduced capital cost is a 
key factor that allows for a profitable development of an offshore oil and gas 
field. To achieve this, a careful study of the development concept has to be 
conducted. According to (Maryam 2011), key parameters for concept 
considerations of oilfield development includes reservoir characteristics, 
distance to shore, drilling/installation and well intervention plan, topside weight, 
utilities, field layout, flow assurance, accessibility, regional influences, financials, 
well count and HSE considerations with water depth as a major player for 
offshore field concept selection. 
 
Figure 9  Worldwide deepwater facilities (a) dry tree platforms (b) floaters and (c) 
subsea satellites (Miriam 2011). 
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In a study of the development concepts in the North Sea (figure 9a & b above), 
the study clearly shows that for shallow water, jackets and remote tiebacks 
were earlier favoured. The study also shows that subsea tiebacks are more for 
deeper water deployments as a result of a dramatic increase of jacket costs at 
these depths while the cost of subsea is principally dependent on well count. In 
the same study, we see that fixed platforms and compliant towers are prominent 
in shallow waters; TLPs are relatively favoured in deepwaters but 
disadvantaged in economics while the FPSOs take the upper hand in deep and 
ultra-deepwater developments as they are greatly even for marginal fields 
(Wensheng Lu 2006, Zhiyong Su 2014).  
 
Figure 10  A typical Ultra-deepwater architecture using an FPSO, courtesy of Modec 
Deepwater conditions inherently dictate the development of oil and gas fields by 
means of subsea production systems, since traditional surface facilities such as 
steel-piled jacket might be either technically unfeasible or uneconomical due to 
the water depth. Figure 10 shows the deployment an FPSO for a deepwater 
development.  
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For riser systems, migration into ultra-deepwaters introduces increase in system 
weight, flow assurance (heat and pressure management) issues, installation 
difficulty, station-keeping challenge and increased vortex-induced vibrations. 
(Fabrice 2001) demonstrates that in order to qualify flexible pipelines for ultra-
deepwater operation of 3000m, hyperbaric test and deep immersion 
performance (DIP) tests are required. Similarly, (Zhang Y 2003) confirms that 
collapse and axial compression are key challenges on flexible deployed in 
deepwater environments due to hydrostatic pressures.  
According to Pedram (2008), below are the five major issues to be tackled with 
respect to ultra-deepwater developments.  
1. Impact of Ultra-Deepwater Environment on Subsea Equipment Reliability 
2. Technical Challenges to Assuring Reliable Performance of  Subsea 
Equipment 
3. Utilizing Novel Subsea Technology 
4. Flow Assurance: Deep Water Challenges 
5. High Cost of Subsea Interventions 
The above list obviously shows that reliability is paramount in any subsea 
development with a significant correlation to environmental parameters. Figure 
11 shows a collapsed rig in an offshore field due to a subsea system failure. 
Deepwater invariably means very high hydrostatic pressure and low 
temperature which fluctuates around 4oC. The low temperature poses a huge 
flow assurance during operations and even worse during startup and shutdown 
operations.  
 18 
 
Figure 11  A semi-sub rig collapses in ultra-deepwaters (UDW Report 2005). 
For conventional systems, Reliability, Availability and Maintenance (RAM) 
analysis can be successfully applied to demonstrate the commercial 
performance of a given concept (Brandt 2009). A RAM model basically gives a 
prediction on the expected system performance on a probabilistic system model 
built on experiential data. These models form the basis for the evaluation of 
different development scenarios and predict the expected performance of the 
design options. 
A reasonable economics is required for an ultra-deepwater field development. 
Hence, deployment at this depth poses a huge challenge due to the demand for 
acceptable financial metrics in today’s uncertain and unstable oil and gas 
environment (Bradley 2001). Reliable equipment that will ensure production 
availability and minimum offshore subsea intervention is the only answer to this. 
Reflection on the root causes of failure suggest that failures are far from 
inevitable and in many cases could have been anticipated and prevented had 
sufficient attention been placed on their identification, assessment and 
management at the design stage (Caroline 2009). 
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2.2 Deep and Ultra-deepwater Controls 
The term “Deepwater” is subject to different interpretation, but in general it is 
assumed to be beyond the reach of current saturation diving technology. A 
typical classification of subsea water depths and number of installations for 
offshore facilities in each class planned between 2014 and 2018 is shown in 
table 1. 
Table 1  Subsea water depth classification and number of installations worldwide 
(Ostebo 2001, Offshore Engineer September 2014). 
 
Classification 
 
Water Depth 
 
No of Installations 
Worldwide planned between 
2014 and 2018 
 
Shallow Water 
 
<500m 
207 
 
Deepwater 
 
500-1000m 
86 
 
Ultra-Deepwater 
 
>1500m 
94 
 
Operations in Deepwater is strictly with the use of remote operated vehicles 
(ROVs) as no diver has access to this depth. Figure 4 shows an ROV during a 
subsea operation on an Xmas tree). During installation or equipment retrieval, 
the high depth implies longer, more tasking and expensive offshore campaign.  
Equipment failure or loss at this depth could be very difficult if not impossible to 
recover due to the nature of the seabed. Analysing the risks associated in 
shallow and deepwater oil and gas exploration requires a deep understanding 
of the variation in the ocean parameters with depth. Figure 12 gives a 
schematic of the ocean reliability influencing factors. These parameters vary 
from region to region and with changing water depths (Paulinus 2012). 
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Figure 12  Ocean properties reliability influencing factors (Paulinus 2012). 
(Paulinus 2012) confirms that Deepwater environment is defined by a number of 
variables which encompass temperature gradient, hydrostatic pressures, 
dissolved gases, salt, pollution, salinity, microbial organisms, carbon-dioxide 
and mineral deposits. Figure 13 shows the variation of some of these 
parameters with depth.  
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Figure 13  Variation of Temperature (oC), Salinity (ppt), Oxygen (ml/l) and pH with 
Depth (m), courtesy Paulinus 2012 
The figure depicts a rapid increase in ocean salinity with depth in the shallow 
water region and a slow increase in the deepwater region. The behaviour of 
temperature is exactly opposite that of the salinity curve as the seabed 
temperature is typically 4oC and decreases with depth as shown on the curve. 
The ocean temperature exhibits a rapid decline in the shallow water region and 
a slow reduction in the deepwater region. The Oxygen and PH curves are very 
similar in behaviour to that of temperature, showing a rapid decrease in shallow 
waters and increasing with the ocean water depth. A study conducted on 
shallow to deepwater facilities and flow assurance challenges in offshore 
Newfoundland (Ewida 2004) also shows the extreme wind speeds wave heights 
for deepwater being slightly lower than those of shallow waters (see table 2). 
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Table 2  Typical/Indicative environmental parameters for shallow water 
  Field (Grand Banks) and deepwater location (Ewida A.A. (2004). 
 
Parameter Grand Banks Deepwater 
Minimum Water 
Temperature @seabed 
(oC) 
~1.7 ~3 
100 Year Extreme Wind 
Speed (1hr mean) (m/s) 
~40 ~30 
100 Year Significant Wave 
Height (Hs) (m) 
~16 ~15 
100 Year Maximum Wave 
Height (Hmax)(m) 
~30 ~27 
100 Year Maximum 
Current Speed (near 
surface) (m/s) 
~1.30 More or less severe 
depending on location 
Annual Mean Iceberg Fux 
per Degree Square 
~50 More or less severe 
depending on location 
Potential for Pack Ice Yes Yes 
 
(Mark A 2004) explains the variation of control requirements with water depth. 
He explains that controls in shallow waters could be effectively executed with 
direct hydraulics principle by basically charging and discharging of the hydraulic 
lines. However, with increased water depth, the absolute control system 
pressure at the actuator increases and depending on the actuator configuration, 
the “fail-safe” return spring may need to provide a greater force to ensure valve 
closure. Also, for shallow water depths, remote accumulator systems are 
tolerable. With increasing water depth, hydraulic systems require local 
accumulation to store energy to operate a valve once the directional control 
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valve (DCV) in the subsea control module has functioned electrically with lower 
power. Although the ‘gauge’ pressure across the actuator does not change as 
the water depth increases, the absolute pressure does. This raises accumulator 
precharge requirements and hence, the pressure at which the gas has to 
operate. Unfortunately, as the pressure of the gas increases, it starts to behave 
more like liquid, thus the amount of stored energy for a given volume decreases 
with depth. This is mitigated by increasing the amount of subsea accumulation, 
resulting in larger assemblies/modules. The key concern in situations where 
limited effective accumulation is present is that the opening of a valve can “pull 
down” the available hydraulic pressure needed to keep other system valves 
open. The control of opening time to maintain system pressure when limited 
accumulation is present can be readily achieved by applying a restriction orifice 
to the flow either upstream of the DCV in the SCM or downstream using a 
venting check valve. 
Modern subsea control systems are generally electro-hydraulic multiplexed 
(EH-Mux) systems, whereby hydraulic power is generated at the surface and 
transmitted to one, or more, subsea control pods by means of an umbilical. In 
essence, a control pod comprises of a number of solenoid-operated hydraulic 
pilot valves such that the hydraulic fluid may be directed to the various hydraulic 
actuators which control the relevant subsea equipment (valves, rams, chokes 
etc ) (Clayton 1998). 
In summary, the move from shallow to deepwater implies a huge risk with 
attendant economic penalty for delayed/lost production. This risk becomes 
increased with the application of novel and prototype technologies.  
In ultra-deepwater subsea development, the application of the processes in API 
17N with the right assumptions, inputs, during the project lifecycle is very critical 
to achieving a reliable offshore oil and gas system. Novel and unproven 
technologies with little or no data find much application in ultra-deepwater 
developments. DNV-RP-A203 provides a sound framework for their 
qualification. The strategy is to identify and assess the level of technical risk in 
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the project, followed by the use of API 17N in driving the project. The processes 
should be used consistently throughout the subsea project lifecycle. 
There is a need for a close integration between reliability and engineering for a 
successful ultra-deepwater project. Equipment’s have the highest probability of 
achieving reliability at the design phase. From this phase through the 
engineering, procurement, testing, installation and operations, serious attention 
should be given to avoid the introduction of defects along the equipment 
lifecycle. 
 
2.3 Subsea challenges and risks 
The search for hydrocarbon is witnessing a dramatic move from shallow and 
deepwater into the ultra-deep arena. According to industry statistics (see table 
3), ultra-deepwater Greenfields have a whopping reserve of 19, 520.75 million 
boe barrels of oil and 6,466 subsea wells globally planned from 2014 
representing about 25% of oil production forecast within this period (Morgan 
2014).  
 
Table 3  Greenfield reserves forecast 2014 to 2018 (Morgan 2012). 
Water Depth Field Numbers Liquid Reserves 
(mmbbl) 
Gas Reserves (bcf) 
Shallow 1214 46,150.75 770,028.05 
Deep 161 12,621.98 97,509.77 
Ultra-deep 107 19,520.75 54,507.00 
Total 1,482 78,293.48 922,044.82 
This shift to ultra-deepwater presents a huge challenge with attendant risk and 
associated hazard. According to Maryam Maddahi (2011), hazards typically 
considered, studied and prevented during an offshore oil and gas field life  
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Table 4  Environmental Stress and typical effects 
Environmental Stress Typical Effects 
Temperature Change in viscosity, physical expansion, 
cracking, thermal aging, oxidation, ice 
formation, brittleness and variation in 
materials properties such as resistance, 
inductance and capacitance. 
Vibration Reduction in material strength, electrical 
signal interference, cracking, leakage etc. 
Thermal cycling Alteration in electrical properties, Cracking 
etc. 
Shock Cracking, Leakage, delamination, 
ruptured seals, mechanical function 
impairment etc. 
Pressure Compression, Leakage, Water ingress 
etc. 
Humidity Leakage, Creates electrical leakage 
paths, oxidation, corrosion, embrittlement. 
Electromagnetic radiation Surious and Erroneous signal, 
disconnection in communication, 
inaccuracy in measurements etc. 
Sand Contamination of lubricants, erosion of 
mechanical parts, clogging of orifices, 
increased friction, abrasion etc. 
Nuclear/Cosmic Radiation Heating and thermal aging, Electrical, 
chemical and electrical properties 
alteration, oxidation and discoloration of 
surfaces, damage to electrical and 
electronic components etc. 
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includes jacking, trawl, blowout, collapse, capsize, subsidence, landslide, 
earthquakes, fire, explosion, lightning, heavy weather, winds and storms, 
tsunamis, workmanship, mechanical failure, pipe laying, piping operations, 
trenching, stuck drill stem, collision and corrosion. For a successful 
development of an oil and gas field, a careful evaluation of each of these 
hazards is required.  
For the purpose of this research, ultra-deepwater refers to deployments above 
1500m. At a mile depth, water squeezes everything at more than one ton per 
square inch (Pedram 2008). According to Shifler (2005), parameters that affect 
systems in seawater includes temperature, dissolved oxygen content, 
hydrostatic pressure, salinity, water chemistry, pH, bio-fouling, 
pollution/contamination, galvanic interactions, fluid velocity characteristics and 
mode, alloy composition, alloy surface films, geometry, surface roughness, and 
heat transfer rate. Table 4 depicts environmental loads and typical effects. A 
clear understanding of the interaction of these factors offers optimum system 
design which ensures a reliable system design. 
 
2.3.1 API 17N and Subsea projects Risks/Reliability 
The key to successful reliability management system is to develop 
understanding and control of all the diverse elements (or risks) which may 
prevent the design, manufacture, installation and operation of reliable subsea 
system (Caroline 2009). Typical hazards associated with oil and gas facilities 
are listed below (API RP 14J 2001):  
• Blowouts 
• Riser/pipeline leaks 
• Process leaks 
• Non-process spills 
• Marine collisions 
• Structural events 
• Marine events 
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• Dropped objects 
• Transport accidents 
• Personal (or occupational) accidents 
• Construction accidents 
• Attendant vessel accidents and 
• Diving accidents 
The American Petroleum Institute created a recommended practice (17N) as a 
central guidance on the implementation of reliability management systems for 
the subsea industry (Haritnov 2009). The RP is based on an initial work done in 
Cranfield University in the late 1990s. The principle of API 17N is that the level 
of reliability effort for a project is fundamentally a function of the level of 
technical risk for which the project is exposed to. Essentially, API 17N 
advocates that the technical risks in subsea projects should be evaluated and 
reliability efforts applied accordingly.  
 
Figure 14  Define-plan-Implement-Feedback Cycle as presented by API RP 17N 
API 17N provides a standard framework for the implementation of reliability 
management system in subsea projects. It is built on twelve (12) key processes 
that cuts across definition of Availability Goals and Requirements, 
organizing/planning for availability, design and manufacturing for availability, 
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reliability assurance, risk and availability Analysis, verification and validation, 
project risk Management, reliability qualification and testing, performance 
tracking and data management, supply chain management, management of 
change down to organizational learning. These processes arranged into four 
basic steps of define, plan, implement and feedback as shown in the figure 14. 
The approach encourages a stop-and-think attitude all through the activities. 
Subsea project development is divided into 5 project stages as shown below: 
1. feasibility; 
2. concept selection; 
3. front end engineering design (FEED); 
4. detail design and manufacture; 
5. System integration test (SIT), installation, commissioning and operations. 
At every stage of the project development, the API 17N reliability processes are 
applied from feasibility through design to operations.  
 
2.3.2 Flow assurance 
The increasing water depth along with the demand for system operability such 
as hydraulic flow instability in the riser system becomes a major concern due to 
the demand for the transportation of multiphase production from the wellbore to 
the topside facilities. Deeper water wells require higher energy to flow to their 
facilities and have higher losses. Even for high pressure wells, with reservoir 
depletion, the energy to move the hydrocarbon to the surface dwindles. 
According to Ewida (2004), system pressure drops for shallow water are 
dictated by tubing head losses, whilst in deepwater pressure drops are largely a 
function of riser head losses. In shallow water, artificial lift applying wellbore gas 
lift system may be sufficient to boost gas-liquid ratios for shallow water systems. 
This is different for deepwater operations as wellbore gas lift combined with 
riser base gas lift is typically applied not only for boosting production, but for 
reducing riser-induced slugging at turndown flow conditions and assisting 
startup. (Frank Close 2008), suggest the application of sub-mudline 
technologies  like electric submersible pumps (ESP), hydraulic submersible 
 29 
pumps (HSP) and seabed boosting for increasing production and ultimate well 
recovery in deep and ultra-deepwaters. 
In deep and ultra-deepwater wells, temperature and wax management is a huge 
task as the subsea systems are exposed to very low temperatures typically 4oC. 
Flow assurance challenges at this depth include: 
• Slug challenges 
• Hydrate formation  
• Wax/Paraffin 
• Asphaltenes/Naphthalene 
• Scales 
• Erosion/Corrosion 
• Emulsion/Viscosity…etc 
 
Figure 15  Hydrate formation flow challenge in ultra-deepwaters 
Figure 15 shows hydrate being retrieved from a blocked pipeline. Drilling 
techniques used in shallow waters are often not applicable in deepwaters. From 
(Luiz Alberto S 2003), you see that the temporary guide bases (TGB) commonly 
used for well spudding operation is not applicable as it often inclines or sinks 
into the mudline during the 36’ hole operation. Other challenges with a move 
into deep and ultra-deep water drilling includes spud in the well, geohazards, 
small tolerance between pore pressure and fracture pressure gradient and 
borehole instability. 
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2.3.2.1 Hydrates 
Gas hydrates typically form when water molecules react with smaller 
hydrocarbon molecules such as methane, ethane, propane, isobutene, butane 
etc. at conditions of high pressure and low temperature to form ice-like 
structures. Crucial factors for hydrate formation are the appropriate 
temperature, pressure and at/below its water dew point (Vienna et al 2013). The 
deep and ultra deep water environment are particularly prone to the formation of 
hydrates due to the low subsea temperatures of 0 to 3 degrees Celsius. At 
these temperatures, hydrates tend to form unless the fluid is sufficiently 
inhibited. Hydrates may form during continuous flow mode as well as during 
shut in and have high tendency to deposit on pipe walls thus plugging up the 
pipes. Removal of hydrate plugs within subsea lines can be complicated, 
therefore a key management strategy is minimizing the risk of operating within 
the hydrate region. This can be achieved by continuous injection of mono 
ethylene glycol (MEG). Key indicators to formation of hydrates plugs are MEG 
injection failure or insufficient MEG inhibition. (Wilson et al 2004). Another 
possible strategy for mitigating hydrates is to reduce heat loss using insulation 
and production flow rate (Kopps et al 2007) 
2.3.2.2 Wax/Parrafin 
Waxes are basically n-paraffins in the range of n-c20 to n-c80 or higher. As the 
fluid temperature drops below the ‘cloud point’ or wax appearance temperature 
(WAT), paraffin precipitate within the fluid. Thermal, chemical and mechanical 
methods are available for wax management. Active heating is a means of 
maintaining temperature in the flowline, thereby preventing wax deposition and 
hydrate plugging. This is achieved by maintaining temperatures above the WAT 
and hydrate formation temperature. Periodic pigging is also a preferred method 
for dewaxing (Koops et al 2007).  
2.3.2.3 Slugging 
Slugging is a multiphase flow pattern that is considered to be a hydrodynamic 
instability in a pipeline system. It can result from terrain changes, hydrodynamic 
conditions, severe pipe turns such as risers and can typically lead to harsh 
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transient pressures and flow that could lead to equipment damage and 
operational problems. General means of mitigating slugging include slug 
catchers, oversized separators and automatic control of topside choke or use of 
pressure and flow measurement along the pipeline to regulate back pressure 
(Viana et al 2013) 
2.3.2.4 Asphaltene/ Napthenates 
Asphaltenes are black, gummy and slick substances that typically precipitate 
out of crude as flocculation pressure moves down the well bore tuning. 
Dispersant chemicals are used for mitigating asphaltenes by ensuring that 
chemical injection points are at reservoir depths and carried out at high-injection 
pressure and rate. (Brown 2002). Asphaltenes present in crude are made of 
large aromatic structures insoluble in non-polar solvents like pentane and 
hexane but are soluble in aromatic solvents (Jordan et al 2008). 
Presence of naphthenic acids in crude, high total acid number (TAN) and 
presence of high bicarbonate and calcium values within the formation brines 
can lead to formation of napthenates. (Sorbie et al 2005). Recent control 
methods include PH modification, chelation and demulsification (Jordan et al 
2008). 
2.3.2.5 Salt and Scale Precipitation 
Inorganic scale formation is closely linked to brine chemistry, as this is related 
to the type and amount of scales formed. Brine compatibility with chemicals is 
also crucial to its control (Jordan et al 2008).  A key factor in managing scales is 
to understand how the brine chemistry changes over the life cycle of the field for 
each well and take measures to place scale control strategy upstream its 
predicted occurrence point (Jordan et al 2001). This is also dependent on the 
water sources. Three major water sources in the oil field environment are 
produced water, de-sulphated seawater and seawater with different ratios of 
calcium and magnesium ions, which has been shown to have significant impact 
on scale performance and inhibitor performance. Programs for scale prediction 
are used to predict the types, likelihood and amount of mineral scales that could 
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occur. Pressure and temperature changes within the flow are used to predict 
the highest super saturation point and/or its deposit mass (Jordan et al 2008).  
 
2.3.3 Subsea and Equipment Qualification 
DNV-RP-A203 is a recommended practice for qualification of new technology 
developed by Det Norske Veritas. It is intended for offshore oil and gas industry 
but its main principles can be used in different application areas. DNV-RP-A203 
identifies failure modes, recommends changes for design improvement and 
provides the confidence that the new and required technology will function 
within the acceptable technological limits. DNV-RP-A203 recommends the 
application of detailed simulation and testing techniques for components, sub-
assemblies and the entire system. Though the process involves some element 
of reliability assessment, it does not provide towards the prediction of the 
system field performance. 
Technology readiness level (TRL) is used to illustrate the level of the stage of 
the technology in the industry. It can be defined for both a component and a 
system. The scale ranges from unproven concept to field proven. See table 5 
for the different levels TRL.  
Table 5  Definition of Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs), courtesy API17N. 
  
TRL 
Development 
Stage 
Completed 
 
Definition of Development Stage 
Concept 0 Unproven 
Concept 
Basic scientific/engineering principles 
observed and reported. No analysis or testing 
completed and no design history. 
Proof of 
Concept 
1 Proven 
Concept 
Concept formulated and functionality proven 
analysis. Essentially paper work and may be  
R&D experimentation 
2 Validated Concept validated by a physical model, a 
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Concept system mock up or functionality testing in the 
laboratory.  
 
Prototype 
3 Prototype 
Tested 
Prototype built and put through functionality 
and performance tests.   
4 Environment 
tested 
System meets all TRL3 requirements. The 
system is designed and built as a production 
unit. The unit is then put through a simulated 
environment (e.g. hyperbaric environment) or 
actual operating environment.  
5 System 
Tested 
Meets all TRL4 requirements; System built as 
a production unit and integrated into its 
intended operating environment with full 
interface and functionality tests, but outside 
the intended field environment.  
 
Field 
Qualified 
6 System 
Installed 
Meets all TRL5. Built as a production unit. 
Full interface and function test performed in 
the intended (or closely simulated) 
environment and operated for less than 
3yrears.  
7 Field Proven Production unit now integrated into the 
intended operating system., installed and 
operating for more than 3years with 
acceptable reliability, showing low risk of 
early life failures in the field.  
Equipment qualification through TRL provides a means of verification and 
validation by highlighting the associated risk in the system. According to 
API17N, testing is performed during qualification for three main purposes 
names: 
1. To demonstrate functional requirement 
2. To screen out faults and manufacturing/assembly defects and  
3. To improve robustness and reliability 
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An outline of component and system qualification process is as shown in figure 
16.  
 
Figure 16  Outline of qualification process, courtesy API17N. 
Other relevant standards reliability analysis are ISO14224, ISO20815, API17Q 
and API Q1 (ISO29001). ISO14224 defines the minimum requirements of data 
to be collected, details of the process of data collection to ensure quality in the 
process. API QI (ISO29001) provides standard for quality delivery of subsea 
systems. API17Q is the American version of DNV RP A203. 
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2.4 Uncertainty and Systems Reliability 
2.4.1 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a state of having a limited knowledge and where is virtually 
impossible to exactly describe the existing state or future outcomes (API 17N). 
In application to equipment functionality and operation, this state demands an 
understanding and assessment of the technical risks that could influence or 
affect the operation of the equipment in question. This assessment depends on 
the amount of information or data available. The result helps in a clear 
priotisation of the defined action to ensure performance and minimise the risk 
that may affect the reliability and availability of the system. Potential sources of 
uncertainty are: 
• Physical environment 
• Company Experience 
• Novel technology requirement 
• Reliability expectation to meet financial goals 
According to (DNV 1992), uncertainty could be classified into: 
• Physical uncertainty 
• Measurement uncertainty 
• Statistical uncertainty and  
• Model uncertainty 
Physical (intrinsic or inherent) uncertainty describes the natural randomness of 
a quantity. Typical examples of this type are the yield stress affected by 
production variability (manufacturing defects) or the variability in the wave and 
wind loading. Measurement uncertainty which is caused by errors in 
instruments or instrumental configurations and sample disturbance due to 
external factors (eg. ‘noise’ in experimental measurements). Statistical 
uncertainty which occurs due to inadequate data or information such as a 
limited number of samples. Model uncertainty due to imperfections and 
idealizations made in the physical model, formulations for load and resistance 
variables as well as the allocation of statistic distribution to the main variables. 
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Uncertainty is normally one of the first activity in a project stage along with 
technical risk assessment. At this stage, the associated technical risk is 
identified and categorised.  
2.4.1.1 Technical Risk Categorisation 
Technical risk categorisation applies to the design stages of a project, from 
feasibility through the detailed stage. This is a qualitative process that identifies 
the factors that could lead to the failure of the project. The five risk factors 
commonly assessed, accordingly to API17N are: 
• Reliability 
• Technology 
• Architecture 
• Environment and  
• Organisation 
Table 6 shows technical risk categorisation. The categorisation, however, does 
not consider criticality.  
Table 6  Technical Risk categorisation (API 17N) 
  
Technical System Scale and Complexity 
Operating 
Envelope 
Organisational 
Scale/Complexity 
Key 
Words 
 
Reliability 
 
Technology 
Architecture/ 
Configuration 
 
Environment 
 
Organisation 
 
Reliability 
requirements, 
Maintainability, 
Availability, 
Failure Modes, 
Risk, 
Uncertainty 
Materials, 
Dimensions, 
Design life, , 
Design 
concept, 
Stress limits, 
Temperature 
limits, 
Corrosion, 
Duty Cycle 
Equipment, 
layout, 
interfaces, 
Complexity, 
Driver/ROV, 
Deployment/ 
Intervention, 
Tooling 
Field location, 
Water depth, 
Seabed 
conditions, 
Reservoir 
conditions, 
Environmental 
loadings, Test 
location, 
Storage 
Location, Company, 
Contractor, Supply 
chain, Design, 
Manufacture, Install, 
Operate, Maintain 
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A (Very 
high) 
Reliability 
improvements; 
significant 
improvement 
requiring 
change in 
technology 
Novel 
technology or 
new design 
concepts to be 
qualified 
during project 
Novel 
application; 
change in 
architecture or 
configuration 
previously 
applied by 
supplier 
New 
Environment; 
Project 
pushing 
environmental 
boundaries 
such as 
pressure, 
temperature, 
severe met 
conditions. 
Whole new Team; 
new project team 
working with a new 
supplier in a new 
location. 
B (High) Reliability 
improvement: 
change to 
design, not 
change to 
technology 
Major 
modifications; 
known 
technology 
with major 
modifications 
such as 
material 
changes, 
conceptual 
changes, 
manufacturing 
changes or 
upgrades. 
Orientation and 
Capacity 
changes; 
significant 
architectural 
modification 
such as size, 
orientation and 
layout. 
Significant 
environmental 
changes. 
Significant team 
changes 
C 
(Medium) 
Minor 
Reliability 
Improvement 
Minor 
modifications 
Interface 
changes 
Similar 
environmental 
conditions 
Minor team changes 
D (Low) Unchanged 
Reliability 
Field proven 
technology 
Unchanged Same 
environmental 
conditions 
Same team as 
previous 
API17N advocates that projects with high uncertainty of technical risk demands 
more detailed reliability effort while those with low technical risk or uncertainty 
should be given little reliability effort beyond good engineering and management 
practices.  
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2.4.2 Systems Reliability 
Reliability is about dependability, successful operation and performance without 
failures. DNV-RP-A203 defines failure as the loss of the ability of an item to 
perform the required (specified) function within the limits set for its intended use. 
Across the industries, several definitions reliability exist. In one context, 
reliability of a component or system is viewed as the probability that it does not 
fail during a certain interval of time (0, t). In an equivalent way, reliability is 
defined as the probability that the component or system is still in operation at 
that time, t (Helder et al 2004). In another close definition, Reliability is defined 
as the probability that a system will perform its intended function for at least a 
given period of time when operated under some specified conditions (DNV-RP-
A203 2011). In the context of this study, the authors are correct as they all 
emphasise the ability of an entity to function when required without failure.  
Basically, reliability is based on the concept of a random variable – time (t), its 
probability density functions (PDF) and cumulative density functions (CDF).  
Reliability relationship is focused on the probability that the time to failure T is in 
some interval( + ∆). 
 
																			( ≤ 	 ≤  + ∆) ≡ ℎ	 ≤ 	 ≤  + ∆		 	 (1.1)	
The above probability can be related to the density and distribution functions, 
and the results are: 
								( ≤ 	 ≤  + ∆) = ()∆ = ( + ∆) − ()	 	 	 (1.2)	
Where, F(t) and f(t) are the cdf and pdf (or the failure density function) 
respectively. If we divide by ∆t in Equation 1.2 and let ∆t→0, 	we obtain from the 
fundamental definition of the derivative the fact that the density function is the 
derivative of the distribution function: 
() = () 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.3)	
Clearly, the distribution function is then the integral of the density function: 
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() =  ( )! " 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.4)	
This function is the probability of failure by time t. Since the random variable 
T is defined only for the interval 0		∞. From Equation 1.2,  
() = (0 ≤ 	 ≤ ) =  ( )! " 	 	 	 	 	 (1.5)	
From 1.5, the probability of success at time t, R(t), for time to failure larger than 
t (that is T>t): 
'() = (	 > ) = 1 − () =  ( )! ) 		 	 	 (1.6)	
Where R(t) is the reliability function. 
Traditionally, systems reliability has been specified qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively. Quantitative methods include FTA and RBD (Magnno 2012). 
FMECA is an examples of a qualitative reliability assessment technique 
(Todinov 2005, Wardt 2011). In non-critical systems, this is perfectly 
acceptable. However, in critical systems like subsea, a quantitative measure is 
required. According to Byrne (1994), a quantitative reliability specification 
should include the following clauses: 
• The criteria for failure. 
• Appropriate reliability characteristics  
• The required value of the reliability characteristics. 
• The time during which, and the conditions in which the system is required 
to perform its function. 
Common approaches for evaluating systems reliability is using random events 
and variables (Todinov 2005). For a system with statistically independent 
components arranged in series (see figure 17), let S signify that the event 
system is working and Ck symbolise the event kth component is working.  
 
Figure 17  System Components in series 
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In this configuration, the event S is an intersection of all events Ck, k=1, 2,…,n, 
since the system will only work if all the components work. Hence, 
S	=	C1	∩	C2	∩	…∩	Cn	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.7)	
Accordingly, the probability that the system will be working is  
P	(S)	=	P(C1)P(C2)P(C3)…P(Cn)	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.8)	
Being a product of the probabilities of the individual components will be working.  
Since the system reliability R = P(S) and the kth components reliability, Rk = 
P(Ck), the reliability is the series arranges system: 
R	=	R1	x	R2	x	…x	Rn		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.9)	
Invariably, the more moments in a series, the less the reliability of the system. 
Another key derivation is that the reliability of the least reliable components is 
bigger than that of the system as R1 x R2 x …x Rn < Rk.  Practically, this implies 
that the reliability of the least reliable component has to be improved for the 
reliability of the system to be improved in a series arrangement. Increasing the 
reliability of a component with an already high reliability has no effect on the 
system reliability if the reliability of the least reliable component is not increased. 
In the same way, for a parallel arranged (see figure 18), the event S (for a 
working system) is a union of the events Ck for the kth components working. 
 
Figure 18  Systems with components in parallel 
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Mathematically, 
S	=	C1	U	C2	U	…	U	Cn	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.10)	
Reasoning in terms of failure, the system will only fail if all the components fail. 
That is: 
7̅ = 	9:;;;	∩ 	9<;;; ∩ …∩ 9=;;;		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.11)	
Hence, the probability of a system failure,  
P	(7̅)	=	P(	9:;;;)	x	(9<;;;)x… x	(9=;;;)		 	 	 	 	 	 (1.12)	
Since the reliability of a system, R	 =	 1	 –	 P	 (7̅)	 and the reliability of the 
components, Ri, where i = 1, 2, …. n.  
R	=	1	–	(1-R1)	x…x	(1-Rn)	x	(1-Rn+1)		 	 	 	 	 (1.13)	
and since Rn+1<1,  
1	–	(1-R1)	x…x	(1-Rn)	<	1	-	(1-R1)	x	…	x	(1-Rn)	x	(1-Rn+1)		 	 (1.13)	
This evaluation shows that the reliability of a system with components arranged 
in parallel is greater that the reliability of its most reliable component. 
Mathematically, 
1	–	(1-R1)	x…x	(1-Ri)	x	…x	(1-Rn)	>	Ri.	 	 	 	 	 (1.14)	
Two possible ways of increasing the reliability of a system are (Todino 2005): 
1. Inclusion of active redundancy at a system level and  
2. Inclusion of active redundancy at a component level 
Consider a system with two identical components, m, as show in figure 19a.  
a.  
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b.  
 
c.  
Figure 19 a, b, c Reliability through redundancy 
For 17b arrangement, the reliability of the system, 
R1	=	m2	(2-m2)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.15)	
For the c arrangement,  
R2	=	m2	(2	–	m)2	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (1.16)	
Since R2 – R1 = 2m2 (m – 1)2 >0, the arrangement in figure 19b has a lower 
reliability than that in figure 19c. This illustrates that redundancy at a component 
level is more effective than redundancy at a system level.  
	
2.5 Reliability assessment techniques 
The performance of materials in the subsea environment has many influences 
and determining the long-term effects of seawater under multiple stress 
conditions can be a daunting task (Mudge 2009). Reliability assessment 
techniques help in addressing this challenge. Across the industries, several 
techniques have been developed for assessing components and systems 
reliability to ensure optimum performance. 
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According to Haroonaadi (2007), there are basically two approaches to system 
reliability assessment – analytical techniques and stochastic simulation. The 
analytical techniques represent the system by analytical models and evaluate 
the reliability indices from these models using mathematical solutions. 
Stochastic simulation, however, involves real time simulation of the systems. 
Here the simulation is performed by mimicking the actual process and random 
behavior of the system. Fu (2009) reviews three methods of assessing reliability 
– The taylor series method, Rosenbleuth point estimation method and the 
Monte Carlo method. The Taylor method applies to linear functions, but 
produces lots of errors with nonlinear functions. The Rosenbleuth method on 
the other hand is for symmetrically distributed random variables. The monte 
carlo method is principallyf based on the laws of large numbers in mathematics 
and depends heavily on data availability. 
Basile (2006) examines the estimation of complex mechanical systems 
reliability based on the reliability of its components subjected to variable loads 
with the use of Reliabilitix, a Matlab library. The author reveals that loads acting 
on system components are not independent of each other. This is true because 
a particular failure mode may be caused by a combination of several failure 
mechanisms. 
Onoufriou (2001) examines methods for reliability in offshore structures and 
associated characteristics with a focus on system resistance and comes out 
with methods ranging from A to E as shown in figure 20. A, being full 
probabilistic, B-search Algorithms, C-pushover, D-Simplified models while E is 
component-based. The Probabilistic analysis methods include the first and 
second-order reliability methods, Monte Carlo simulation, Importance sampling, 
Latin Hypercube sampling, and stochastic expansions (Choi 2007). 
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Figure 20  Systems Reliability methods (Onoufriou 2001) 
Here, the author proposes that within the five groups from A to E, methods 
closer to A are associated with a higher level of complexity and recommends 
that methods close to E are most suitable for research purposes. In this 
research, a level E method was adopted.  
 
For the system to be evaluated as a multi-component system reliability data for 
each of its components is required. The approach involves the use of 
techniques such as fault tree analysis (FTA), failure mode and effect analysis 
(FMEA) and reliability block diagrams (RBDs) for generating the system 
reliability values. These systems are briefly explained in section 2.5.1.  
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2.5.1 Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) 
The reliability of complex systems can be assessed using well established 
methods like reliability block diagrams and fault tree analysis (Vintr 2007). 
Application of RBDs requires a deep understanding of system functionality, 
failure modes and redundancy matrix for a reliable operation of the system.  
This method basically involves the analysis of systems into their different 
components and establishing their interdependencies and redundancy. 
Catelani, M (2014) and Dahmani, O (2014) are examples of the application of 
reliability block diagram (RBD) in modelling systems reliability.  
Common interdependencies in the RBDs are the series, parallel and the m-out-
of-n redundancies.  Figure 21 shows an RBD representation of a system with 
components in series. 
 
Figure 21  RBD with components in series 
In the series configuration, if one component fails, the whole system fails. RBDs 
are best for analysing and comparing systems options instead of looking for 
absolute values of reliability. This helps in obtaining better design options by 
introducing good redundancies or eliminating weak links in systems design. 
 
2.5.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)  
A fault tree is a graphical representation of the relationships between 
component level faults and system level failures or top level undesired (Moore, 
2007, Maqnno 2009). An FTA is a top-down deductive approach for evaluating 
the failure of a single system by exploring all the possible causes of that failure.  
Hiraoka, Y et al (2014) and Murakami (2009) give examples on the application 
of the FTA in analysing and visualising events. FTA is particularly useful for 
highly complex systems or processes in which the outcome of one or more non-
 46 
critical, lower-level events may produce an undesired critical event. This is 
particularly true in application especially to the subsea industry where failure 
results in very high offshore intervention cost. Figure 22 shows a typical fault-
tree diagram with input events A and B, producing C as the failure event. 
 
Figure 22  A typical fault tree diagram with an an-gate 
 
Much like FMECA, reliability data is quite fundamental to its quantitative 
analysis. The fault tree explicitly shows all the associated events and 
relationships that lead to the top event. It reveals the logic behind the cause of 
the top event. It also provides a framework for a quantitative as well as 
qualitative evaluation of the top event. Two of the biggest issues with FTA are 
complexity and inaccuracy in component fault rate estimation. Other limitations 
of the FTA are: 
Highly dependent on subjective opinions with risk of inaccurate information 
• A wrong failure source identification would result in wrong results 
• It is not very effective for complex systems 
• For very large systems, a a quantitative software analysis may be 
required 
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2.5.3 FMECA 
FMECA is one of the most popular tools for assessing systems reliability among 
others like FTA and RBD (Adnan (2012). Application of FMEA dates back to the 
1950/60s (Arhagba 2010, Liu 2013) and since then has been used in a wide 
range of industries including nuclear, aerospace, mechanical, automotive, 
medical, electronics and the onshore/offshore oil and gas industries. Today, 
FMEA is available in at least four (international standards. MIL-STD 1629A 
(1980), which is used in the united states military, IEC 60812 (IEC1985), BS EN 
60812 (BSI 2006), SAE-J1739 (SAE 2002) standard (Braksmaa 2012) and 
DNV-RP-D102_2012. 
An FMECA is a structured approach that examines potential failure modes and 
the impact of failures on product operation during field use or to identify and 
correct process problems prior to first execution (Wabnitz 2001, Mamman 
2009). The technique is best applied during the planning and design stage for 
optimal results. It is an assessment tool that allows the user to methodically list 
system components or process steps, identifying their functions, failure modes, 
effects and failure causes to rank their criticality or risk. The approach can 
easily be modified and applied to a wide range of situations allowing adjusting 
the criteria for what constitutes “risk” to the respective purpose of the analysis. 
FMECA is principally aimed at identifying failures, evaluating their probability of 
occurrence and establishing the criticality associated with the failure. The 
process starts out qualitatively progressing into quantitative evaluations as data 
becomes available with the identification of corrective actions for all associated 
failure modes as the end result. More details for FMECA is provided in chapter 
5. 
In Ammar, M. H. (2014) and Quintana, C (2014), FMECA is used for reliability 
and criticality assessment for systems by revealing failure modes, effects and 
the associated criticality.  
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2.6 Subsea Production System (SPS) 
A subsea production system comprises a wellhead, valve tree (‘x-mas tree’) 
equipment, pipelines, structures and a piping system and, in many instances, a 
number of wellheads have to be controlled from a single location (Haritonov 
2009) (see figure 23). Subsea systems deployments typically requires 
specialised and expensive vessels, which need to be equipped with diving 
systems for relatively shallow waters and robotic devices for deeper water 
depths (Sunde 2003). Figure 24 shows the deployment of a subsea umbilical 
termination assembly to the seabed. 
 
Figure 23  Subsea Production system (SPS) building blocks 
Any requirement to intervene or repair with installed subsea system is thus 
normally very expensive and may result in economic failure of the development.  
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High equipment reliability is therefore required in order to safeguard the 
environment and make the exploitation of hydrocarbons with subsea technology 
economically feasible.  
A key element of the subsea production system is the controls. The subsea 
control system (SCS) is responsible for the operation of valves and chokes on 
subsea manifolds, Xmas trees, completions, templates and pipelines. In 
addition to satisfactory operational characteristics, the design of the control 
system must also provide the means for a safe shutdown on failure of the 
equipment or on loss of hydraulic/electrical control from the topside (a 
platform or floating facility) and other safety features that automatically 
prevent dangerous occurrences.  
 
Figure 24  Subsea equipment deployment 
The interface between the subsea control system and its surroundings 
(boundary) as stated by OREDA is shown in figure 25. The boundary definition 
applies subsea production/injection control systems, controlling both satellite 
wells and more complex subsea production facilities such as multi-well manifold 
template systems.  
There are four main subsea production system manufacturers in the world, 
namely:  
• Cameron  
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• FMC 
• Aker Solutions and  
• GE (Oil and gas).  
Cameron, now called Onesubsea have facilities in all major oil-producing 
regions including United Kingdom, Germany, Houston and Brazil. FMC’s major 
facilities are located in United Kingdom, Norway and Houston. Aker Solutions is 
based in Houson and Norway, principally. GE’s oil and gas hub is in USA, Italy 
and United Kingdom. These companies all have capacities for the manufacture 
of the key building blocks in a subsea production system with varying product 
range and track record. Other companies exist that manufacture subsea tie-in 
systems, subsea valves...etc. but are not considered to be subsea production 
system suppliers because of their limited product range. 
 
 
Figure 25  Subsea control system boundary, courtesy of OREDA 2009. 
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Figure 26  Subsea equipment in an SPS, courtesy of GE Vetco 
2.6.1 Subsea Xmas Tree 
A Christmas (Xmas) tree is an assembly of valves, spools, and fittings used for 
an oil well, gas well, water injection well, water disposal well, gas injection well, 
condensate well and other types of wells (Bai 2010). Christmas trees are used 
on both surface and subsea wells. Trees installed on the seabed are called 
subsea trees (see figure 27) while those on topside structures are called 
surface/dry trees.  
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Figure 27 A typical Subsea Xmas Tree System, coutesy of GE Vetco 
There are lots of variations depending on the field requirements, features and 
functions. For this project, the focus is on subsea Xmas trees. Below are the 
functions of a subsea Xmas tree system: 
• Control the production of hydrocarbons 
• Provide a Safety barrier between the sea and the reservoir 
• Safely stop produced or injected fluid 
• Enables Injection of chemicals to well or flowline 
• Provides control of downhole valves 
• Deliver electrical signals to downhole gauges 
• Excess pressure bleed off from the annulus 
• Regulate of fluid flow through a choke (optional) 
• Allow for well intervention 
The subsea tree has a number of hydraulically operated remote operated 
valves, which can be used to open up or close hydrocarbon flow from the Well 
(Bradley 2006, Voss 2003). In a cluster configuration, the well fluids flow via the 
tree system to a pipe known as a Jumper to a Subsea Manifold before going to 
the topside processing unit. The tree valves provide safety barriers to the fluid 
flow, perform excess pressure bleed off, regulate fluid flow and also allow for 
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intervention of the well system. The tree system also enables the injection of 
chemicals into the well stream and the flowline for flow assurance purposes. 
The actuator, also referred to as cylinder, is the component in a subsea Xmas 
tree that drives the gate valves. It can produce linear or rotary motion. In 
subsea, they are principally hydraulic, though we now have electrically operated 
actuators. The hydraulic actuator (see figure 28) converts hydraulic power to 
mechanical power for the operation of subsea tree valves.  During operations, 
fluid is injected at one side of a piston forcing the piston in the opposite 
direction. An actuator can be single or double acting, meaning that the pressure 
can be applied only from one side or from both directions.  
 
Figure 28  Subsea hydraulic ball valve, courtesy of Weiku. 
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Figure 29 Types of Subsea Xmas tree, self-addition 
There are basically two categories of subsea Xmas trees – Vertical trees (VT) 
and the horizontal trees (HT) (figure 29) (Matusek 2005, Wester 2001, Skeels 
1993). The vertical trees are further broken down into basic conventional trees 
(CXT) and the enhanced conventional trees (ECXT) while the horizontal trees 
are divided into the basic horizontal trees (HXT) and the enhanced horizontal 
tree (EHXT).  
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Figure 30 Horizontal and conventional subsea Xmas tree, courtesy GE 
The main difference between the vertical and the horizontal trees are the 
configuration, size and weight. In consideration of water depth, trees could be 
driverless or have diver assist facilities (See figure 30)( Wester 2001). In the VT, 
the tubing hanger (TH) is installed on the wellhead and the well is completed 
before installing the tree. This differs from HT where the tree is installed before 
completions and the TH is installed in the tree body instead of the wellhead. 
This configuration requires the tree to be installed on the wellhead before the 
completion of the well. The pressure ratings for the subsea Xmas trees are 
5000, 10,000 and 15,000psi in accordance to API 17D.  
Subsea tree valves are operated directly from the topside using the subsea 
control system (SCS) or through a manual override with an ROV/diver.  The 
main component of the tree mounted control system is the Subsea Control 
Module (SCM). The SCM contains electronics, instrumentation, and hydraulics 
for safe and efficient operation of subsea tree valves, chokes, and downhole 
valves. Other tree mounted equipment includes various sensors, electrical and 
hydraulic connectors. A typical horizontal subsea Xmas tree will contain the 
following valves as a minimum: 
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• Production wing valve, PWV 
• Production master valve, PMV 
• Annulus wing valve, AWV 
• Crossover valve , XOV 
• Methanol Injection valve, MIV (optional) 
• Chemical Injection Valve, CIV 
During a subsea tree operation, a typically a well start-up would be  - Open 
PMV -  Open MIV - Open AMV - Open AWV - Open SCSSV - Open CIV - Open 
PWV while a well shutdown would be  - Close PWV - Close AWV - Close AMV - 
Close XOV - Close PMV - Close CIV - Close MIV  - Close SCSSV. 
These operations on an E-H SCS all pass through the subsea control module 
(SCM) for its execution, making the SCM one of the most critical components of 
a typical SPS. 
 
2.6.2 Subsea Control System (SCS) 
The subsea control system (SCS) comprises the surface installed master 
control station including hydraulic/electrical power units as well as the umbilical 
(s) and the control equipment installed subsea on the tree or the 
manifold/template (e.g. SDU and SCM). The umbilical is a conduit that connects 
the topside equipment’s to the subsea, providing the hydraulic, signal, chemical 
injection and electrical power (Bai 2010). The SCS is considered the most 
critical part of any subsea installation with very high complexity in features and 
function (Fabbri 1988). Proper performance of the control system is required to 
ensure a reliable and safe operation.  An SCS is basically divided into three 
main parts (see figure 31): 
 
1. Topside equipment’s 
2. The Umbilical and  
3. The subsea control equipment’s 
 57 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31  Schematic of an SCS showing the topside, umbilical and subsea controls 
equipment. 
The topside is basically made up of the electronic power unit (EPU), hydraulic 
power unit (HPU) and the master control station (MCS) providing controls to the 
subsea equipment’s. The HPU stores and deliver hydraulic fluids to the entire 
subsea system. Located topsides with redundant pumps, accumulators and 
hydraulic circuitry, the HPU supplies low pressure (LP) and high pressure (HP) 
control fluids through the topside umbilical termination unit (TUTU) into the 
subsea production system (SPS) umbilical.  
The control umbilical is a critical link in the subsea production system and 
provides the connection between the topside and the subsea parts of the 
system. Not only do they provide hydraulic power and electrical signals to 
operate and control the production centers, they also convey fluids (production 
chemicals, gas lift, annulus bleed) to assist in the recovery process and to 
maintain the life and operability of the trees and flowlines (Stable 2010), see 
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figure 33. According to Roberts (2002), most subsea failures come from the 
control system and summaries them as follows: 
• Subsea Control Module: Water Ingress within directional valves &Internal 
subsea electronic architecture failure 
• Subsea Monitoring: Pressure and temperature transducer housing weld 
failures 
• Umbilical and Jumper Connections: Power and communication failures, 
Hydraulic Connection failures, Electrical connector failures 
 
Figure 32 Subsea Umbilical, courtesy of Oceaneering. 
There are principally six different types of subsea control systems (SCS), 
namely (Bai 2010):  
• Direct hydraulic 
• Piloted hydraulic 
• Sequential hydraulic 
• Electro-hydraulic (hard-wired 
• Electro-hydraulic multiplexed and more recently 
• The all-electric control system 
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The first control systems were basically direct hydraulic systems, with little or no 
telemetry. Figure 33 shows a typical block diagram for such a system. The 
system is simple, low cost, and reliable with a dedicated host for each of the 
control functions. It is typically used for subsea intervention/workover 
applications. However, its typically slow for long tie-back applications, requires a 
large number of hoses with no subsea monitoring information because of the 
absence of electrical signals.  
 
Figure 33 Direct hydraulic SCS 
With the requirement for additional functions and the need for condition 
monitoring information, scaling hydraulic system became difficult giving rise to 
the multiplexed electro-hydraulic control systems, with the use of the subsea 
control module. The system initially started with analogue sensors adapted from 
land-based operations, but has progressed significantly into digital systems with 
higher bandwidths and standardised interfaces. Here a master control station, 
which is implemented using a computer unit communicating with a micro-
processor installed subsea in an SCM while the electrical power unit (EPU) 
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supplies a clean-noise-free power to the SEM unit.  Coded signal is sent to the 
SEM for interpretation and direction to the appropriate solenoid valve, allowing 
the flow of hydraulics to the subsea tree valve. Sensor data is also 
communicated to the master control station (MCS) through the SEM. The 
Multiplexed Electro-Hydraulic system allows many Subsea Control Modules to 
be connected to the same communications, electrical and hydraulic supply 
lines. This allows many wells to be controlled through one simple umbilical (see 
figure 34 and 35). A summary of the different types of SCS is given in table 7.  
The focus of this research will be on electro-hydraulic multiplexed controls. 
 
Figure 34  The E-H multiplexes subsea Control System, self-addition 
Three key joint industry projects have been responsible for defining interfaces 
for subsea controls intelligent wells, sensor interfaces and the application of 
fibre optics 
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IWIS, defined in ISO13628-6 provides the intelligent wells interface standard for 
subsea controls integration for the operation of intelligent wells. It defines the 
interface requirements for physical size, communications, electric power and  
Table 7  Types of Subsea Control Systems (SCS) 
System 
type 
Major 
components 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
 
Range 
Typical 
Applications 
Direct 
Hydraulic 
-HPU 
-Control 
Panel 
-Umbilical 
-Simple 
-No subsea pods 
-High reliability 
-Slowest Response 
-Large Umbilical 
0-3miles -Single Satellite 
-Small fields 
-Short distances 
Piloted 
hydraulic 
-HPU 
-Control 
Panel 
-Umbilical 
-Subsea Pilot 
Valve 
-Improved 
response 
-Reduced 
Umbilical 
-Proven Reliable 
-Subsea 
Equipment 
-Large Umbilical 
-Costly>5 miles 
2-5miles -Medium distances 
-Satellite Trees 
Electro-
hydraulic 
Piloted 
(hard-
wired) 
-HPU 
-Control 
panel 
-Umbilical 
-Subsea mini 
pod 
Quick response 
for selected tree 
valve 
-Subsea 
Equipment 
-Large Umbilical 
-Costly>15 miles 
2-15 
Miles 
-Long distance 
-Satellite Trees 
-Minimum feedback 
Electro-
hydraulic 
Multiplexed 
-HPU 
-Control 
panel 
-Umbilical 
-Subsea 
control pod 
-Fastest 
response 
-Subsea data 
feedback 
-Smallest 
umbilical 
Greatest flexibility 
-Complex 
-Subsea 
equipment 
-Subsea Electrical 
connection 
-Costly Electronics 
5 Miles+ -Long distance 
-Data feedback 
-Large templates 
-Remote manifold 
-Complex fields 
All-electric -DC power 
source 
-PRCM 
Control 
Panel 
Fibre optics 
Subsea 
control pod 
-Instantaneous 
response 
-Subsea data 
feedback 
Fibre optics cable 
High 
reliability/flexibility 
-Sea water ingress 
-Insulation issues 
Not enough 
reliability info 
Unlimited 
distance 
-Long distances 
-Data 
feedback/monitoring 
-Complex fields 
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testing to avoid incompatibility, multiple standards, extended project schedules, 
high engineering cost and reliability issues. Additionally, the Subsea Instrument 
Interface Standardisation (SIIS), setup in 2002, extends the IWIS to cover 
subsea control interfaces with sensor systems. SIIS is focussed mainly on 
‘simple’ digital sensor interfaces. SEAFOM, a joint industry forum, covers the 
institution of a structured approach in the application of the fibre-optics to 
subsea systems 
 
Figure 35  Subsea control Architecture, courtesy GE Vetco. 
 
2.6.3 The All-Electric SCS 
Today, the all-electric subsea systems are becoming an attractive supplement 
to the existing electro-hydraulic systems due to the following market trends and 
requirements (Mahler 2014): 
• Deeper water/Longer offsets 
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• Pursuit of marginal fields 
• Cost reductions 
• Tie-in to existing subsea systems  
• Subsea processing 
• New operational requirements – fast response, better control 
• Good reliability demonstrated with electrical cables and connectors 
• Increased environmental focus 
Generally, the system provides improved system reliability and uptime 
availability.  Other benefits accrued include the ability to incorporate virtually 
unlimited step-out distances and water depth capabilities. The all-electric 
system eliminates hydraulics for power transmission, along with the need for 
fluid purchase, transportation, maintenance, interaction and disposal. An added 
environmental benefit is that the hydraulic fluid is no longer vented to sea during 
system operation. Despite the huge advantages of the all-electric systems, 
there are still unresolved issues with respect to hydrostatic effects in deeper 
water and limitations for long distance tieback. Management change is also a key 
issue in the bid to deploy this all new system because the conservativeness of the 
subsea industry. Figure 36 shows a picture of an all-electric subsea control module 
(SCM). 
 
Figure 36  The all-electric SCM, courtesy of FMC 
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3 Risk Identification of Subsea Control Module (SCM) 
3.1 Historical background 
In the last 30years, the SCM has witnessed a huge leap in systems design and 
configuration. Much like the changes being experienced in the electronic 
industry, it took 25years to move from 1200bps to 9600bps (Morgan 2010). It is 
now 10Mbps in just five years. 1980 to 1990 witnessed the use of the diver-
installed SCM (see figure 37a) used extensively in the UK North sea and 
shallow waters globally with little or no standardization and a slim bandwidth of 
1200bps. The SCM has gone through evolutionary changes in design features, 
function and applications with focus now on modular and configurable products. 
Today, we have the monolock configurable style (figure 37g), with a higher 
speed function for downhole data retrieval and operations down to 3000m water 
depth. Table 8 shows a variation of the different types of SCM across the years, 
their features and application. 
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Table 8  A historical view of SCM development, self-summary 
 
SCM Name 
 
Year 
 
Features 
 
Application 
DIVER type 
SCM 
1980-1990 
• Bandwidth 
1200bps 
• Only one or two 
serial interfaces 
• Many variations, 
with few common 
parts 
• Little 
standardisation.  
North Sea and Shallow 
waters globally 
Forklock 1990-1995 
• Similar to Diver 
type, 1200bps. 
• Similar designs, 
mainly common 
components used 
Predominantly Norwegian 
North sea for Statoil and 
Hydro 
Old Type 
twinlock 
1990-2000 
• Bandwidth of 
1200bps with a 
data link to a 
downhole gauge 
• Many variations, 
with few common 
parts 
• Little 
standardisation, 
only one or two 
serial interfaces. 
Used in shallow waters 
globally up to 600m 
New style 
twinlock 
configurable 
2005 - 
onwards 
• Bandwidth up to 
10Mbps.  
• Also backward 
compatible 
• Common core 
components, 
configurable, 
flexible design. 
Modbus, Canbus, 
Ethernet, IWIS, 
SIIS2 interfaces 
For shallow and 
deepwaters up to 2000m 
Old Style 
monolock/Old 
style IconSEM 
monolock 
1990-2000 
• Circular shape 
• Bandwidth of 
1200bps 
• The IconSEM 
monolock 
communication 
speed was up to 
9600bps with 12 
serial interfaces 
Used globally in 
deepwaters up to 2700m 
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• Many variations, 
with few common 
parts, little 
standardisation.  
• Integrated 
baseplate and 
manifold 
application 
New style 
monolock 
configurable 
2010 – 
onwards 
• Communication 
speed of up to 
10Mbps 
• Can be desiged 
off-project with 
extensive analysis 
and requirements 
for shallow and 
deep waters to to 
3000m. 
• Common core 
components, 
highly 
configurable, 
flexible design. 
Modbus, Canbus, 
Ethernet, IWIS, 
SIIS2 
Used globally 
    
Figure 37 (a) Diver Scm (1980-90)  Figure 37 (b) Forklock Scm (1990-95) 
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Figure 37 (c) Old Style Twinlock 1990-2000        Figure 37 (d) Old Style 
  Monolock 1990-2000 
                            
Figure 37 (e) Old Style Iconsem Monolock Figure 37 (f) New Style Twinlock 
Configurable 
 
Figure 37 (g) New Style Monolock Configurable 
Figure 37  Evolution of the subsea control module, courtesy of Aker solution 
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3.2 The SCM functional description 
The SCM is the brain of a subsea control system. It is typically installed in a 
subsea Xmas tree, manifold or subsea distribution units (SDUs) and serves as 
the control centre responsible for the distribution of electrical and hydraulic 
power and the interpretation of all signals. A sealed, dielectric fluid-filled 
container at 1-atm pressure protects the internal components from seawater 
intrusion. Figure 38 is a picture of the subsea control module mounted in a 
subsea Xmas tree. There are basically three types of subsea control module 
(Broadbent 2010): 
• The all-hydraulic SCM 
• Electro-hydraulic SCM and  
• The all-electric SCM 
 
Figure 38  Subsea Xmas tree showing the tree SCM, courtesy of GE Oil and Gas 
Current SCMs are primarily designed for subsea valve operations and 
downhole safety valve control and monitoring of temperature and pressure at 
the wellhead. Figure 39 shows the key functions of the SCM in an SPS. 
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Figure 39 Functions of the SCM, courtesy of GE Vetco 
The functions could be classified as: 
• LP functions 
• HP functions 
• Remote sensing 
• Internal sensing 
• Control fluid accumulation and  
• Down hole gauges control 
The SCM contains two fully redundant subsea electronic modules (SEMs) for 
control of all subsea valve operations and communications with the topside. The 
two SEMS are completely independent of each other. If one SEM fails, the 
control link is switched to the next one for the provision of all control functions. 
Normally, the switching operation is performed manually by the topside control 
operator. See figure 40 for the picture of a subsea electronic module (SEM) 
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Figure 40 Subsea Electronic Module (SEM), courtesy of Weatherford 
The SCM receives low pressure (LP), high pressure (HP) including multiplexed 
electrical power and signal from the surface via the umbilical. This operation 
triggers happens in such a way that a hydraulic signal is transmitted to the 
appropriate hydraulic valve in the subsea Xmas tree, manifold, downhole 
instrumentation or any other subsea equipment. Electrical signals decoded by 
the SEM operate solenoid directional control valves (DCVs), directing the fluid 
to the appropriate subsea system valves, safety valves or chemical injection 
functions. Signals from the subsea sensors are also encoded through the SEM 
in the SCM and sent back to the surface facility. The SCMMB provides the 
connecting point between the SCM and the subsea Xmas tree functions and 
monitoring equipment. Tubing and electrical cables connect the SCMMB to the 
tree.  
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Figure 41 Key parts of the SCM, courtesy of GE Vetco 
Figure 41 shows the key parts of the SCM. The SCM will typically contain the 
following parts (Broadbent 2010).  
• A base plate 
• A latching mechanism  
• Hydraulic filters  
• Selector valves 
• Relief valves 
• Needle valves 
• Subsea electronic modules 
• A compensation cover 
• Electrical connectors 
• Accumulators 
• Hydraulic couplers 
• Electrical connectors 
• SCM housing/cover 
• DHPT assemblies  
• miscellaneous seals, fittings, fasteners and electrical components 
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A key component of the hydraulic system in the SCM is the directional control 
valve. DCVs are used in subsea control systems to provide hydraulic power to 
open and close hydraulically actuated process valves on subsea Christmas 
trees, manifolds and other similar subsea control equipment. Failure of a DCV is 
very critical to subsea control operations. Figure 42 below shows a dual 
solenoid, electro-hydraulic (E-H) directional control valve (DCV) with two stages 
– pilot and the main stage typically used in an SCM. The pilot stage, with small 
solenoid operated hydraulic valves; provide a hydraulic pilot to operate a main 
stage. The main stage is a larger hydraulic valve which diverts the hydraulic 
pressure to and from the process valve actuator, to open and close it. 
 
Figure 42 Directional control valve (DCV), courtesy OTC 13233 
A pressure compensation system in the SCM provides compensation for 
pressure and temperature differentials as the SCM is lowered subsea during 
installation or retrieval. During installation, the SCM is lowered using a subsea 
control module running tool (SCMRT) onto the subsea control module mounting 
base (SCMMB) where the hydraulic couplers and electrical connectors on the 
SCM base plate mate with their associated couplings and connectors on the 
SCMMB. Figure 43 is a picture of an SCMMB, showing the couplers and 
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tubings. A latch mechanism ensures an accurate mating of the SCM to the 
SCMMB. A typical subsea control module specification is shown in Appendix D. 
 
 
 
Figure 43 Subsea Control Module Mounting Bases (SCMMB), courtesy of GE 
Vetco 
Typically, the SCM consists of four main parts as listed below: 
• Electrical equipment subsystem 
• Hydraulic equipment subsystem 
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• Mechanical Parts and  
• The SCM housing 
Figure 44 and 45 give a diagrammatic representation of the sections and parts 
of the SCM. To analyse the reliability of the SCM, the system should be broken 
down into its respective components or elements. According to Byrne (1994), 
the critical elements of the SCM includes the subsea electronic module (SEM), 
directional control valve (DCV), pin connectors, hydraulic couplings, hoses and 
cables while the non-critical parts are the pressure and temperature sensors.
 
Figure 44 Schematic of the different sections of the SCM 
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Figure 45 Parts a typical subsea control module (SCM), courtesy of Chevron. 
 
Broadbent (2010) elaborates on the ten most common failure disciplines in the 
subsea control module as listed in table 9. He explains that SCMs must go 
through qualification testing, subsystem factory testing (FAT), system FAT test 
and environmental stress screening (ESS) before being sent offshore. All these 
tests are performed in accordance to ISO13628-6.  
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Table 9 Typical SCM Failure disciplines and the affected parts. 
 
Top 
10 
 
Discipline 
 
Main SCM Part Affected 
1 Electrical SEM 
2 Electronic  SEM 
3 Hydraulic Directional control valves 
4 Mechanical SCM Housing 
5 Mechanical Directional Control Valve 
6 Mechanical Manifold 
7 Mechanical SEM 
8 Hydraulic Couplings 
9 Electrical Electrical Connector 
10 Mechanical External - Anode, Check valve ...etc 
 
3.2.1 SCM hydraulic Equipment Subsystem 
The SCM contains three separately rated circuits; an LP circuit, an HP circuit 
and a return circuit at pressure values typically lower than the LP and HP 
circuitries (See figure 46) Rowntree 2002, Cohan 2010, Beedie 2010, Bavidge 
2013).  The return circuit is common for spent fluid from both the LP and HP 
circuits. 
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Both the LP and HP circuits of the SCM are supplied via two separate supply 
lines termed ‘A’ and ‘B’, which enter the SCM via base mounted hydraulic 
couplers.  Upon entering the SCM the fluid of each line is passed through filters 
and pressure transducers to remove contamination and enable individual line 
pressure measurement. 
 
Figure 46  SCM Hydraulic schematic, self-addition 
 
The dual supplies for each circuit are consolidated identically within the SCM, 
by the use of a selector and shuttle valve arrangement.  The arrangement 
consists principally of a DCV, fitted to each of the incoming lines.  The output 
lines from the DCV’s are routed to shuttle valves thus permitting a single supply 
to each of the SCM LP and HP distribution networks. 
A selector valve arrangement presents several hydraulic supply options to the 
SCM namely (Cohan 2010, Bavidge 2013): 
• Both selector DCV’s open (supply of fluid to the SCM distribution system 
controlled by the shuttle valve). 
• Only selector DCV ‘A’ open, thus supply to the SCM via line ‘A’. 
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• Only selector DCV ‘B’ open, thus supply to the SCM via line ‘B’. 
• Neither selector valve open, thus isolating the SCM from the system 
hydraulic distribution network. 
Any of these options may be selected, depending on the agreed configuration. 
Following consolidation and selection of hydraulic supply line, both LP and HP 
fluid is fed via further pressure transducers and flowmeters, enabling pressure 
and flow measurement of the selected hydraulic supply.  Fluid is then fed to 
each of the LP and HP function line DCVs. 
 
The LP system passes through an accumulator system. The stored volume 
enables valve operation. Typically, an accumulator with a lower volume is fitted 
to the HP circuit. In the absence of an HP accumulator, an intensifier may be 
used in the LP circuitry to deliver HP functions. 
The LP and HP DCVs are usually multiport, multi-way, bi-stable valves which 
require a pilot pressure and momentary electrical pulse to enable switching.  
The pilot pressure is derived from the main supply fluid within the DCV, through 
a pilot stage filtration screen.  The electrical pulse is derived from the SEM, as 
and when it is required to open a valve.  The DCV’s are set in a normally closed 
position; that is to say that the ‘function’ or ‘actuator’ line is normally connected 
to the return line.  Upon switching, the valve connects the ‘supply’ and ‘function’ 
lines to permit supply of hydraulic pressure to tree valves via couplings in the 
SCM baseplate and the host structure mounting base.  Pressure transducers 
are fitted to each of the LP and HP function lines to permit pressure read back 
in these lines and thus inference of the tree valve position. 
The return line of the SCM vents to the sea in open loop system or returns to 
the surface for closed loop designs. Spent return fluid from the LP and HP 
DCV’s is co-mingled within the SCM and routed through the SCM baseplate for 
exhaust from the SCM. 
A check valve separates the LP circuitry from the HP circuitry. The exhaust 
point from the SCM is also fitted with a dual redundant, metallic check valve to 
prevent pressure spikes from elsewhere in the system affecting the SCM. 
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Compensation accumulators on the return line provides system compensation 
against ambient pressure and also allows for a thermal expansion and 
contraction of control fluid in the system  
The final components in the return line are the check valves fitted on the 
exhaust lines of the selector DCV’s.  These items protect the selector DCV’s 
from pressure spikes and potentially contaminated fluid originating from 
elsewhere in the system. 
 
3.2.2 SCM Electrical equipment Subsystem 
The SCM is generally fitted with dual redundant electrical systems for reliability 
reasons (Bavidge 2013). Electrical power and communication between the SCM 
and topsides is achieved through the use of the comms on power (COPS) or 
comms and power system (CAPS) depending on the configuration. In the 
COPS, both power and communication signals are carried via the same wire 
pair. The wires are separate in the comms and power system (CAPS). 
Normally, two discrete channels are connected as separate supplies (termed 
channel A and channel B) to the SCM via two sets of electrical connectors 
located at the top of the SCM. 
Within the SCM are dual Subsea Electronics Modules connected to the two 
redundant channels of the SCM. Within the SCM, each SEM is connected to all 
electrical components. The SEM is a computer-like electronic device 
responsible for the control of the hydraulic manifold system in the SCM using a 
selection of solenoid driven valves for the delivery of subsea hydraulic 
functions. It is also connected to internal and external sensors systems for 
production and subsea condition monitoring. Figure 47 is an electrical 
schematic showing the electrical distribution from the SEM to the SCM 
components. 
 
 81 
 
Figure 47 SCM electrical functional schematic, self-addition 
 
A typical configuration will require pilot valves with two solenoids each to 
operate, one to open and the other to close. The solenoids are driven by the 
solenoid drivers in the SEM. 
To open a tree valve, the appropriate solenoid is commanded from the MCS, 
the microprocessor in the SEM activates the solenoid driver which energises 
the open solenoid. This allows hydraulic fluid to flow into the function line to the 
tree valve actuator. The pressure in this line will rise very quickly to a value 
which allows the valve to latch open hydraulically. Thereafter, the valve will 
remain open as long as the hydraulic supply pressure remains above a 
prescribed value. To close a tree valve, the close solenoid is energised in a 
similar manner causing the spool in the valve to move, venting the hydraulic 
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fluid from the tree valve actuator. The used fluid exits the SCM via the return 
line. It’s worth mentioning here that most of the control valves in the SCM, when 
operated are latched open hydraulically. On electrical power failure to the SCM, 
these valves will stay as-is. 
 
3.2.3 SCM Mechanical equipment subsystem 
The SCM consists in principle of a pressure and temperature compensated, 
dielectric oil filled chamber, bound by a protective cover and baseplate.  Within 
the dielectric chamber are housed all major hydraulic and electrical components 
Incoming electrical supplies are made via two electrical connectors located at 
the top of the unit.  Hydraulic connections are made via couplers located in the 
baseplate of the SCM and hidden from view in normal operation by a protective 
skirt. 
The SCM is designed to be locked to the mounting base through the use of a 
latch and lock mechanism. SCM podlock mechanism. During the lock down 
sequence the SCM is moved from an initial ‘landed’ position to a final fully 
‘locked’ position, where all hydraulic and electrical connections are made and 
the SCM is torque tightened against a mechanical stop. 
During subsea deployment, initial coarse positioning of the SCM on the 
mounting base is achieved by the RCRL in conjunction with host structure 
docking points.  Intermediate positioning is achieved by the interface of the 
mounting base guidance funnel and SCM sides, final alignment being due to the 
engagement of the SCM guide pins and mounting base guide bushes. 
 
3.2.4 SCM Housing subsystem 
The SCM housing is a very critical part of the subsea control module as failure 
results in the ingress of water to the internals of the system (Bai 2010). This 
typically results in the corrosion of exposed metallic components and eventual 
failure of the entire system with time. The SCM is manufactured from either 
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painted carbon steel, non-metallic materials or corrosion resistant alloys 
(primarily stainless steel).  There are three separate corrosion cases relevant 
for the SCM when in its deployed state; these are the protection of the external 
surfaces of the SCM, the protection of the (shielded) under skirt area and the 
protection of the internal dielectric chamber. 
The metallic external surfaces of the SCM rely on the cathodic protection 
system of the tree for corrosion protection.  Physical connection between the 
SCM and host structure is achieved through the poppets of the SCM and 
SCMMB National couplers, which are clamped together by the podlock 
mechanism. 
The area contained under the skirt of the SCM and above the mounting base 
top plate is shrouded from any host structure CP system and thus cannot be 
expected to derive any protection.  Dedicated anodes are fitted to the SCM to 
protect components located in this shrouded area.  The exposed surface area is 
minimised by the use of coatings (primarily Xylan), even on certain corrosion 
resistant materials to reduce the drain on the anodes. 
Due to the long design life and the limited space in the under skirt area to fit 
anodes, it is recommended that the under skirt anodes are inspected and 
renewed on an opportunistic basis. 
The internal structures of the SCM are primarily (uncoated) stainless steel and 
the painted metallic internal walls of the cover.  The primary defence against 
corrosion in this area is the use of dielectric oil filling.  The cover and any 
penetrations through it are sealed using O-rings and/or gaskets to prevent loss 
of dielectric fluid.  The pressure balanced design of the SCM ensures no driving 
force exists to promote fluid loss.  However, in the event of seawater ingress 
into this area, the SCM internals are fitted with anodes designed to provide at 
least 1 year cathodic protection.  This is coupled to a seawater ingress 
detection system, designed to alert operators that ingress has occurred.  The 
ingress detector has four levels of alarm, corresponding nominally to 25% 
increment seawater fill levels. Failure in the ingress detection system results in 
the loss of signal to the topside control system.  
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3.3 Failure Modes and Effect Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
In reliability engineering, there is a fundamental need of understanding the 
modes and mechanisms for which systems and components are likely to fail 
with the aim of eliminating them. In the words of Roberts (2002), achievement of 
reliability requires an understanding of what causes unreliability and how 
unreliability and its associated risks can be managed and prevented. This is 
particularly significant in the hydrocarbon industry due to the shift into 
deep/ultra-deep terrain of the ocean and the attendant safety, environmental 
and reliability concerns. The ability of FMEA/FMECA to provide the above 
information makes it one of the most applied reliability tools. Several definitions 
of FMEA exist, a few are mentioned below: 
DNV 2003 defines FMEA as a structured review technique with the purpose to 
identify and analyze all significant failure modes and effects associated with the 
particular system under consideration. In Arierhe (2010), FMEA is defined as a 
structured qualitative analysis of a system, sub-system, components or function 
that highlights potential failure modes, their causes and the effects of a failure 
on system operations. The FMEA approach is an inductive approach which 
identifies the failure modes of the system and infers the likely consequences or 
impacts of these failures on the rest of the systems. Thus, the output is typically 
a listing of failure modes and the corresponding effects on the system (Ruede 
2012).  
The main objective of FMEA is to identify potential failure modes, evaluate the 
causes and effects of different component failure modes, and determine what 
could eliminate or reduce the chance of failure. The results of the analysis can 
help analysts to identify and correct the failure modes that have a detrimental 
effect on the system and improve its performance during the stages of design 
and production (Liu 2013). Fundamentally, there are five parts in a typical 
FMEA namely: 
• Definition of objects or processes 
 85 
• Identification of the potential failure modes 
• Identification of the failure effects 
• Establishment of the failure causes 
• Risk assessment  
The first step in conducting an FMEA is to define the scope of the exercise. This 
requires the breaking down of designs into sub-assemblies and components 
such that key failure modes and effects are not overlooked. Operational and 
environmental factors for each component are then evaluated for the 
corresponding failure modes and mechanisms. There are essentially four types 
of FMEA ( Wardt 2011, Liu 2013), namely:  
• System  
• Design 
• Process  
• Service 
System FMEA focuses on the global functions of a system, Design FMEA looks 
at the components and subsystems failures modes and mechanisms, process 
FMEA focuses on manufacturing and assembly processes while service FMEA 
focuses on service functions of the system in question. According to Don Shafer 
(2009), irrespective of the type, FMEA requires the identification of the following 
basic information: Item (s), Functions, Failure(s), Effect(s) of failure, Cause(s) of 
failure, Actions to be taken in case of failure, Remediation recommendations.  
Typically, a failure mode and effect analysis would involve a method for 
evaluating the risk for each of the failures. When an FMEA involves analysing 
the criticality of the failures, this is called an FMECA (Hu-Chen Liu 2012).  
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Figure 48 Generic methodology for FMECA 
The FMECA procedure is fundamentally made up of two procedures, the failure 
mode and effect analysis (FMEA) and the criticality analysis (CA). NASA (1966) 
defines FMECA as a reliability procedure which documents all possible failures 
in a system design within specified ground rules, determines by failure mode 
analysis the effect of each failure on system operation, identifies single failure 
points, i.e., those failures critical to mission success or crew safety, and ranks 
each failure according to criticality category of failure effect and probability of 
occurrence. In another definition, the FMECA is defined as a technique that 
permits evaluation of assets functions to predict critical failure modes and the 
resultant consequences in order to determine appropriate maintenance tasks 
for the assets (Mamman 2009). FMECA is conducted to identify, address and if 
possible, design out potential failure modes (Bai 2010). Figure 48 gives the 
general methodology for conducting an FMECA.  
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Criticality assessment (CA) could be qualitative or quantitative. In qualitative 
analysis, the severity and occurrence is being rated and used in the comparison 
which uses a criticality matrix. In quantitative analysis, the item 
reliability/unreliability is being evaluated at a time to deduce the corresponding 
failure mode/mechanism.  For each mode, the probability of occurrence is then 
being evaluated and used in the criticality analysis.  In practise, there are two 
key ways of performing failure modes criticality analysis (Braglia 2001 and 
Braglia 2003), namely: 
• Calculating criticality number (CN) 
• Developing a risk priority number (RPN) 
Criticality number evaluation, as given in US MIL-STD-1629A (Todinov 2005), 
involves the evaluation of a failure effect probability (C), the mode ratio (∝), the 
component failure rate (E) and the operating time (). With these values, the 
failure mode criticality number for each failure () is evaluated as follows:  
9FG =∝G∗ CG ∗ EI ∗ 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (5.1)	
A high level rigour is involved in this methodology, making it a relatively 
unpopular technique. In the RPN evaluations, linguistic terms are used in 
ranking the chance of failure mode occurrence O, chance of being undetected 
D and the severity S, usually on a numerical scale of 1 to 10. Mathematically, 
the RPN is calculated with a multiplication of these three values as: 
RPN	=	O	*	S	*	D	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (5.2)	
This method has been found to be less expensive and quick compared to the 
CN technique. Key advantages of FMECA, according to Bai (2010) are listed 
below: 
• Applicable at all project stages and can be used without data (Braaksma 
2012), 
• Versatile – applicable to high-level systems, components and processes 
• Can prioritize areas of design weakness 
• Systematic identification of all failure modes 
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Table 10 gives a simple comparison between the FMEA/FMECA and other 
common reliability techniques. 
Table 10 A comparison of FMEA/FMECA with other engineering tools. 
 
Tool 
 
Purpose 
 
Application 
 
When to perform 
FMEA/FMECA 
• Bottom up approach to 
identify single failure 
points and their effects 
• To assist in the 
efficient systems 
design 
• To establish and rank 
critical failures 
• To identify interface 
problems 
• More beneficial 
if performed on 
newly designed 
equipment 
• More applicable 
to equipment 
performing 
critical functions 
e.g. control 
systems. 
 
 
• Early in design 
phase 
Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) 
Top down approach to 
identify effects of faults on 
system safety or reliability 
Address multiple failure 
• Can be applied 
when FMECA is 
too expensive 
• To address 
effects of 
multiple failures 
Early in design 
phase, in lieu of 
FMECA. 
Reliability Block 
Diagram (RBD) 
• This is equivalent to a 
success tree analysis. It is 
also known as dependence 
diagram. It is the logical 
inverse of a fault tree 
analysis. 
•  It highlights a system 
using paths as against 
gates.  
• It is often drawn as a series 
of blocks connected in 
parallel or series 
configuration. Each block 
represents a component 
with failure rate. 
• Can identify where 
redundancy is 
required 
• The diagrammatic 
procedure indicates 
how component 
reliability 
contributes to a 
system’s success or 
failure.  
 
• Trivial except for 
complex systems 
Cannot be used to 
identify hazards 
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Distribution 
Fitting 
 
Fits distributions to data to 
find the type of distribution 
(normal, lognormal, 
gamma, beta, etc.) 
• Presents forecasts 
for the future. 
• Checks the 
goodness-of-fit 
comparison. 
• Hypothesis testing 
because it quantifies 
the correlation 
between observed 
probabilities and 
predicted 
probabilities from a 
distribution. 
• Subject to 
uncertainty 
• Change in 
environmental 
conditions can 
affect the 
probability of 
occurrence. 
• Resource intensive. 
Fuzzy Set 
Theory 
For forecasting 
uncertainties due to sparse 
or absence of data 
• Very flexible and 
easy to apply. 
• Helps in reduction 
of maintenance and 
operational cost. 
• Used as a form of 
approximate 
reasoning 
• Applied when data 
are sparse and weak 
• Time consuming. 
• Difficult to estimate 
membership 
function. 
Common limitations of the FMEA process are: 
• It requires a deep knowledge of the product or process being evaluated 
• Scoping and organisational boundaries may be an issue 
• Not able to report failure intervals 
• A relatively questionable criticality and ranking process with RPN 
 
 
3.4 Application of FMEA/FMECA in Offshore and subsea 
systems. 
The most common methods of identifying and mitigating technical risks for 
deepwater completions are generally peer reviews, failure mode and effects 
analysis (FMEA), HAZOP and system integration testing (SIT) (Tomaso 2009, 
Schubert 2002, Duhon 2011, IEC 61882 2001). These methods are applicable 
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across the equipment and project lifecycle, irrespective of the phase in 
question. However, the earlier they are applied for risk identification, the better 
the mitigation and corrective action plans. Again, Cuvex-Micholin (2012)  posits 
that  FMEA is a key approach used in analysing risks in both the upstream and 
downstream oil and gas industries other tools like HAZOP, preliminary hazard 
analysis, probabilistic risk assessment including hazard analysis and critical 
control point (HACCP). 
In the words of (Brandt 2001) FMEA is always the first step in a system 
reliability study in the subsea industry. The author explains that FMEA/FMECA 
is highly effective during the concept selection stage of an offshore subsea 
project due to the availability of more detailed information for establishing 
reliability targets. In line with this, FMECA is applied in Harold (2004), for 
identifying technical risks in a high-technical subsea development offshores with 
high temperature-high pressure (HP/HT) risks. Binder (2009) mentions FMEA 
as a key tool for hazard analysis and offshore integrity management. Annamaria 
(2009) identifies FMEA as a key study for RAM and maintenance issues. Wael 
(2003) recommends that FMEA is a very effective tool for analysing complex 
systems. The tool is used here in the analysis of an integrated active heave 
hoisting system. Wardt (2011) evaluates the significance of using the FMECA in 
the commissioning phase of oil and gas projects in both the onshore and 
offshore sectors. The author posits that though FMECA tends to be used at the 
component level for drilling and commissioning operations, application of this 
tool at the system level is pertinent for reducing risks due to the complexity and 
cost involved in these operations. Finally, the paper concludes that application 
of FMECA significantly improves the reliability of automated drilling systems. 
(Shaughnessy 1999) advocated that FMEA is key to design and manufacture of 
the BOP control system as it helps eliminate single point failures by 
implementing subsystems redundancy.  According to Fenton (2002), the result 
of an FMEA directly impacts the CAPEX of a subsea facility. This comes in the 
form of alteration of a field design concept, changes in drilling locations and well 
end points, changes in well construction, alterations in pipeline routes and 
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sizes, changes in manifold locations, inclusion of down-hole shut-off valves, all 
to minimize or completely eliminate failure in the  subsea system. 
In Riley (2001), FMEA is used in the documentation of failure and potential 
consequences in a well tieback system. This provides a direct feed to the 
system fault tree analysis including RISKEX and RAMEX calculations. In Rizzi 
(1998), FMEA/FMECA is used in the identification of hazards and the grouping 
of initiating events for deepwater field development alongside other tools like 
the HAZOP. FMEA offers design improvements by suggesting preventive and 
corrective measures early in the design phase of the project. Patel (2011) uses 
FMEA in the analysis of well control systems for mobile offshore drilling unit 
(MODU)/rig most especially when system modifications are performed that may 
affect the system classification. It is seen that FMEA/FMECA could also include 
human interfaces in operational evaluation and depending on the operational 
specifics and the phase of the project.  
In Andrea (1998), FMEA/FMECA is used in the risk evaluation for floating oil 
production in deepwater environment along with other systems like the HAZOP 
and preliminary hazard assessment (PHA). Mamman (2009) looks at the 
criticality in the failure of subsea valves from both the technical and commercial 
perspective. The losses are evaluated looking into the loss production, 
environmental impact including subsea intervention and IMR costs. With the 
criticality analysis, a prevention and elimination strategy is then developed into 
the valve system to prevent early life failure. In (Langli 2001), FMECA is used 
for revealing design weaknesses in control systems covering topsides, 
umbilical, subsea distribution & control units, subsea and downhole 
instrumentation), workover control systems, subsea separation unit (including 
pump) and smart well equipment’s.  
API17N (2009) recommends three key activities for addressing reliability in 
subsea systems design, which are: 
• Reliability, Availability and Maintainability (RAM) 
• Failure mode assessment (FMEA and FMECA) 
• External design review 
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This emphasizes the significance of FMEA/FMECA in the design of engineering 
systems including offshore and subsea control systems. According to API17N, 
FMEA helps to identify potential faults that could lead to components or system 
failure. With this, the failure will be detected, isolated and removed in order to 
maintain the component, subsystem and overall system integrity. Again, it is 
used in evaluating the failures across the functional hierarchy from component, 
subassembly down to the high-level system levels. The significance, probability, 
consequence of each failure type is also analysed. Again, the output from 
FMECA is used in FTA modelling for establishing reliability figures and in RCM 
analysis. A key concern in subsea systems deployments is the requirement for 
intervention; FMECA helps in the identification of subsea intervention task. 
Locheed (1979), emphasises that the application of FMEA to a subsea control 
module gives rise to improved reliability. 
 
3.5 Subsea Control Module FMECA Evaluation 
A key part of this research is that a very comprehensive FMECA analysis was 
being performed for a tree-mounted subsea control module (SCM) in an 
Offshore subsea production system. The evaluation was based on an assembly 
of subsea engineering experts. The results showing the failure modes ID are 
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Table 11 Criteria for FMECA Evaluation 
 
shown in figure 49. In this analysis, the risk factors, occurrence (O), severity (S) 
and detectability (D) are evaluated and the associate risk priority number (RPN) 
generated for each of the failure modes. A total of one hundred failure modes 
were generated, derived from analysis typical loss of defined functions that 
could result from the SCM component. This involved a wide consultation of 
industry experts. Table 12 gives a comprehensive listing of the failures modes, 
causes, effects, risk factors and the RPN values for all the evaluated modes.  
 
Hazardous 10 Exteremely high 10 Absolutely uncertain 10
Serious 9 Very High 9 Very remote 9
Extreme 8 Repeated failures 8 Remote 8
Major 7 High 7 Very low 7
Significant 6 Moderate high 6 Low 6
Moderate 5 Moderate 5 Moderate 5
Low 4 Relatively low 4 Moderately high 4
Minor 3 Low 3 High 3
Very Minor 2 Remote 2 Very high 2
None 1 Nearly impossible 1 Almost certain 1
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Figure 49 RPN for the SCM failure modes against FM ID 
A further analysis was then performed with thirty (30) of the failure modes with 
the highest RPN values.  The analysis was performed to determine the most 
critical failures modes in the SCM and the corresponding consequence. 
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FM ID 
Subsystem 
or 
Component 
Failure Mode Failure Cause Failure Effects O S D 
Risk 
Profile 
Number 
(RPN) 
F1 
LP Selector Valve LP selector valve spuriously closes. LP selector valve internal fault of the 
latching mechanism. 
Selector Valve spuriously isolates and vent down 
an incoming supply                                                                  
Loss of a single LP hydraulic supply to the SCM.             
No Effect on normal operation                                                           
Loss of hydraulic supply redundancy 
4 6 2 48 
F2 
  LP selector valve fails to open. Failure of the valve solenoid system Loss of a single LP hydraulic supply to the SCM.                
No Effect on normal operation                                           
Loss of hydraulic supply redundancy 
6 6 2 72 
F3 
    LP selector valve internal fault of the 
latching mechanism to latch. 
Loss of a single LP hydraulic supply to the SCM.                 
No direct Effect on normal operation                                                    
Loss of hydraulic supply redundancy 
4 6 2 48 
F4 
  LP selector valve fails to close. Complete failure of the selector  valve 
solenoid system 
Unable to select LP channel as required                             
No direct Effect on normal operation                          
Loss of hydraulic supply redundancy 
4 6 2 48 
F5 
    LP selector valve internal fault of the 
latching mechanism. 
Unable to select LP channel as required                             
No direct Effect on normal operation                          
Loss of hydraulic supply redundancy 
4 6 2 48 
F6 
HP Selector Valve HP selector valve spuriously closes. HP selector valve internal fault of the 
latching mechanism. 
Selector Valve spuriously isolates and vent down 
an incoming supply                                                                  
Loss of a single HP hydraulic supply to the SCM.             
No Effect on normal operation                                                           
Loss of HP hydraulic supply redundancy 
4 6 2 48 
F7 
  HP selector valve fails to open. Failure of the valve solenoid system Loss of a single HP hydraulic supply to the SCM.                
No Effect on normal operation                                           
Loss of hydraulic supply redundancy 
6 4 2 48 
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F8 
    HP selector valve internal fault of the 
latching mechanism 
Loss of a single HP hydraulic supply to the SCM.                 
No direct Effect on normal operation                                                       
Loss of hydraulic supply redundancy 
4 4 2 32 
F9 
  HP selector valve fails to close. Failure of valve solenoid system Unable to select HP channel as required                             
No direct Effect on normal operation                          
Loss of hydraulic supply redundancy 
4 4 3 48 
F10 
    HP selector valve internal fault of the 
latching mechanism. 
Unable to select HP channel as required                             
No direct Effect on normal operation                          
Loss of hydraulic supply redundancy 
4 4 3 48 
F11 
LP Shuttle Valve Shuttle Valve fails to change over to 
the next LP supply line. 
Shuttle valve internal fault. Inability to select/change over to an LP supply on 
demand.                                                                                       
No direct effect if 2nd line is serviceable                                                                 
4 7 3 84 
F12 
  Severe Leak in the Common LP 
Hydraulic Header. 
Severe leak from the LP Shuttle 
valve. 
Loss of common LP supply pressure                            
All DCVs eventually unlatch                                                                     
Loss of Production 
4 7 3 84 
F13 
    Severe leak from a LP Accumulator. Loss of common LP supply pressure                                                                       
All DCVs eventually unlatch                                                         
Loss of Production 
5 7 3 105 
F14 
    Severe leak from the LP Common 
Header Pressure Transmitter. 
Loss of common LP supply pressure                                                                       
All DCVs eventually unlatch                                                    
Loss of Production 
5 7 3 105 
F15 
  
  Severe leak from the LP Common 
Header Flow Meter. 
Loss of common LP supply pressure                                                                       
All DCVs eventually unlatch                                                         
Loss of Production 
5 7 3 105 
F16 
HP Shuttle Valve Shuttle Valve fails to change over to 
the next HP supply line. 
HP Shuttle valve internal fault. Inability to select/change over to an HP supply on 
demand.                                                                             
No direct effect if both lines remain serviceable                                                                 
All DCVs unltach and Well shutin if 2nd line is not 
available                                                                                       
Complete Loss of Production 
6 7 2 84 
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F17 
  Severe Leak in the Common HP 
Hydraulic Header. 
Severe leak from the HP Shuttle 
valve. 
Loss of common HP supply pressure                                                                       
All DCVs eventually unltach                                                    
Loss of Production 
6 7 2 84 
F18 
    Severe leak from the HP manifold 
(seals etc). 
Loss of common HP supply pressure                                                                       
All DCVs eventually unlatch                                                     
Loss of Production 
6 7 2 84 
F19 
    Severe leak from the HP Common 
Header Pressure Transmitter. 
Loss of common HP supply pressure                                                                       
All DCVs eventually unlatch                                                     
Loss of Production 
6 7 2 84 
F20 
    Severe leak from the HP Common 
Header Pressure Transmitter. 
Loss of common HP supply pressure                                                                    
All DCVs eventually unlatch                                                     
Loss of Production 
6 7 2 84 
F21 
    Severe leak from the HP Common 
Header Flow Meter. 
Loss of common HP supply pressure                                                     
All DCVs eventually unlatch                                                      
Loss of Production 
6 7 2 84 
F22 
LP Manifold System Severe Leak in the LP Manifold Faulty seals and other system 
malfunction 
Loss of common LP supply pressure                                                                       
All LP DCVs eventually unltach and Well shutin.                      
Complete Loss of Production 
3 5 4 60 
F23 
HP Manifold System Severe Leak in the HP Manifold 
(E.G. Seals etc) 
Faulty seals and other system 
malfunction 
Loss of common HP supply pressure                                                                       
All HP DCVs eventually unlatch and Well shutin.                      
Loss of Production 
3 5 3 45 
F24 
LP Accumulator 
System 
Loss/reduction in LP Accumulation. Loss all LP accumulator  pre-charge. Loss of common LP supply pressure                                                                       
All DCVs eventually unlatch                                             
Complete Loss of Production 
6 7 3 126 
F25 
  
  
Severe leak from the LP Common 
Header Pressure Transmitter. 
Reduction in LP accumulation                               
Excessive drop in supply during valve operation                                    
All DCVs delatch/All tree valves close                               
Complete Loss of Production 
5 7 3 105 
F26 
    Single LP bladder failure. Reduction in LP accumulation                               
Excessive drop in supply during valve operation                                                                      
All DCVs delatch/All tree valves close                              
Complete Loss of Production 
5 7 3 105 
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F27 
HP Accumulation 
System 
Reduction  in HP Accumulation. Single HP accumulator loss of pre-
charge. 
Reduction in HP accumulation                               
Excessive drop in supply during valve operation                                                                      
All DCVs delatch/All tree valves close                                
Loss of Production 
4 7 3 84 
F28 
    Single HP bladder failure. Reduction in HP accumulation                               
Excessive drop in supply during valve operation                                                
All DCVs delatch/All tree valves close                             
Loss of Production 
4 7 3 84 
F29 
  Loss of HP Accumulation. Loss all HP accumulator  pre-charge. Loss/reduction in HP accumulation                                   
All DCVs delatch                                                                                
Complete Loss of Production 
4 7 3 84 
F30 
  Loss/reduction of HP supply 
pressure. 
HP supply line plugged with 
particulate. 
Loss/reduction in HP accumulation                               
Excessive drop in supply during valve operation                                                                      
All HP DCVs delatch                                                             
Complete Loss of Production 
4 7 3 84 
F31 
Subsea Electronic 
Module (SEM) 
Complete Loss of Power supply 
from the SEM 
Internal fault with the SEM power 
supply units                                                                      
Water ingress into the SCM unit 
Loss of DHPT signal from the SEM channel                          
Loss of control and communication to the topside                                                                        
Loss of power to all DCV valve solenoids                                          
Loss in SCM system redundancy                                          
Complete Loss of Production 
6 8 2 96 
F32 
  Loss of Controller board 
functionality 
Controller board failure Loss of single LP channel in the tree SCM.                             
Loss of Tree Controls                                                      
Loss of control and communication to the topside                                            
Loss of Production 
6 8 2 96 
F33 
  Loss of Signal from one SEM I/O card failure in SEM, Corrupt 
software 
Loss of single LP channel in the tree SCM.                 
Loss of Tree Controls                                                    
Complete Loss of Production 
6 8 2 96 
F34 
  Complete Loss of signal from both 
SEM 
I/O card failure in SEM, Corrupt 
software 
Loss of DCV Valve controls                                          
Loss of all associated subsea instrumentation.  
Loss of Xmas Tree controls                                                         
Complete Loss of Production 
6 8 2 96 
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F35 
  Loss of I/O Interface Board I/O Board Internal fault. Loss of the channel I/O Board. 
 Inability to monitor one set of external 
instrumentation. 
All DCVs will remain latched to their current 
positions.              Complete Loss of Production 8 8 2 128 
F36 
  Loss of DHPT Board DHPT Board Internal fault. Loss of Communication to the Tree DHPT 
instruments from the Channel .                                                                
All DCVs remain in their last positions.                                                   
The redundant DHPT board provides the service                  
Complete loss of monitoring 
              6 8 2 96 
F37 
  Loss of Modem Functionality - 
Interface to topside 
Modem Failure . Loss of one communication channel to the topside                                                                                                                          
Loss of control and communication to the topside              
The control function of the SCM is unaffected.                     
Complete loss of monitoring 
6 8 2 96 
F38 
    Modem Freezes - produces steady 
output 
Partial Loss of monitoring                                                                                                   
Loss of control and communication to the topside                         
Complete loss of monitoring 
6 8 2 96 
F39 
  Critical Loss of Electronic Control Combinational loss of power supply, 
modem and control board 
Inability to monitor subsea instrumentation or 
command Inability to open or close any valve from 
the topside             All hydraulically actuated valves 
remain in last positions                                                                                
Inability to shut in the tree in a controlled manner 
through the integrated system                                               
Complete loss of subsea monitoring                                                       
Complete Loss of Production 6 8 2 96 
F40 
Hydraulic circuitry Loss of single LP hydraulic supply Solenoid valve spuriously operates Loss of single LP channel in the tree SCM.                            
Pressure drop in the shuttle valves                                                            
Total loss of Tree controls                                            
Complete Loss of Production 
4 6 3 72 
F41 
    Leakage from LP hydraulic 
lines/connectors 
Loss of single LP channel in the SCM.                                    
Leakage of hydraulic fluid into the sea.                             
Loss of Production 
6 6 3 108 
F42 
    Single LP hydraulic line blocked Loss of LP pressure in the affected channel.                          
Loss of Xmas Tree controls                                                       
Loss of Production 
5 6 2 60 
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F43 
  Loss of single HP hydraulic supply Loss in HP hydraulic line/connector in 
a single channel. 
Loss of single HP channel to all the Xmas tree. 
Severe leakage of hydraulic fluid into the sea.                               
Eventual drop of all the HP DCVs                                        
Loss of Production 
6 6 2 72 
F44 
    Leakage from HP hydraulic lines Gradual loss of single HP channel to all the Xmas 
tree/Well.                                                                          
Leakage of hydraulic fluid into the sea.                           
Loss of Production 
6 5 3 90 
F45 
    Single HP hydraulic line blocked  Loss of HP pressure in the affected channel.                         
Loss in SCSSV and FCV Controls                                     
Loss of Production 
4 6 2 48 
F46 
  Loss of both LP hydraulic supplies Line/connector Leakage in the LP 
supply Lines 
Loss of hydraulic suplies to the LP DCVs                              
Loss of Xmas Tree controls                                                  
Complete Loss of Production 
5 8 2 80 
F47 
    Blocked LP hydraulic lines Loss of hydraulic suplies to the LP DCVs                              
Loss of Xmas Tree controls                                                  
Complete Loss of Production 
5 8 2 80 
F48 
  Loss of both HP hydraulic supplies Leakage in the HP supply lines Loss of hydraulic suplies to the HP DCVs                              
Loss of SCSSV and IWCV controls                                                  
Complete Loss of Production 
5 8 2 80 
F49 
    Blocked HP hydraulic lines Loss of hydraulic suplies to the HP DCVs                              
Loss of SCSSV and IWCV controls                                                  
Complete Loss of Production 
5 8 2 80 
F50 
LP Directional 
Control Valves 
(DCV) 
LP tree valves DCV fails to open on 
demand 
Failure of the valve solenoid coils Selected Xmas tree valve fails to open on demand                                                                             
DCV remains in the last latched and shut position.                                                                            
Well remains in the shutin position                           
Complete Loss of Production                                  
6 6 3 108 
F51 
    Internal fault in the DCV latching 
mechanism  
Selected Xmas tree valve fails to open on demand                                                                             
DCV remains in the last latched and shut position.                                                                      
Well remains in the shutin position                           
Complete Loss of Production                                    
6 6 3 108 
F52 
  LP Tree valves DCV shuts 
spuriously from the open position. 
Internal fault in the DCV latching 
mechanism  
Associated tree valve spuriously closes                   
Unscheduled Loss of production                                              
Complete Loss of Production 
4 6 3 72 
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F53 
  LP Tree DCV fails to close on 
demand 
Failure of the valve solenoid coils Unable to shutoff production                                                    
Partial Loss in well control 
7 5 3 105 
F54 
Choke DCV valve Choke DCV fails to open on 
demand. 
Failure of the valve solenoid coils Unable to set required choke valve position                                                                                                            
Reduction in flow of oil from the well.                                     
Partial Loss of Production   
4 4 2 32 
F55 
    DCV internal valve failure. Unable to set required choke valve position                                                                                         
Reduction in flow of oil from the well.                                     
Partial Loss of Production   
6 4 2 48 
F56 
  Choke DCV  fails to shut on 
demand. 
Solenoid valve sticks in energised 
position. 
Production Choke Valve Close actuator (PCVC) 
fails to extend to required position.                                              
Reduction in flow of oil from the well.                                   
Partial Loss of Production                                                                            
4 4 2 32 
F57 
    DCV internal valve failure. Production Choke Valve Close actuator (PCVC) 
fails to extend to required position.                                              
Reduction in flow of oil from the well.                                 
Partial Loss of Production                                                                                   
6 4 2 48 
F58 
    Failure of the valve solenoid coils Production Choke Valve Close actuator (PCVC) 
fails to extend to required position.                                              
Reduction in flow of oil from the well.                                   
Partial Loss of Production                                                                                   
4 4 2 32 
F59 
HP Directional 
Control Valves 
(DCVs) 
SCSSV DCV fails to open on 
demand from the closed position. 
Failure of the valve solenoid coils SCSSV fails to open.                                                             
Unable to start production from the well.                                  
Complete Loss in Production 
5 6 4 120 
F60 
    DCV internal fault of the latching 
mechanism 
SCSSV fails to open.                                                             
Unable to start production from the well.                                  
Complete Loss in Production 
5 6 4 120 
F61 
  SSCSV shuts spuriously from the 
open position. 
DCV internal fault of the latching 
mechanism. 
SCSSV spuriously closes.                                                 
Unscheduled loss of production.                                             
Complete Loss in Production 
5 6 4 120 
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F62 
  SCSSV fails to shut on demand 
from the open position. 
Failure of the valve solenoid system Loss of SCSSV protection                                                  
Reduced well barrier for the SPS                                            
Partial Loss in Well Control                          
6 6 3 108 
F63 
    DCV internal fault of the latching 
mechanism to latch. 
Loss of SCSSV protection                                                  
Reduced well barrier for the SPS                                       
Partial Loss in Well Control                                            
6 6 2 72 
F64 
Baseplate mounted 
hydraulic couplings 
Inability to connect the SCM to the 
Xmas tree 
Worn couplings during SCM 
installation               Corrosion and 
wear of the base couplings   
Inability to makeup the SCM to the Xmas tree                        
Complete Loss of Production 
2 4 2 16 
F65 
LP Circuit Pressure 
Transducers + 
Return line 
Loss of electronic monitoring of a 
single hydraquad function. 
Loss of DCV Output Pressure 
Transducer. 
All associated DCV's remain latched in their last 
position                                                                                                                     
Loss of monitoring and positional status of a single 
DCV.                                                                                   
No direct impact on a normally operating tree.                                                                               
Partial Loss in subsea monitoring 
4 2 2 16 
F66 
  Loss of electronic monitoring of the 
LP line Pressure. 
Faulty LP Pressure Transducer. All associated DCV's remain latched in their last 
position                                                                                                                        
Loss of monitoring and positional status of a single 
DCV.                                                                                   
No direct impact on a normally operating tree.                                                                                                      
Partial Loss in subsea monitoring 
6 4 2 48 
F67 
HP circuit pressure 
transducers + Return 
Line 
Loss of electronic monitoring of a 
single hydroquad function. 
Loss of DCV Output Pressure 
Transducer. 
All associated DCV's remain latched in their last 
position                                                                                                                        
Loss of monitoring and positional status of a single 
DCV.                                                                                   
No direct impact on a normally operating tree.                     
Partial Loss in subsea monitoring                                                                                            
4 3 2 24 
F68 
  Loss of electronic monitoring of the 
HP Supply Pressure. 
Loss of HP Pressure Transducer. All associated DCV's remain latched in their last 
position                                                                                                                     
Loss of monitoring and positional status of a single 
DCV.                                                                                   
No direct impact on a normally operating tree.                                                                               
Partial Loss in subsea monitoring 
4 2 2 16 
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F69 
LP supply flowmeter Loss of electronic monitoring of the 
LP Supply flow. 
Internal fault in the LP flowmeter Loss of flow monitoring  of the LP supply.                                 
No direct impact on a normally operating tree.                         
Partial Loss in subsea monitoring 
4 4 2 32 
F70 
HP supply flowmeter Loss of electronic monitoring of the 
HP Supply flow. 
Internal fault in the HP flowmeter Loss of flow monitoring  of the HP supply.                                 
No direct impact on a normally operating tree.                         
Partial Loss in subsea monitoring 
4 4 2 32 
F71 
Return line 
flowmeter 
Loss of electronic monitoring of the 
Return line flow. 
Internal fault in the Return line 
flowmeter 
Loss of flow monitoring  in the Return Line                                
No direct impact on a normally operating tree.                         
Partial Loss in subsea monitoring 
4 4 2 32 
F72 
LP circuit hydraulic 
filters 
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration Filter element missing                                            
Rupture of filter element                                 
Wear filter element components                                        
Holed or filter by-pass spuriously 
operates. 
Dormant failure in normal operation                                           
Clogging or binding of mobile parts of the DCV 
valves                                     Unfiltered 
contaminated hydraulics  - Blockage and Wearing 
of SCM components                                            
Stop or slow slowly moving of actuators.                               
Malfunction of subsea components                                                                       
Complete Loss in well production 
4 5 4 80 
F73 
    Inadequate filter elements.                             
Design error in the filter porosity 
Clogging or binding of mobile parts of the DCV 
valves and other components,                                                      
Wearing of SCM components                                            
Stop or slow slowly moving of actuators.                             
Complete Loss in well production 
4 5 4 80 
F74 
    Clogging                                                               
Blockage due to fluid contamination 
Clogging or binding of mobile parts of the DCV 
valves and other components,                                         
Wearing of SCM components                                            
Stop or slow slowly moving of actuators.                             
Complete Loss in well production 
4 5 4 80 
F75 
HP circuit hydraulic 
filters 
Loss of HP hydraulic fltration Filter element missing                                            
Rupture of filter element                                      
Wear filter element components                                        
Holed or filter by-pass spuriously 
operates. 
Dormant failure in normal operation                                           
Clogging or binding of mobile parts of the DCV 
valves                                     Unfiltered 
contaminated hydraulics  - Blockage and Wearing 
of SCM components                                            
Stop or slow slowly moving of actuators.                               
Malfunction of subsea components                                                                       
Complete Loss in well production 
4 4 4 64 
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F76 
    Inadequate filter elements.                             
Design error in the filter porosity 
Clogging or binding of mobile parts of the DCV 
valves and other components,                                                      
Wearing of SCM components                                            
Stop or slow slowly moving of actuators.                             
Complete Loss in well production 
4 4 4 64 
F77 
    Clogging                                                               
Blockage due to fluid contamination 
Clogging or binding of mobile parts of the DCV 
valves and other components,                                                      
Wearing of SCM components                                            
Stop or slow slowly moving of actuators.                             
Complete Loss in well production 
4 4 4 64 
F78 
Return line 
check/dump valves 
Reduction in LP hydraulic dump 
capability. 
Blocked dump return lines. Unable to completely "dump" LP hydraulic supply 
pressure to compensation circuit.                                                                                                                                    
All DCVs remain hydraulically latched with tree 
valves remaining in last position.                                                    
Production flow is not shut in.                                                
No Loss in Production 
4 3 2 24 
F79 
  LP Dump Valve fails to operate on 
demand. 
Internal fault in the dump valve 
system 
Unable to completely "dump" LP hydraulic supply 
pressure to compensation circuit.                                                                                            
All DCVs remain hydraulically latched with tree 
valves remaining in last position.                                                              
No Loss in Production  
4 4 2 32 
F80 
Electrical 
Connectors 
(External) 
Loss of power from the SCM 
electrical connectors 
Internal fault in the electrical  
connectors 
Loss of power to one SEM channel in the SCM                           
Loss of DHPT signal from the SEM channel               
Loss of control and communication to the topside                                                                        
Loss of power to all valve solenoids                              
All DCVs remain in their last latched position              
Loss in SCM system redundancy                                            
Complete Loss in Well Production 
6 4 2 48 
F81 
    Leakage in the connector system Loss of power to the SEM channels in the SCM                           
Loss of DHPT signal from the SEM channels                      
Loss in SCM system redundancy                                          
Loss of control and communication to the topside                                                                        
Loss of power to all valve solenoids                              
All DCVs remain in their last latched position                            
Complete Loss in Well Production          
6 6 2 72 
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F82 
  Unable to disconnect EFL from 
SCM Assembly  
Connector failure. Unable to disconnect the Electrical Lead from the 
SCM         
Nil effect during normal operation                                       
If EFL fails, lead and umbilical repacement not 
possible        Retrieval and replacement of the SCM                                       
Complete Loss in Well Production 
1 6 2 12 
F83 
  Unable to connect SCM assembly 
to tree. 
Connector failure. Complete Loss of subsea monitoring                                              
Complete Loss in Well Production 
1 6 2 12 
F84 
  Loss of electronic control from the 
terminals in the Connector. 
Short circuit / open circuit. Loss of power to the SEM channel in the SCM                           
Loss of DHPT signal from the SEM channel               
Loss of control and communication to the topside              
Loss of power to all the DCVs                                            
All DCVs remain in their last position                                   
Complete Loss in production                                                                
4 6 2 48 
F85 
Electrical 
Connectors/Cabling 
(internal) 
Loss of power from the SEM to the 
valve units 
Short circuit / open circuit. Loss of power to the associated valve solenoid                          
DCV valve remains in its last latched position             
Loss of control and communication to the topside              
Loss of power to all the associated subsea/well 
instrument                                                                                     
Partial Loss of subsea monitoring 
4 6 2 48 
F86 
    Faulty Electrical cable/connector Loss of power to the associated valve solenoid                          
DCV valve remains in its last latched position             
Loss of control and communication to the topside              
Loss of power to all the associated subsea/well 
instrument                                                                             
Partial Loss of subsea monitoring 
4 6 2 48 
F87 
SCM Dielectric fluid 
chamber 
Loss of dielectric protection to the 
electrical system 
Leakage in the SCM housing system            
Wrong installation procedure 
Seawater ingress into the SCM                                          
Contamination of the dielectric fluid                                                                            
Failure of the Electrical components of the SCM                   
Total                                                                                      
Complete Loss of production 
2 6 8 96 
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F88 
SCM Housing Loss of communication from the 
Water ingress Sensor 
Internal fault in the Water Sensor. Loss of the internal house keeping water ingress 
monitoring. 
All DCVs remain in their current positions.                    
Partial Loss of subsea monitoring                                          
Complete loss in production 
2 8 2 32 
F89 
  Loss of SCM pressure 
compensation. 
Leakage of dielectric fluid from SCM 
via vent. 
Dielectric fluid leaks from SCM whilst installed 
subsea       Potential water ingress into SCM and 
damage to electronic components. 
Complete Loss in Well production 
2 6 2 24 
F90 
  Unable to disconnect SCM 
assembly from tree.  
Hydraulic coupler failure. Unable to disconnect the SCM from the tree.                     
Nil effect under normal operation                                         
High Cost Tree retrieval and replacement                           
Severe Loss in produdction + Pull Completion 
2 4 6 48 
F91 
  Unable to connect SCM assembly 
to tree. 
Faulty Hydraulic couplers Unable to connect the SCM to the tree.                               
Possible replacement of the SCM assembly                        
Loss in production                    3 4 6 72 
F92 
  
  
Debris (sand, calcium carbonate) Unable to connect the SCM to the tree.                               
Possible replacement of the SCM assembly                          
Loss in production                      
3 4 6 72 
F93 
  
  
Seal carrier misaligned/damaged Unable to connect the SCM to the tree.                               
Possible replacement of the SCM assembly                        
Loss in production                         
3 4 6 72 
F94 
    Damaged SCM baseplate Unable to connect the SCM to the tree.                               
Possible replacement of the SCM assembly                        
SCM replacement                                                                        
Loss in production    
3 4 5 60 
F95 
  Loss off internal temperature sensor Faulty temperature sensor No Loss of normal systems operations                                
Partial Loss of subsea monitoring 
6 4 2 48 
F96 
  Loss off internal pressure sensor Faulty pressure sensor No Loss of normal systems operations                                
Partial Loss of subsea monitoring 
6 4 2 48 
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F97 
Seawater check 
valve 
Seawater check Valve Leakage Valve component embrittlement                     
Installation damage                                        
Wear                                                             
Dynamic instability 
Seawater ingress into the SCM                                          
Contamination of the dielectric fluid                                                                            
Failure of the Electrical components of the SCM               
Total loss of electronic and hydraulic functions                       
Complete Loss in well production 
5 7 3 105 
F98 
Dieelectric chamber 
over pressure relief 
valve 
Valve fails to operate on demand Valve component embrittlement                        
Worn valve components                                                             
Dynamic instability 
Overpressured SCM chamber                                                                                            
Failure of the Electrical components of the SCM                  
Failure in the hydraulic components                                 
Total loss of electronic and hydraulic functions                    
Complete Loss in well production 
3 6 4 72 
F99 
SCM Podlock SCM not correctly locked to 
SCMMB 
Insufficient number of turns                              Unable to operate all LP and HP control functions 
3 8 4 96 
F100 
  Unable to unlock the SCM from the 
mounting base 
Worn couplings during SCM 
installation               Corrosion and 
wear of the base couplings                                                      
Dead Hydraulic lockdown                             
Live hydraulic lockdown                               
Debris (sand, calcium carbonate) 
Inability to disconnect the SCM from its SCMMB                 
Inability to retrieve the SCM to the surface for 
repairs For VXT, Tree assembly retrieval to 
the surface                                                                    
For HXT, Tree and Well Completions retrieval                                   
Severe loss in production + Pull Completion                                                    
2 6 4 48 
 
Table 12  Comprehensive Subsea control module failure modes and effect criticality analysis, FMECA 
 
 
 108 
The FMECA was conducted using ten (10) experienced subsea experts in the 
industry. A characterisation of the experts used is briefly explained in section 
4.3.1.1 of this report. The experts were given a listing of the failure modes and 
using the scale for the risk factors ticked the corresponding values of the risk 
factors to the associated failure mode. A statistical mode-based evaluation was 
used to determine the value of the risk to the associated failure mode and the 
results are as shown in figure 50. 
 
 
Figure 50  RPN plot of SCM Failure modes 
At the end of the evaluation, all the failure modes were ranked considering the 
values of their RPN. Table 13 below shows the ten most critical failure modes 
and the failure mode ID, Its evaluated RPN and the ranking. 
The result shows the SEM power failure as the most critical component in the 
SCM system with ‘Loss of power supply’ failure mode. In a typical 
communication on power (COPS) subsea control system, a loss in power 
invariably means a loss in the downhole signal to the topside and vice versa. 
Next to the SEM are the directional control valves. 
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Table 13  SCM Failure modes showing the RPNs and the failure mode ranking 
Failure Modes 
Failure 
ID 
RPN 
Failure 
Mode 
Ranking 
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit  F1 288 1 
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 252 2 
Severe leakage from HP DCV  F5 144 3 
Loss of HP Accumulation  F7 144 3 
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module  F3 140 5 
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 112 6 
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 96 7 
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line  F14 96 7 
Loss of LP accumulation F11 84 9 
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 72 10 
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 72 10 
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 70 12 
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 63 13 
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 56 14 
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 56 14 
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 54 16 
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 48 17 
LP selector valve fails to open  F15 48 17 
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 42 19 
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 42 19 
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 42 19 
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 42 19 
HP DCV fails to open on command  F17 36 23 
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor  F22 30 24 
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 28 25 
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 27 26 
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 24 27 
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 24 27 
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 18 29 
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 16 30 
Leakages in LP and HP DCVs make up 33.33% of the top 20% failure modes in 
the evaluation. This is logical as DCV have been known to be a major 
contributor to frequent failures in the SCM system (Broadbent 2010, OREDA 
2009) (see figure 51).  
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Figure 51  Components in the SCM top 20% most critical failure modes 
Due to the gaps and limitations of the classical RPN evaluation as mentioned in 
section 3.6, a multi-criterion technique based on the fuzzy TOPSIS 
methodology was then used for further evaluation of the SCM failure modes, 
causes and effects. The results are shown in chapter 4. 
 
3.6 Gaps/Limitations of FMEA/FMECA application 
A key challenge in conducting an FMEA study is ensuring that the failure 
mechanisms are identified. The scope of the study has to be clearly defined in 
order to determine the level of detail to be covered in the exercise. 
FMEA is best conducted in a group session, much like a HAZOP session. A 
group session will improve the identification of possible failure modes in the 
technology covered; it is however important that the right competence is made 
available including personnel with background and knowledge in several 
technological disciplines (Bradnt 2003). In Fougere (2006), we see that though 
FMEA has been the primary reliability tool for dynamic positioning systems, 
these vessels are known to experienced faults which were either not captured in 
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the FMEA or were more severe than indicated by the FMEA.  Key gaps 
identified by Fougere (2006) in conducting FMEA are as follows: 
• Poor scoping leads to ineffective FMEA 
• Normally requires specialists with in-depth knowledge of the system 
under examination.  
• Multi-discipline team might be required for large and complex 
systems.  
Scope is very important in conducting an FMEA as it defines the boundary 
around the system to be analysed. This is typically carried out by the team 
members involved in the evaluation. If not carefully performed, key parts of the 
system may be eliminated. An FMEA is as good as the member of the team and 
the failures highlighted are normally bordered around the experience of the 
team involved. If a team member has not experienced an issue, there is a 
tendency for that to be left out during the exercise. For complex systems, a 
requirement for a multi-disciplinary team makes the exercise a cumbersome 
one. Other weaknesses of the FMEA/FMECA according to Bai (2010) are listed 
below. 
• Does not identify the real reason of the failure mode 
• Highly a time-consuming task 
• Extremely difficult for complex systems. 
• High reliance on expert judgment with a probability for inaccuracy 
Traditionally FMECA is performed by developing a risk priority number (RPN). 
RPN helps to compare and prioritize issues for necessary correction. For RPN 
to be used, the severity (S) of the risk has to be rated, the occurrence (O) rated 
and the likelihood of detection also known (Xu Bai 2012, Tomaso Ceccarelli 
2009) and RPN is a multiplication of these three factors  
RPN   =  Severity (S) x Occurrence (O) x Detection (D)   	 (3.1) 
These three factors are evaluated in a scale of 1-10 each. For each failure 
mode, the values for S, O and D are being evaluated and multiplied to obtain an 
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RPN number, which is then priotised and ranked. Focus is then given to the 
high RPN failure modes for the possibility of corrective actions. Though this 
technique has proven to be a vital and useful tool for preventing failures in 
system design, process and services, the methodology has been extensively 
criticised (Sutrisno 2011, Liu 2013, Braglia 2003) in many literatures for the 
following reasons. 
• Lack of consideration to the relative importance of O, S and D 
• Different combinations of O, S and D produces equal values with 
differing implications 
• Difficulty in precision on the prediction of the values for O, S and D 
• Varying methods for converting the scores of the risk factors 
• The RPN is not capable of measuring the effective of the corrective 
actions 
• The values of the RPN are not continuous with many holes 
• The interdependencies across the failure modes are not considered. 
• The RPN is highly sensitive to variations in the risk factors 
• Many duplicate RPN numbers in the evaluations 
• The RPN considers just three factors principally on safety terms 
An extensive study of FMEA methodologies all aimed at bridging these gaps, 
according to Hu-Chen Liu 2012, shows that they are grouped into five key 
categories namely: 
• Multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) 
• Artificial Intelligence (AI) 
• Mathematical programming (MP) 
• Hybrid approaches 
• Others 
Fundamentally, each of these techniques have varying approaches of 
implementation. Prominent among all these according to the author is the fuzzy 
approach.   
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In this research, a multi-criteria decision making methodology called technique 
of order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) is being 
implemented for prioritising the associated criticality in subsea control module 
failure modes. This is principally to overcome the obvious limitations with the 
conventional FMECA. A fuzzy approach is adopted as it eliminates the intrinsic 
difficulty of handling crisp values during the conventional FMECA RPN 
evaluation. Again, considering the vague nature of the three conventional 
FMECA risk factors – occurrence (O), severity (S) and detectability (D), they are 
being expanded into ten parameters. 
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4 A framework for Multi-criteria Risk assessment of SCM with 
unconventional parameters 
In this chapter, a multi-criteria fuzzy TOPSIS analysis of a subsea control 
module (SCM) failure modes is conducted using unconventional parameters. A 
set of thirty (30) failure modes produced from a comprehensive failure mode 
and effect analysis (FMECA) of the system is used in the analysis. At the end of 
the evaluation, a risk ranking is presented in order to prioritise the risk for each 
of the failure modes. This innovative risk-based reliability analysis approach 
serves as a key part of the PhD and a novel contribution to knowledge. The 
methodology is demonstrated, the worksheets presented and the results 
explained. Finally, a sensitivity analysis is also performed. 
Key objectives of this evaluation are: 
• Identify critical components of the SCM responsible for the failure of the 
SCM 
• Perform a comprehensive fuzzy TOPSIS risk analysis of the SCM using 
unconventional parameters 
• Identify the most probable failure mode in the operation of the SCM 
• Perform a comparative analysis between results obtained using the 
conventional FMECA technique and the fuzzy TOPSIS methodology 
• Perform a sensitivity analysis of the TOPSIS evaluation accessing the 
effect of each risk factor on the failure modes ranking 
• Identify the criticality of the SCM failure modes by using the fuzzy 
TOPSIS ranking methodology 
 
4.1 Multi-criteria decision Analysis 
Multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) sometimes called multi-criteria decision 
making (MCDM) or multi-attribute decision analysis (MADA) is one of the fastest 
growing areas in the last decades a popular topic in decision making and refers 
to the process of making selection from a number of actions in the face of 
multiple and often conflicting attributes (Virine 2007, Bejari 2010, Jahanshahloo 
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2006). Computer systems have significantly enhanced the application of MCDM 
in complex systems and decision analysis. According to Jahashahloo (2006), 
the primary concerns in discrete decision analysis are listed below: 
1. The choosing of the a most preferred alternative 
2. The ranking of the alternatives in the order of importance or  
3. Screening of the alternatives with the aim of a final decision 
MCDM does not necessarily produce an optimised solution of all the objective 
functions, but introduces an efficient solution other called the Pareto optimal 
solution (Jahashahloo 2006). This is normally a set of solutions that aid in the 
choice of final decision. This final choice remains an issue. Below is a concise 
representation of MCDM problem. 
Table 14  A representation of MCDM problem 
 C1 C1 …............. Cn 
A1 x11	 x12 …............. x1n 
A2 x21	 x12 …............. x1n 
 
    
Am xm1	 xm2 …............. xmn 
W	=	[w1,	w2,	……..,	wn],	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.1)	
Where A1, A2, ……….Am are possible alternatives by which decision makers have 
to measure performance and choose based on the criterion C1, C2, ……Cn . Xij 
represents the rating of the alternatives Ai based on the criterion Cj while wj 
refers to the weight of the criterion Cj. Below are the man steps in MCDM: 
• Establish the system evaluation criteria 
• Develop alternatives  
• Evaluate alternatives based on set criteria 
• Apply normative multicriteria analysis method 
• Accept and optimal/preferred alternative 
• Re-perform an iteration of the with additional information 
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The weights in MCDM do not have clear significance to the process, though 
they help in modeling the preference analysis in the classical MCDM analysis. 
TOPSIS, known as the technique for order performance by similarity to ideal 
solution gives performance ratings including the weights of the criteria in clear 
exact values and has been used extensively in the analysis of MCDA issues as 
exemplified by Kolios (2010), Braglia (2003), Ahmet Can (2012), Jahanshahloo 
(2006), Anish (2009) , Liu (2013) and Wang (2009). In (Kolios 2010), MCDA is 
used in the analysis and comparison of support structures for offshore wind 
turbines. (Braglia 2003 and Ahmet 2012) give practical applications of MCDA 
for failure modes and effects criticality analysis based on the fuzzy version of 
the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS). The 
papers also highlight the limitations associated with the conventional FMECA 
methodology. In Jahanshahloo 2006 Anish (2009), Liu (2013) and Wang (2009, 
the MCDA TOPSIS method is used for decision making based on data for 
feasible alternatives.  
In MCDA, the first step is to define the criteria for the analysis (Cheng 2003, 
Sodhi 2012). For the subsea control module the evaluation matrices includes 
the hydraulic performance, electrical performance, ultra-deepwater suitability, 
cost, familiarity with operators & engineers, qualification/proven, 
complexity…etc.  
 
4.2 MCDM methods and their application in engineering 
applications 
Decision making is one of the most important and popular aspect of application 
of mathematical methods. MCDM techniques have been used in many 
performance measurements as they are useful in the identification and 
evaluation of compatible alternatives (or solutions) in decision support tools. 
According to Medineckiene (2014), there are five steps in multi-criteria decision 
making. These are: 
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1. Identification of the problem 
2. Structuring of the issue 
3. Model building 
4. Use of the model as as assessment tool 
5. Development of an action plan. 
Jato-Espino (2014) and Liu (2013) enumerate several MCDM methods and their 
application in the engineering construction industry. The summary is as shown 
below: 
AHP - Analytic hierarchy process structured technique for analysing 
MCDM problems according to a pairwise comparison scale. 
ANP- Analytic network process Generalization of the AHP method which 
enables the existence of interdependences among criteria. 
COPRAS Complex proportional assessment - Stepwise method 
aimed to rank a set of alternatives according to their significance and 
utility degree. 
DEA - Data envelopment analysis non-parametric system for measuring 
the efficiency of a set of multiple decision making units. 
Delphi Iterative method - designed to obtain the most reliable 
consensus from a group of experts responding to a series of 
questionnaires. 
DRSA - Dominance-based rough set approach Derivation of rough set 
theory which allows defining a MCDM problem through a series of 
inference rules of the type 
“if… then”. 
ELECTRE -  Elimination et choix traduisant la realité Group of 
techniques addressed to outrank a set of alternatives by determining 
their concordance and discordance indexes. 
FSs - Fuzzy sets Extension of the traditional concept of crisp sets which 
states that the belongingness of an element to a set may vary within the 
interval [0, 1]. 
GST-Grey system theory Philosophy of handling data according to the 
information contained in them, from black (no information) to white 
(complete information). 
GT  - Game theory Area of applied mathematics that studies the 
interaction of formalized structures to make strategic decisions. 
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HOQ - House of quality House-shaped diagram that transforms user 
demands into quality design criteria through a relationship matrix and a 
correlation matrix. 
IFSs - Intuitionistic fuzzy sets In addition to the belongingness grade of 
an element to a set proposed by FSs, IFSs also considers its non-
belongingness grade (hesitancy). 
MAUT - Multi-attribute utility theory Methodology employed to make 
decisions by comparing the utility values of a series of attributes in terms 
of risk and uncertainty. 
MAVT - Multi-attribute value theory Compensatory technique that 
converts the attributes forming a MCDM problem into one single value 
through the called value functions. 
MCS Monte Carlo simulations- Non-deterministic methods used to find 
approximate solutions to complex problems by experimenting with 
random numbers. 
MEW - Multiplicative exponential weighting Aggregative scoring system 
in which alternatives are evaluated by the weighted product of their 
attributes. 
MIVES  - Modelo integrado de valor para evaluaciones sostenibles: 
Nested methodology which combines two concepts as MCDA and Value 
Engineering to synthesize any type of criteria in a value index. 
PROMETHEE- Preference ranking organization method for enrichment 
of evaluations. Family of outranking methods based on the selection of a 
preference function for each criterion forming a MCDM problem. 
SAW - Simple additive weighting Technique aimed to determine a 
weighted score for each alternative by adding the contributions of each 
attribute multiplied by their weights. 
SIR - Superiority and inferiority raking Method that uses six generalized 
criteria to establish the preferences of a decision maker by determining 
the superiority and inferiority flows. 
SMAA -Stochastic multi-objective acceptability analysis. Methodology 
that determines the acceptability index of an alternative as the variety of 
measurements making it the preferred one. 
TOPSIS - Technique for order of preference by similarity to ideal 
solution. Technique based on the concept that the best alternative to a 
MCDM problem is that which is closest to its ideal solution. 
UT - Utility theory Method for measuring the degree of desirability 
provided by tangible and/or intangible criteria through their utility 
functions. 
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UTA - Utilities additives Methodology that uses linear programming to 
optimize the use of utility functions to properly reflect the preferences of 
decision makers. 
VIKOR - Visekriterijumska Optimizacija Ikompromisno resenje. Method 
for determining the compromise ranking - list of a set of alternatives 
according to the measure of closeness to the ideal solution. 
 
Jato-Espino (2014) clearly reveals the TOPSIS as one of the most popular 
multi-criteria techniques with a very wide application. TOPSIS is seen in both 
isolated application and in hybrid use with other techniques such as AHP, FSs, 
IFS, GST, ANP and VIKOR. The TOPSIS method is easy to compute and 
algorithmically structured, which considerably automates its implementation 
procedure. Similarly, the VIKOR method searches for the closest solution to the 
overall ideal, but unlike TOPSIS, its normalization process is made linearly, 
instead of vectorially. In any case, the greater difference resides in their 
diffusion grade; VIKOR's spread is far from that of TOPSIS, presumably 
because the first became known to the public several years after the second. 
 
4.3 TOPSIS method, theory, advantages and limitations 
TOPSIS is a multi-criteria decision making linear weighing technique initially 
proposed by Hwang (1981). TOPSIS starts with creating a decision matrix: 
X = [	xTU	]		 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.2)	
Where the Valternative (i = 1, 2........,n) is evaluated with respect to jth criteria (j 
= 1, 2........,m). The next step is the normalisation of the judgement matrix    X = [	xTU	]. Many approaches are used for this. From Deng at al 2000, to 
transform each element  [	xTU	], the equation below is used: 
GW = 	 XYZ∑ XYZ\Y]^      i	=	1,	2,	.....,n	 	 	 	 (4.3) 
Next to this is the weight computation for each of the comparison criterion. This 
is done by first evaluating the entropy ej of each criterion C1, C2, ......., Cn 
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Let ej represent the entropy of the jth criterion. 
_W =	 :`a =∑ GW ln GW=Gc: 	 j	=	1,2..........m	 	 	 	 	 (4.4)	
Here, 1/ln m is a constant term and keeps the value of ej among 0 and 1.  
The weights of each criterion given by: 
eW =	 :fgZ∑ (:fgZ)hZ]^ 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.5)	
The positive and negative ideal solution is then determined. This gives the 
performance indicator for each of the criterion of comparison. 
ij = (	k  (G:),k  (G<),…… . .k  (G=))		 	 	 	 (4.6)	
ij = (	i:j	, i<j , …… . . ……… . . i=j)	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.7)	
and 	if = (	k  (G:),k  (G<),…… . .k  (G=))		 	 	 	 (4.8)	
if = (	i:f	, i<f , …… . . ……… . . i=f)	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.9)	
The distance of the criterion between the positive ideal and negative solutions is 
then computed. The following equation is used in the calculation of the 
Euclidean distance of each alternative to i:j and i:f: 
!Gj = l∑ eW(iWj − GWmWc: )<	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.10)	
!Gf = l∑ eW(GW −mWc: iWf)<	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.11)	
The !Gjgives the distance of the Vcriterion relative to the positive ideal solution 
while	!Gf	represents the distance of the	Vcriterion measured from the negative 
ideal solution. Finally, the preference order is then ranked.   
In principle, TOPSIS method is performed in such a way that the alternative 
chosen would have the “shortest distance” from the positive ideal solution and 
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the longest distance from the negative ideal solution. Though a very popular 
technique, some limitations of the method exists. These are listed below: 
1. It uses the Euclidean distance algorithm in principle, but the algorithm 
doesn’t consider the correlation of attributes. 
2. The weight coefficients are fixed using an expert method or AHP, which 
all have some elements of subjectivity 
 
4.4 The Fuzzy Concept  to FMECA 
Fuzzy logic is a form of multi-valued logic derived from fuzzy set theory to deal 
with reasoning that is approximate rather than precise (Mesut Kumru 2013). 
The variables in a fuzzy logic have membership values between 0 and 1. Here 
the degree of truth is not constraint to the truth values of (1) and (0) but can 
range in values of anything between 0 and 1. Hence, it provides a basis for 
approximate reasoning giving values that is not exact or say very exact. It offers 
a relatively more realistic framework or human reasoning rather than the 
traditional two-valued logic. Below is steps for the fuzzy logic algorithm:  
• Definition of linguistic variable and terms 
• Construction of membership function (MF) 
• Construction of the rule base 
• Fuzzification – Conversion of crisp values into their fuzzy values using 
MF 
• Evaluation of the rules in the rule base 
• Combination of the results in each rule base 
• De-fussification – conversion of the fussified values into crisp values 
 
Linguistic variables are basically inputs or output variables of systems whose 
values are words or sentences instead of numerical values. Generally, it is 
usually decomposed into a set of linguistic terms (Wang 2009, Chen 2000).  
Membership functions in fuzzy logic systems (FLS) are used in the fuzzification 
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and de-fuzzification in mapping non-fuzzy values to fuzzy linguistic terms and 
vice versa. It basically quantifies the value of a linguistic term. Different forms of 
membership functions exists – trapezoidal, piecewise linear, triangular, 
Gaussian or singleton (Chen 2000, Wang 2009).  
The triangular membership function is the most popular among all (Ahmet Can 
2012) and is represented with three points as A = (a1, a2, a3), see figure 52.  The 
membership function no( ) can be represented as follows: 
 
Figure 52 The triangular fuzzy 
Key merits of using the triangular fuzzy numbering are as follow (Braglia 2003):  
• Its relatively less complex in handling  
• It provides an easier and better raking result 
• It more effective in representing the judgement distribution of multiple 
experts 
Let X be a nonempty set. A fuzzy set A in X is characterised by its membership 
function no: q → [0,1] and no( )	 expresses the degree of membership of 
element x	in fuzzy set A for each  ∈ q.  
no( ) = 	tu
v Xfw^wxfw^ 				: ≤  ≤ <wyfXwyfwx 		< ≤  ≤ z0			 < :		 > z	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.12)	
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Where :, <, z are real numbers. Assuming that A and B are defined as  
A = (:, <, z) and B = (:,< , z). 
Then the addition of these variables, C will be represented as  
C = (: + :, < + <	, z + z), 
The subtraction D as  
D = (: − :, < − < , z − z),  
And the multiplication 
E = (:. :, < . < , z. z). 
Fuzzy FMECA allows the use of quantitative data and qualitative linguistic 
information to be analysed in a consistent way making it possible for the risk 
factors – severity, occurrence and detectability to be combined in a more 
flexible structure. However, Braglia (2000) and Braglia 2003 argue that ranking 
and priotising failure modes with the fuzzy if-then rules was faulty as the relative 
importance of the risk factors is not captured in the analysis. The author 
developed a geometric methodology for bridging this gap using linear 
programming. In Braglia et al 2003, a fuzzy TOPSIS methodology is developed 
which allows for the relative evaluation of the conventional FMECA risk factors 
(O, D and S) capturing the importance of their weights using the triangular fuzzy 
numbers. The fuzzy TOPSIS methodology is explained in the following sections. 
 
4.5 The Fuzzy TOPSIS methodology 
The fuzzy multi-criteria decision methodology is a preferred approach for 
bridging the gaps and limitations in the conventional FMEA approaches (Ahmet 
2012, Liu 2013). Sodhi 2012 confirms that the fuzzy TOPSIS method is an 
objective, systematic and efficient strategy of evaluating alternatives on multiple 
criteria analysis based on a selected set of criteria. In the fuzzy TOPSIS 
analysis, the alternative closest to the fuzzy positive ideal solution (FPIS) and 
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farthest from the fuzzy negative ideal solution (FNIS) is selected as the optimal 
alternative. FPIS is indicative of a higher performance compared to that of the 
FNIS, which is being attributed to a worse performance. According to Lee 
(2013), the use of FUZZY TOPSIS has the following advantages: 
• A sound logic that represents the rationale of human choice; 
• A scalar value that accounts for both the best and worst alternatives 
simultaneously 
• A simple computation process that can be easily programmable.  
• the performance measures for all alternatives can be visualised  
In Summary, there is no fool-proof map of how to manage risks in deepwater 
completion projects (Tomaso 2009). The FMEA is a qualitative analysis outlines 
all the possible failures that may be encountered during equipment’s operational 
lifecycle. It is implemented early during the system’s design phase and often the 
first step in the evaluation of subsea systems reliability. During the exercise, as 
many components, sub-assemblies, assemblies, sub-systems and systems as 
possible is being reviewed with the purpose of identifying failure modes, causes 
and their respective effects. Though often finalized during the detailed 
engineering stage of a project, the list of the failure modes is often not 
exhaustive as more failure modes could be generated during the equipment 
lifecycle. 
It is therefore recommended that instead of finalizing the FMEA/FMECA 
documentation at the detailed design stage, documentations indicating an 
FMEA/FMECA conducted before and after the detailed design stage should be 
maintained for future referencing for system maintenance and design 
improvements of future projects. For a subsea control module (SCM), the 
FMECA serves a particularly useful tool for generating all possible failures that 
could be encountered by the system. For this report, the fuzzy TOPSIS FMEA 
method is being proposed. Figure 53 gives a general overview on the fuzzy 
TOPSIS methodology: 
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Figure 53  Fuzzy TOPSIS Methodology 
In fuzzy TOPSIS application, the importance (weight) of each evaluation criterion is 
expressed in linguistic terms as shown in table 15 (Chen 2000, Braglia 2000). 
Table 15 Linguistic scale for importance weight of each criterion (Ri) 
Linguistic variable 
Corresponding triangular fuzzy number 
(TFN) 
Very Low (VL) 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Low (L) 0.0 0.1 0.3 
Medium (M) 0.3 0.5 0.7 
High (H) 0.7 0.9 1.0 
Very High (VH) 0.9 1.0 1.0 
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Similarly, the linguistic scale for evaluating the SCM failure modes to the 
corresponding risk factors is depicted in table 16 (Chen 2000, Braglia 2000). 
 
Table 16 Linguistic scale for rating the SCM failure modes against the risk factors 
Linguistic variable Fuzzy Score 
Very Low (VL) 0 0 1 
Low (L) 0 1 3 
Medium Low (ML) 1 3 5 
Medium (M) 3 5 7 
Medium High (MH) 5 7 9 
High (H) 7 9 10 
Very High (VH) 9 10 10 
 
Consider that we have K number of experts or decision makers making use of the 
linguistic variables shown in table 15 and 16 to evaluate the weight of each criterion 
and the rating of these criterions to the corresponding alternatives, the fuzzy 
rating and importance weight of a kth decision maker about an ith alternatives 
based on jth criterion are: 
 GW{ = (GW{ , GW{ , |GW{ , )	and	eW:{ , eW<{ ,eWz{ )	respectively	 	 	 	 (4.13)	
where i=1,2,…,m, and j=1,2,…,n. Then the aggregated rating, xij of the 
alternatives (i) in correspondence to the respective criterion (j) is given by:  GW =(GW, GW, |GW), where: 
GW = 	mG={ {GW{ },		GW = :∑ GW{{GW ,	and		|GW = 	mwX{ {|GW{ },			 	 	 (4.14)	
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Similarly, the aggregated weights eGW of each criterion is eGW = (eW:, eW< , eWz), 
where 
	eW: =	mG={ {eW{:},		eW< = 	 :∑eW{< ,		,	and		eWz = 	mwX{ {eW{z}	 	 (4.15)	
Accordingly, a fuzzy decision matrix of the alternatives can then be represented 
in the format below: 
                                                            	|:				|<…… . |= 
    				 = 								 :<m 
 :: <:… m:
 :< <<… m<
…… GW…
 := <=… m= 
 =	e:, e<,…………..e= denoting the weight of the criterion. 
Here xij are built by failure modes G( = 1,… . . k), which are evaluated against 
criterion 9W = 1, …… . . ). To avoid complication, a linear scale transformation is 
used for the normalisation process of the criteria scale. The fuzzy normalised 
decision matrix, 
	 = ̃GWm==		
::<:⋮m:
:<::⋮m<
……⋮
:=::⋮m=		 	 	 	 	 	 (4.16)	
Where i=1, 2, …m, j=1,2….,n. The normalised values for benefit and cost 
related criteria are as shown below: 
̃GW = 	wYZZ∗ , YZZ∗ , YZZ∗,	and	|W∗ = 	 YZG ; (  ∈ ¡, __	|_)	 	 (4.17)	
̃GW = 	wZ¢YZ , wZ¢YZ , wZ¢YZ,	and	Wf =	TawYZG ; (  ∈ 9, |£	|_)	 	 (4.18)	
The normalisation process here preserves and maintains the triangular fuzzy 
numbers within the range [0, 1]. Considering the weight of each criterion, the 
weighted normalised fuzzy matrix is computed as: 
¤¥ = [iGW]m= ,	i=1,	2…m;	j=1,2….n	 	 	 	 	 	 								(4.19)	
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Where iGW =	 ̃GW(. )e¦W 
The fuzzy positive ideal solution (FPIS) and fuzzy ideal negative solution (FNIS) 
of the failure modes (Ai) are then defined as follows: 
∗ = (i§:∗ , i§<∗, …… , i§=∗)		 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.20)	
eℎ__, iW∗ = 	k  	¨iGWz©,			 = 1,2,… . . , k;   = 1,2,…… . . ,  
 
f = (i§:f , i§<f, …… , i§=f)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (4.21)	
eℎ__, iWf =	k 	¨iGW:©,			 = 1,2,… . . , k;   = 1,2,…… . . ,  
The distances (!G∗	!	!Gf) of the failure modes (Ai, i=1,2….m), from the FPIS 
(A*) and FNIS (A-) respectively is computed as follows: 
!G∗ = ∑ !ª=Wc: «i§GW, i§W∗¬,  = 1,2,… ,k.		 	 	 	 	 (4.22)	
!Gf = ∑ !ª=Wc: «i§GW, i§Wf¬,  = 1,2,… ,k	 	 	 	 	 (4.23)	
Where !ª(§, ¥) denotes the Euclidean distance between two fuzzy numbers §	and	¥. 
The closeness coefficient 99G  is then calculated to determine the ranking of 
each alternative (Ai, i=1,2,…..m). The closeness coefficient,  
 
99G = 	 Y¢Y¢jY∗ , eℎ__	 = 1,2,…………k.		 	 	 	 	 (4.24)	
With respect to the SCM failure modes evaluation using the fuzzy TOPSIS 
methodology, the failure mode with the highest closeness coefficient 99G 
represents the concept with the highest risk and is closest to the FPIS and 
farthest from the FNIS. The sheer implication of this is that the component with 
this failure mode would require a closer attention and focus for subsea control 
 129 
module (SCM) design evaluation, close attention during manufacturing and 
would demand a good attention during installation and operations.  
4.5.1 The Survey and Data gathering 
Risk analysis requires a lot of data for the system under examination. Obtaining 
a representative set of data for the system or component is a very challenging 
task. In offshore oil and gas, this is complicated due to the move into deep and 
ultra-deepwaters with the application of new and often unproven technologies 
application in the environment. 
Common sources for obtaining data are: 
• Industry data banks (OREDA, Wellmaster, WOAD, E&P Forum) 
• Vendor Data 
• Expert judgements 
• Synthesized Data 
• Combination of the above methods 
Industry data represents data obtained from operators, OEMs and similar 
companies typically from a defined joint industry project and are often limited to 
the experience and environment for which they were obtained.  
Prominent in the offshore industry is the OREDA database. The OREDA Joint 
Industry Project (JIP) consists ten (10) major oil companies and acts as the hub 
for managing and coordinating reliability data collection. The OREDA subsea 
software covers subsea equipment such as umbilical, Xmas trees, control 
systems, template, manifolds, and subsea pumps, including critical components 
such as valves, connectors and sensors. More information on OREDA is 
provided in section 7.2. Use of this data for system evaluation requires a certain 
level of understanding for proper application. If available and where applicable 
vendor data could be very useful. Vendor data are typically obtained from an 
OEM across the equipment life-cycle from design through testing, 
manufacturing and even decommissioning. They are often combined along with 
expert judgment when required. Expert judgments are very useful for system 
reliability analysis where historical data is either sparse or totally unavailable.  
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Synthesised data applies when no explicit historical data is available for a 
system reliability analysis. Closely related to expert judgement, it is based on a 
ranking technique which produces a numerical encoding of results about the 
probability of failure. New technologies and environments typically involve 
innovative features that cannot be addressed by the existing scenario or 
normative standards. This is particularly peculiar in the subsea industry as 
developments shift into deeper waters and harsher unpredictable environments. 
Expert opinion plays a key role in evaluating the risk and reliability of systems in 
this terrain. The data used in this analysis were obtained through expert 
elicitation (EE). To ensure credibility, a systematic process is applied for 
obtaining and processing of the data. Below are some steps that were taken 
during the survey in order to ensure a more objective and accurate results: 
• Each of the experts were engaged in a structured interview. Twenty five 
experts were contacted, but ten of them responded. This added to the 
project cost as the experts were spread across different continents of the 
world. The approach was adopted in order to add value to the whole 
research, but was time consuming. 
• Experts were interviewed across different operating units and across 
continents from Europe, Africa through to Americas. This ensured the 
decisions were not skewed 
• The list of experts came from the major oil and gas operators, subsea 
equipment manufacturers down to the engineering consultancy firms. 
• The experts were given an opportunity to revise their assessments 
before sending in the final results 
• During the engagement, the experts were asked to state the rationale 
behind their evaluations. 
The key limitation with the use of data databases is that the information is 
skewed to the function specification of the system under study including the 
specific environment being examined. Results may be different with varying 
system specification, usage and environmental parameters. For expert 
judgement, the limitation is that the results obtained is relatively subjective and 
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in congruent with the exposure, knowledge and know-how of the experts 
involved in the analysis.  
A survey was designed for evaluating the weight of the SCM risk factors 
including the rating of these risk factors to the corresponding failure modes. Ten 
(10) reputable experts in the offshore subsea industry cutting across Oil and 
Gas operators, original equipment manufacturers (OEM) to subsea systems 
industry design consultants were used for the exercise. The survey had two 
sections. The first section focused on the importance of the risk factors. This is 
called weight evaluation and represents the significance of the respective risk 
factors in the SCM system reliability. In the second section, the risk factors were 
then used in establishing a rating with the respective failure modes. 
 
4.5.1.1 Characterisation of Experts 
The SCM survey was conducted using very experienced offshore engineering 
professionals with proven practice in the subsea industry. Below are brief 
profiles of the experts that were used for this analysis: 
Decision Expert-1: 
This expert has over fifteen years of experience in the offshore subsea industry. 
He has worked across the entire system lifecycle from field concept evaluation 
studies, concept selection, concept definition down to equipment construction, 
installation, pre-commissioning and commissioning. The expert is specialised in 
subsea controls and currently works for an operator group. He has been 
involved in several subsea failure and root cause analysis for field controls 
failure. 
Decision Expert-2: 
Decision expert is a subsea controls expert working for a top subsea equipment 
original equipment manufacturer. He has been involved for over ten years in the 
manufacturing, testing, installation and retrieval of subsea control module. 
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Expert currently works for a controls equipment manufacturer in the United 
Kingdom. 
 
Decision Expert-3: 
This is a subsea controls reliability expert currently working for a subsea 
engineering organization as a controls expert. With about twenty years’ 
experience in the oil and gas industry, the expert has worked for several years 
as a client representative on subsea engineering controls projects. His 
experience span delivery in the North-Sea and the West African waters. 
Decision Expert-4: 
Expert works for an operator as a subsea site representative on subsea 
hardware covering subsea control module, subsea distribution units (SDUs), 
Umbilical termination units (UTAs) including Electrical and hydraulic flying 
leads. He has about ten years’ experience in the subsea industry. Expert has 
been involved in extensive subsea equipment testing in manufacturing yards 
cutting across, Norway, Houston, United Kingdom and several other locations in 
the world. 
Decision Expert-5 
Decision expert 5 works for a major international IOC in West Africa. Expert 
also has a practical subsea equipment manufacturing experience for several 
years working as a project engineer responsible for the delivery of subsea 
controls equipment. Expert has a huge experience in subsea tree systems from 
vertical right through to the horizontal enhanced deepwater tree systems. 
Decision Expert-6 
This specialist expert works with subsea equipment manufacturer and has 
twenty years’ experience of subsea equipment’s manufacturing, testing 
including offshore installations in shallow, deep and ultra-Deepwater. Expert is 
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also a specialist in hydraulic systems with several years of hydraulic systems 
design engineer. 
 
 
Decision Expert-7 
Decision Expert with a top oil and gas operator. He has worked on several 
offshore projects with cognate experience in Deepwater controls. Expert has 
been involves in the operation of several subsea assets in the West-African 
waters. Expert works as a subsea operations engineer with eight years of 
experience supporting shallow and deepwater subsea operations. 
Decision Expert-8 
Expert works for an operator group as a Senior Subsea Engineer responsible 
for delivery of deepwater projects. He is directly responsible for testing of 
subsea control equipment and the subsea intervention portfolio. He has been 
involved in several subsea systems qualification from tree systems to the tie-
ins. Expert has been involved in systems failure analysis for subsea systems. 
Decision Expert-9 
Decision expert here is a controls technician with a top equipment manufacturer 
that has been involved in the manufacturing, testing, running and retrieval of 
subsea control modules for over twenty years. Technician has experience 
across three of the four major subsea equipment manufacturing companies. His 
experience spans the North sea and the West-african waters. Expert also has 
experience working as a systems reliability engineer in a consulting portfolio. 
Decision Expert-10 
This expert is a consultant in subsea controls technology with twenty five (25) 
years of experience. Trusted with several years of practical experience on 
subsea production systems. His experience cuts across Gulf of Mexico, North-
sea and the West African waters.  
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4.5.2 The Risk Factors – Expanding conventional factors 
A lot of risk factors affect the reliability of the subsea control module (SCM) 
operation. This ranges from the subsea field architecture, tie-back distance, 
water depth, safety requirements and other environmental requirements.  
Conventionally, three parameters have been used for the failure modes effect 
criticality analysis (FMECA) and the criticality ranking of the failure modes. 
These are occurrence (O), Severity (S) and detectability. These three factors do 
not present the true picture of the associated risks in the system. For this 
reason, they have been broken down into more appreciable units for better 
comprehension. Figure 54, shows the breakdown of the conventional risk 
factors into ten risk factors. 
 
Figure 54 Breakdown of the conventional FMECA risk factors 
Occurrence here, presents the probability of the respective failure modes to 
occur. It, however, does not in any way define the environment or functional 
boundary for which the probability is being predicted. This makes the value a bit 
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vague and unrepresentative of the true setting for the evaluation of the failure 
probability. In order to make this more explicit and paint the picture of the true 
scenario, the occurrence parameter as a risk has been split into three different 
factors namely: 
• Occurrence associated with water depth (R1) 
• Occurrence under normal operation (R2) 
• Occurrence under extreme conditions (R3) 
R1 here represents the risk of failures in relation to increase in water depth. In 
the ocean environment, every 10m increase in water depth represents a 
proportional hydrostatic pressure increase of 1bar with attendant effect on 
subsea systems. The change in pressure, temperature, salinity and other depth-
varying sea parameters constitute potential sources of failure to the SCM. The 
R1 evaluates these in correspondence to each of the failure modes. 
R2 evaluates the probability of the system failure under a defined set of 
functional design parameters. SCMs designed within a known operational 
boundary are still known to fail even with correctly defined functional 
parameters. This parameter is used in rating such failures. 
Sometimes the SCM is found operate in unpredictable conditions that are 
outside their standard design specifications like higher pressure ratings, 
temperature range, salinity…etc. The R3 factor evaluates the probability of 
failure occurring if the system is operated outside its defined design 
specification. For example, what is the probability that an SCM designed to 
operate with a maximum LP working pressure of 3000psi will fail if the actual 
flow pressure in the LP circuitry increases to 4500psi. 
In the same way as occurrence, the severity parameter in FMECA analysis is 
an assessment of the seriousness of a failure mode on the user or customer if 
the corresponding failure occurs. The parameter is a bit vague as it does give in 
quantitative terms the value of the severity in terms of cost, impact to the 
environment or associated personnel. In this evaluation, the parameter is split 
into the following risk factors: 
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• Direct Cost of failure (R4)    
• Indirect cost of failure (R5) 
• Failure impact on environnent (R6) 
• Fatality associated with failure (R7) 
• Risk to business – non-financial (R8) 
SCM component failure leads to loss in revenue as the part/subsystem system 
may require repair or outright replacement. The R4 risk factor rates the failure 
modes in terms of the market cost of the corresponding component that failed. 
This factor is attributed to the direct cost associated with repair or outright 
replacement of the faulty component (e.g. cost of SCM filter, cost of LP sensor, 
unit cost of DCV…etc. 
Indirect cost of failure (R5) evaluates the level of secondary cost associated with 
restoring the component function back to service. A typical failure in the 
offshore environment requires the hiring of a maintenance vessel in order to 
have access to the component or system for repair or replacement. These 
vessels come at very high and prohibitive values. The SCM under evaluation is 
electro-hydraulic with the application of electrical as well as hydraulic power for 
control. Principally, two types of hydraulic fluids are in use – water-based and 
oil-based. These all come at their respective level of contamination if 
discharged to sea during operation whether by design or by accident. The R6 
factor evaluates the impact of each of the failure modes to the offshore 
environment. This measure considers parameters like discharge to sea and 
failure impact on aquatic life.   
R7 assesses the severity of the failure modes in terms on the number of lives 
that may be lost as a result of such a failure mode. For SCMs that operate in 
deep and ultra-deep waters, this would be unlikely as the operation is typically 
performed using the remote operated vehicle (ROV). However, this may not be 
completely ruled out in shallow waters where divers are sometimes used. Loss 
of live may occur from failures associated with the high pressure systems and 
even with failures associated with the power units. 
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Not all effects associated with failures could actually be quantified in terms of 
cost, impact to environment or fatality. Some failures may have effect in the 
business on a global perspective. This value is being assessed using R8 - Risk 
to business – non-financial. For example, a failure in the HP circuitry that leads 
to a shutdown of the well means a reduction in production to the offshore field 
operator. Due to the huge risks involved, most oil and gas fields are run in a 
joint venture (JV) arrangement with other firms and sometimes even the 
government of the country of operation. Incessant shutdown of a well (s) due to 
the failure of the surface controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV), for 
example, may lead to a poor reputation of the firm in the face of its partners 
because of the associated loss in production. In the same way, frequent 
contamination of seawater due to failure of the SCM might lead to litigation with 
the environmental agencies and other regulation authorities. Cumulatively, the 
company may lose public respect, business partnership and may be disallowed 
into subsequent biddings for new oil blocks in the country of operation.  
Other risk factors used in this evaluation are: 
• Detectability (R9) and  
• Redundancy (R10) 
These factors are principally safeguards, which are introduced into the system 
to enhance system availability. The R9 factor evaluates the ease for which a 
failure mode occurrence could be detected. Sensors are the primary means of 
failure detection in subsea systems. They provide process data and parameters 
for assessing the condition of the equipment. Examples of sensors in the 
subsea environment are combined pressure and temperature sensors, flow 
sensors, level sensors, pressure sensors, sand detectors/fluid cleanliness, 
temperature sensor, valve position sensor...etc. Not all failure modes could be 
detected using sensors. This factor evaluates the risk involved in the inability to 
detect the respective failure mode. 
Due to the huge risk associated with failure of systems in the subsea 
environment, most systems are operated in redundancy. Though, not a direct 
function of detectability, redundancy also helps to detect if a subsystem or 
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component is operational or faulty. The R10 factor assesses the risk associated 
with the requirement and loss of redundancy in relation to the corresponding 
failure mode. For example, in a typical SCM, there are two subsea electronic 
modules (SEMs) operated in redundancy. If one fails, the system switches to 
the next for continued operations. Loss of this redundant SEM means a loss of 
power to all the LP and DCVs and a total loss of communications from the 
downhole well system as well as a loss in signal to the topside operator. The 
impact here is severe as it leads to a total shutdown of the well and required a 
support vessel for the retrieval of the SCM in order to fix the failure. 
The R9 and R10 risk factors bother on the system safeguards to failure. 
Redundancy prevents a complete failure of the entire system due to the failure 
of a component or subsystem. Detectability allows for quick and easy detection 
of potent failure in the system allowing for time for mitigation measures to be 
taken. 
In summary, the risk factors being considered in the evaluation are listed below: 
Table 17 Risk Factors - Expanded conventional risk factors 
Risk ID The risk Factors 
R1 Occurrence associated with water depth 
R2 Occurrence under normal operation 
R3 Occurrence under extreme conditions 
R4 Direct Cost of failure 
R5 Indirect cost of failure 
R6 Failure impact on environment 
R7 Fatality associated with failure 
R8 Risk to business – non-financial 
R9 Detectability 
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R10 Redundancy 
4.5.3 The SCM failure modes under Evaluation 
The failure modes (FMi) under consideration are the thirty (30) drawn from a 
comprehensive evaluation of SCM failure modes considering each of the key 
components and subsystems in the subsea control module and the 
corresponding possible causes of their failures. 
• Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit (F1) 
• SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure (F2) 
• Total Loss of signal from the SEM module (F3) 
• Loss of LP hydraulic filtration (F4) 
• Severe leakage from HP DCV (F5) 
• Loss of HP hydraulic filtration (F6) 
• Loss of HP Accumulation (F7) 
• Severe leakage from LP DCV (F8) 
• Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve (F9) 
• Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve (F10) 
• Loss of LP accumulation (F11) 
• Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line (F12) 
• Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header (F13) 
• Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line (F14) 
• LP selector valve fails to open (F15) 
• Loss of SCM pressure compensation (F16) 
• HP DCV fails to open on command (F17) 
• LP DCV fails to open on command (F18) 
• HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position (F19) 
• HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position (F20) 
• LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position (F21) 
• Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor (F22) 
• LP selector valve spuriously closes (F23) 
• LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position (F24) 
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• Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure (F25) 
• Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure (F26) 
• Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow (F27) 
• Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow (F28) 
• Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring (F29) 
• Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring (F30) 
The SEM is responsible for the supply of power to the various components of 
the SCM. A loss of power from the SEM unit (F1) means a total failure of the 
system. The SCM is equipped with a check valve, principally responsible for 
preventing seawater ingress into the SCM and as safety release of 
overpressure in the SCM chamber. Failure of this (F2) leads to a water ingress 
into the SCM. The SEM also coordinates all condition monitoring signals in the 
SCM and downhole instrumentations relaying same to the topside units. Loss of 
this (F3), leads to total loss of subsea control. Clean fluid is quite key in the 
delivery of subsea controls. A loss of filtration (F4 and F6) leads to blockage in 
the control tubings and loss of controls. Leakage of DCVs in the SCM (F5, F8, F9, 
F10, and F13) leads to loss of hydraulic power in the SCM. This is particularly 
important in the electro-hydraulic (EH) SCM where the valves are hydraulically 
powered. A loss in in accumulation (F7 and F11) occurs as a result of the inability 
of the subsea accumulator in the SCM to hold hydraulic power. This failure 
mode leads to the entire system shutdown and loss of production. Sometimes, 
spurious signals trigger the shutdown of SCM valves F19 and F24). This failure 
mode could lead to a loss in production. The failure of either an LP or HP 
shuttle valve to change over from its initial position is critical to SCM operations. 
This is because the valve is mostly implemented as a single unit, so this failure 
mode (F12 and F14) leads to a loss total loss in hydraulic control for either LP or 
HP. Valves sometimes get stuck to their last position of operation either in the 
open, close or midway for several reasons ranging from loss in power, wears 
and tear, debris, unclean fluids and other mechanical failures. These failure 
modes (F15, F17, F18, and F20) lead to loss in hydraulic control of the valve under 
operation. Condition monitoring data from the SCM is very key to the evaluation 
and control of subsea systems. Loss of these signals lead to loss in critical 
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information and control of the SCM. The consequence is sometimes as high as 
a total loss in production as the system may shutdown with a clear reason of 
known logic. Failure modes associated with this are F25, F26, F27, F28, F29, and 
F30
.
  
4.5.4 The SCM Fuzzy TOPSIS Evaluation 
Ten experts, D1 to D10, from the subsea industry used the weighing variables 
shown in table 15 to assess the importance of the risk factors (see section 
4.3.1.1 above). The rating of these risk factors against the failure modes was 
also evaluated by each of them. The evaluation is such that, for example, if 
increase in water depth increases the probability of occurrence of that failure 
mode, the rating value is expected to have a high value and vice versa. A high 
value for all the risk factors imply a big risk for the respective failure mode being 
evaluated. 
The experts used the weighing variables shown in table 15 to assess the 
importance of the risk factors listed in section 4.3.1.1. The results are presented 
in table 18. Clearly, from the table, the experts believe that increase in water 
depth is a key factor that would affect the reliability of water depth. Nine of the 
experts give the risk factor (R1) a VH, with only one ticking an H. The next 
highest is the indirect cost of failure (R2) factor. This is not strange because a 
typical failure in the subsea control module would require hiring an expensive 
offshore support vessel (OSV) equipped with a remote operated vessel (ROV) 
for effecting the repair subsea and most times a retrieval, repairs and re-
installation of the module. Typical cost for such operations run into millions of 
dollars. This is further amplified by the cost of deferred production as the well 
may have to remain shut down for such operations, a huge loss to the operating 
company. 
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Table 18  Importance weight of the risk factors. 
 
At the bottom of the weight scale are the direct cost of failure factor (R4) and 
fatality related with the failure modes (R7). The direct cost of failure refers to the 
flat cost of the failed component if an outright replacement is considered without 
looking at lost production, cost of a repair vessel or any other cost required to fix 
the failure. This value is normally quite small in comparison to those that would 
be incurred indirectly as a result of a component failure. The SCM is typically 
placed thousands of kilometres on a subsea hardware unit and remotely 
operated through an umbilical system from a topside facility. For deep and ultra-
Deepwater operations, divers are not allowed at this depth, hence the chance of 
fatality (R7) is virtually eliminated. Again, the tree valves in the production bore 
controlled by the SCM are usually of fail-safe-close configuration. The means a 
complete loss of hydraulic control from the SCM to the tree system will lead to a 
closure of all the valves in the production tubing. Hence, no direct effect on the 
topside system and personnel. For shallow water intervention, however, divers 
come in very handy and fatality cannot be totally ruled out. 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Occurrence associated with water depth, R1 VH VH VH H VH VH VH VH VH VH
 Occurrence under normal operation, R2 VH H H VH VH VH VH VH H H
Occurrence under extreme conditions, R3 H H H H M H H H M M
Direct Cost of failure, R4 M M M M H H H H H VH
Indirect cost of failure, R5 VH VH VH H VH VH VH VH H H
Failure impact on environment, R6 M M H H M M M H H H
Fatality associated with failure, R7 L L M L M M L M H M
Risk to business – non-financial, R8 H H M H M M M M M M
Detectability, R9 VH H H VH H M H H VH VH
Redundancy, R10 H H VH H VH VH VH H VH H
Importance weight Evaluation
 143 
Next, the experts use the linguistic variables shown in table 16 to evaluate the 
rating of the risk factors to the corresponding failure modes. Result is shown in 
Appendic C. The fuzzy Decision matrix and fuzzy weights of the failure modes 
applying tables 15 and 16 to tables 17 and Appendix C respectively is as shown 
in table 19. Though experts were accessed across the globe, he results showed 
a very high level of consistency with very minor deviations in the values 
provided. 
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Table 19 Fuzzy decision matrix for the failure modes (Fi) and the respective weights of the risk factors (Ri)
R1  R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10
(0.7, 0.99, 1.0) (0.7, 0.96, 1.0) (0.3, 0.78, 1.0) (0.3, 075, 1.0) (0.7, 0.97, 1.0) (0.3, 0.7, 1.0) (0.0, 3.9, 1.0) (0.3, 0.6, 1.0) (0.3, 0.9, 1.0) (0.7, 0.95, 1.0)
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 (0, 0.8, 3) (5, 7.8, 10) (7, 9.9, 10) (7, 9.4, 10) (9, 10, 10) (0, 0.3, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 2.1, 7) (0, 0.9, 3) (9, 10, 10)
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 (5, 9.3, 10) (0, 0.9, 5) (7, 9.6, 10) (3, 5.0, 7) (7, 9.9, 10) (0, 3, 10) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.7, 7) (7, 9, 10) (1, 4.8, 5)
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 (0, 1.8, 7) (1, 5.2, 9) (7, 9.4, 10) (7, 9.3, 10) (9, 10, 10) (0, 0.7, 7) (0, 0, 1) (0, 1.7, 7) (0, 0.2, 3) (7, 9.8, 10)
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 (0, 0.4, 3) (0, 0.9, 5) (7, 9.5, 10) (, 7.2, 10) (5, 7.2, 10) (0, 0.2, 3) (0, 0, 1) (0, 2.8, 5) (7, 9.8, 10) (7, 9.2, 10)
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 (0, 1.4, 5) (0, 4.2, 7) (7, 9.3, 10) (3, 7.8, 9) (7, 0.1, 3) (7, 9.2, 10) (0, 0.1, 3) (5, 7 9) (0, 2.0, 7) (5, 8.2, 10)
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 2.8, 7) (5, 8.7, 10) (0, 1.0, 3) (7, 9.6, 10) (0, 1.2,10) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 1.0, 5) (7, 9.4, 10) (5, 8.0, 10)
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 (3, 5.6, 9) (0, 0.7, 5) (5, 8.9, 10) (3, 6.4, 9) (5, 7.2, 10) (0, 0.4, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (1, 3.8, 7) (0, 2.8, 7) (5, 7.4, 10)
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 (0, 1.5, 5) (0, 1.3, 7) (7, 9.5, 10) (3, 5.4, 9) (7, 9, 10) (3, 5, 7) (0, 0.1, 3) (3, 3.6, 9) (0, 0.4, 3) (3, 7.8, 10)
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 (0, 1.6, 5) (0, 1.4, 7) (7, 9.9, 10) (3, 5.8, 9) (7, 9.9, 10) (1, 5, 7) (0, 0.1, 3) (3, 5.4, 9) (0, 2.0, 5) (5, 8.2, 10)
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 (0, 2.0, 5) (0, 1.0, 5) (7, 9.6, 10) (3, 6.2, 9) (7, 9.9, 10) (0, 1.6, 5) (0, 0.1, 3) (3, 5, 7) (0, 1.2, 5) (3, 8,2, 10)
Loss of LP accumulation F11 (3, 6.4, 10) (0, 0.7, 5) (7, 9.6, 10) (1, 6.4, 9) (7, 9.6, 10) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 2.8, 5) (0, 2.2, 5) (5, 7.8, 10)
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 (0, 1.0, 5) (0, 0.5, 3) (7, 9.6, 10) (3, 6.2, 9) (7, 9.1, 10) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 1.2, 5) (0, 0.7, 3) (3, 7.4, 10)
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 (0, 0.8, 5) (0, 0.4, 5) (7, 9.7, 10) (1, 6.4, 9) (7, 9.9, 10) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.1, 3) (5, 7.6, 10) (0, 0.8, 3) (5, 7.6, 10)
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 (0, 1.7, 5) (0, 0.6, 3) (7, 9.7, 10) (1, 6.0, 9) (7, 9, 10) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 1.6, 7) (0, 0.1, 3) (5, 8.4, 10)
LP selector valve fails to open F15 (0, 1.3, 5) (0, 1.3, 5) (5, 9.2, 10) (3, 6.4, 9) (5, 8.8, 10)  (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 1, 3) (0, 1.1, 5) (3, 5.6, 9)
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 (7, 9.6, 10) (7, 8.6, 10) (7, 9.6, 10) (3, 6.0, 9) (7, 9.9, 10) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0, 1) (3, 5, 7) (0, 2.6, 5) (3, 6.2, 9)
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 (0, 1.2, 5) (0, 1.5, 5) (5, 9.2, 10) (1, 6.4, 9) (5, 8.6, 10) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.8, 3) (0, 1.3, 5) (5, 8.6, 10)
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 (1, 1.8, 7) (0, 1.2, 5) (5, 8.6, 10) (0, 5.6, 9) (5, 8.6, 10) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.5, 3) (0, 0.9, 5) (3, 6.0, 10)
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 (0, 2.2, 5) (0, 1.3, 5) (5, 7.7, 10) (0, 5.8, 9) (5, 7.8, 10) (0, 0.8, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.3, 3) (0, 1.6, 7) (3, 5.6, 9)
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 (0, 0.5, 3) (0, 1.2, 5) (7, 9.6, 10) (0, 6.0, 9) (5, 8.0, 10) (0, 0.8, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.4, 3) (0, 0, 1) (3, 5.8, 9)
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 (0, 1.1, 5) (0, 1.4, 5) (5, 9.4, 10) (1, 6.2, 9) (5, 8.4, 10) (0, 0.7, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.6, 3) (0, 1.4, 5) (3, 5.2, 9)
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.5, 3) (7, 9.3, 10) (0, 1.6, 5) (5, 7.8, 10) (1, 3, 5) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 1, 7) (0, 0.3, 3) (3, 5.8, 10)
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.1, 3) (5, 8.7, 10) (0, 5.4, 9) (5, 8.6, 10) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.7, 3) (0, 0.5, 7) (3, 5.6, 10)
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0, 1) (5, 9.1, 10) (1, 5.6, 9) (5, 8.6, 10) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (1, 5.2, 9) (0, 1.3, 7) (1, 4.4, 10)
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 (0, 0.2, 3) (0, 0.8, 5) (5, 9.3, 10) (0, 3.2, 7) (7, 9, 10) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.2, 3) (0, 0.7, 5) (1, 4.0, 7)
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 (0, 0.3, 3) (0, 0.6, 5) (7, 9.7, 10) (0, 3.2, 7) (5, 7.6, 10) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 1.0, 5) (0, 0.4, 5) (1, 4.2, 10)
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 (0, 0.3, 3) (0, 0.6, 5) (5, 9.2, 10) (0, 2.2, 7) (0, 6.4, 9) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.9, 5) (0, 0.5, 5) (1, 4.8, 10)
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 (0, 0.2, 3) (0, 0.8, 5) (7, 9.7, 10) (0, 2.8, 7) (3, 6.8, 9) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 1.3, 5) (0, 0.7, 5) (1, 3.8, 7)
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 (0, 0.3, 3) (0, 1.3, 5) (7, 9.8, 10) (0, 2.4, 7) (3, 5.6, 9) (0, 1, 3) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 1.4, 5) (0, 0.6, 5) (1, 4.2, 7)
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 (0, 0.3, 3) (0, 0.8, 5) (5, 8.9, 10) (0, 2.6, 7) (3, 5.2, 9) (0, 0, 1) (0, 0.1, 3) (0, 0.9, 3) (0, 1.0, 5) (1, 3.2, 7)
Failure 
Mode ID
Failure Modes
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Applying equation 4.17 and 4.18, the fuzzy decision matrix is normalised and 
the weight applied. This leads to a normalised weighed fuzzy matrix. Next, the 
fuzzy positive ideal solution (FPIS) and the fuzzy negative ideal solution (FNIS) 
is obtained as shown below: 
 
The distance of the failure modes to the FPIS and FNIS is then evaluated using 
the vertex method (equation 16 and 17). A correlation coefficient for each failure 
mode is evaluated and ranked (see table 20 and figure 55). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FPIS: F* = [(1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1)]
FNIS: F
-
[(0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0.15, 0.15, 0.15), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0), (0.07, 0.07, 0.07)]
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Table 20 Summary of the failure modes evaluation using Fuzzy TOPSIS methodology with Unconventional parameters 
 
R1  R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 d
+ R1  R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 d
- CCi
d (F1, F*) 0.88 0.57 0.47 0.49 0.21 0.90 0.77 0.79 0.88 0.22 6.18 d (F1, F
-
) 0.18 0.75 0.61 0.72 0.88 0.17 0.58 0.41 0.18 0.81 5.29 6.15
d (F2, F*) 0.38 0.78 0.48 0.66 0.30 0.74 0.90 0.82 0.59 0.69 6.32 d (F2, F
-
) 0.81 0.29 0.60 0.46 0.85 0.59 0.19 0.40 0.74 0.33 5.28 6.11
d (F3, F*) 0.77 0.63 0.48 0.49 0.21 0.82 0.90 0.80 0.90 0.30 6.30 d (F3, F
-
) 0.42 0.60 0.60 0.71 0.88 0.41 0.19 0.41 0.17 0.77 5.16 5.97
d (F4, F*) 0.90 0.88 0.48 0.59 0.41 0.91 0.90 0.80 0.46 0.30 6.64 d (F4, F
-
) 0.17 0.29 0.60 0.66 0.73 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.78 0.75 4.66 5.36
d (F5, F*) 0.81 0.73 0.48 0.58 0.30 0.50 0.77 0.60 0.77 0.40 5.93 d (F5, F
-
) 0.30 0.47 0.59 0.62 0.84 0.70 0.58 0.58 0.42 0.69 5.79 6.77
d (F6, F*) 0.91 0.82 0.52 0.88 0.41 0.78 0.77 0.84 0.46 0.40 6.81 d (F6, F
-
) 0.17 0.43 0.58 0.18 0.73 0.58 0.58 0.29 0.77 0.69 5.00 5.74
d (F7, F*) 0.53 0.79 0.52 0.61 0.30 0.90 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.41 6.30 d (F7, F
-
) 0.62 0.29 0.58 0.59 0.83 0.17 0.58 0.43 0.43 0.67 5.20 6.02
d (F8, F*) 0.81 0.82 0.48 0.63 0.30 0.67 0.77 0.71 0.90 0.48 6.57 d (F8, F
-
) 0.30 0.41 0.60 0.57 0.82 0.45 0.58 0.54 0.17 0.67 5.11 5.89
d (F9, F*) 0.81 0.82 0.47 0.62 0.30 0.70 0.77 0.67 0.80 0.40 6.34 d (F9, F
-
) 0.30 0.41 0.61 0.58 0.85 0.45 0.58 0.55 0.31 0.69 5.34 6.18
d (F10, F*) 0.79 0.83 0.48 0.61 0.30 0.82 0.77 0.70 0.83 0.47 6.60 d (F10, F
-
) 0.31 0.29 0.60 0.59 0.85 0.30 0.58 0.44 0.30 0.68 4.94 5.68
d (F11, F*) 0.50 0.79 0.48 0.64 0.30 0.97 0.77 0.80 0.79 0.40 6.44 d (F11, F
-
) 0.69 0.29 0.60 0.59 0.84 0.06 0.58 0.30 0.31 0.68 4.95 5.72
d (F12, F*) 0.83 0.85 0.48 0.61 0.30 0.97 0.77 0.84 0.89 0.49 7.02 d (F12 F
-
) 0.29 0.18 0.60 0.59 0.82 0.06 0.58 0.29 0.18 0.65 4.24 4.85
d (F13, F*) 0.84 0.85 0.48 0.64 0.30 0.97 0.77 0.58 0.89 0.41 6.71 d (F13, F
-
) 0.29 0.29 0.60 0.59 0.85 0.06 0.58 0.64 0.18 0.68 4.76 5.47
d (F14, F*) 0.80 0.84 0.48 0.65 0.30 0.91 0.77 0.80 0.91 0.39 6.85 d (F14, F
-
) 0.30 0.18 0.60 0.58 0.82 0.17 0.58 0.41 0.17 0.70 4.52 5.18
d (F15, F*) 0.82 0.82 0.48 0.61 0.38 0.97 0.77 0.89 0.83 0.53 7.10 d (F15, F
-
) 0.30 0.30 0.59 0.59 0.79 0.06 0.58 0.18 0.29 0.55 4.23 4.82
d (F16, F*) 0.69 0.36 0.48 0.62 0.30 0.97 0.90 0.69 0.78 0.52 6.29 d (F16, F
-
) 0.45 0.80 0.60 0.58 0.85 0.06 0.19 0.44 0.32 0.57 4.86 5.63
d (F17, F*) 0.82 0.81 0.48 0.64 0.39 0.91 0.90 0.89 0.82 0.39 7.06 d (F17, F
-
) 0.30 0.30 0.59 0.59 0.78 0.17 0.19 0.18 0.30 0.71 4.10 4.68
d (F18, F*) 0.74 0.79 0.49 0.67 0.39 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.52 7.14 d (F18, F
-
) 0.42 0.30 0.58 0.57 0.78 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.29 0.61 4.09 4.66
d (F19, F*) 0.79 0.82 0.51 0.67 0.40 0.89 0.77 0.90 0.78 0.53 7.06 d (F19, F
-
) 0.31 0.30 0.56 0.58 0.75 0.18 0.58 0.17 0.41 0.55 4.40 5.02
d (F20, F*) 0.89 0.87 0.48 0.66 0.40 0.89 0.77 0.90 0.97 0.53 7.35 d (F20, F
-
) 0.18 0.30 0.60 0.58 0.76 0.18 0.58 0.17 0.06 0.56 3.96 4.50
d (F21, F*) 0.83 0.82 0.48 0.64 0.39 0.89 0.77 0.90 0.86 0.54 7.12 d (F21, F
-
) 0.30 0.30 0.60 0.59 0.77 0.18 0.58 0.17 0.29 0.54 4.31 4.92
d (F22, F*) 0.91 0.89 0.48 0.82 0.40 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.90 0.52 7.29 d (F22, F
-
) 0.17 0.18 0.59 0.30 0.75 0.31 0.58 0.41 0.17 0.61 4.08 4.64
d (F23, F*) 0.97 0.96 0.49 0.67 0.39 0.97 0.77 0.90 0.82 0.53 7.46 d (F23, F
-
) 0.06 0.17 0.58 0.57 0.78 0.06 0.58 0.17 0.40 0.60 3.98 4.52
d (F24, F*) 0.91 0.91 0.49 0.66 0.39 0.91 0.77 0.69 0.79 0.63 7.13 d (F24, F
-
) 0.17 0.06 0.59 0.57 0.78 0.17 0.58 0.55 0.41 0.57 4.46 5.09
d (F25, F*) 0.90 0.88 0.48 0.75 0.30 0.91 0.77 0.91 0.84 0.67 7.41 d (F25, F
-
) 0.17 0.29 0.59 0.43 0.82 0.17 0.58 0.17 0.29 0.41 3.93 4.46
d (F26, F*) 0.90 0.89 0.48 0.75 0.40 0.91 0.77 0.84 0.85 0.64 7.43 d (F26, F
-
) 0.17 0.29 0.60 0.43 0.75 0.17 0.58 0.29 0.29 0.57 4.15 4.70
d (F27, F*) 0.90 0.89 0.48 0.77 0.62 0.91 0.77 0.85 0.85 0.62 7.66 d (F27, F
-
) 0.17 0.29 0.59 0.42 0.63 0.17 0.58 0.29 0.29 0.58 4.02 4.54
d (F28, F*) 0.90 0.88 0.48 0.76 0.50 0.91 0.77 0.84 0.84 0.67 7.55 d (F28, F
-
) 0.17 0.29 0.60 0.42 0.66 0.17 0.58 0.29 0.29 0.40 3.89 4.40
d (F29, F*) 0.90 0.87 0.48 0.77 0.53 0.89 0.77 0.86 0.85 0.66 7.56 d (F29, F
-
) 0.17 0.30 0.61 0.42 0.62 0.18 0.58 0.29 0.29 0.41 3.86 4.38
d (F30, F*) 0.90 0.88 0.49 0.76 0.54 0.97 0.77 0.89 0.83 0.69 7.73 d (F30, F
-
) 0.17 0.29 0.58 0.42 0.61 0.06 0.58 0.18 0.29 0.39 3.57 4.04
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow 28
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring 29
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring 30
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure 27
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure 20
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow 24
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor 23
LP selector valve spuriously closes 25
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position 15
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position 16
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position 26
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position 17
Loss of SCM pressure compensation 11
HP DCV fails to open on command 21
LP DCV fails to open on command 22
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header 12
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line 14
LP selector valve fails to open 19
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve 10
Loss of LP accumulation 9
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line 18
Loss of HP Accumulation 5
Severe leakage from LP DCV 7
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve 2
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration 13
Severe leakage from HP DCV 1
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration 8
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit 3
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure 4
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module 6
Failure Modes
Fuzzy TOPSIS 
RANKING
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Figure 55  Fuzzy TOPSIS ranking for SCM failure modes. 
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In summary, the analysis presents the following failure modes as the top 10% failure 
modes: 
• Severe leakage from HP DCV  
• Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve 
• Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit 
Clearly, the evaluation shows that severe leakage in the HP DCV (F1) has the highest 
risk among the failure modes. The HP DCV is responsible for the control of the all-
important and sensitive surface controlled sub-surface safety valve which is a key 
safety barrier in a typical subsea completion well. It is also responsible for the control of 
the well intelligent flow control valves (IFCVs).  
Severe leakage in this valve would lead to a loss in pressurization of the SCSSV and 
eventual closure of the valve. This automatically means a loss in production from the 
well. This failure modes requires the SCM to be pulled, DCV fixed before the 
SCM is re-installed subsea. An offshore support vessel is required for this along 
with the retrieval and installation tools. Support vessels come at a high cost 
which is further amplified in the form of deferred production if a vessel is not 
readily available in the field and there is no spare compatible SCM which is 
immediately available for a replacement operation.  
Next in ranking is severe leakage in the LP shuttle valve (F9). The clearly 
demonstrate that DCV leakage is a major problem in the subsea industry.  
Hydraulic control in subsea production system is such that two low pressure 
supplies come in from the topside HPU to the SCM for redundancy purposes. 
The LP shuttle valve is responsible for the selection of which of the lines 
(typically named LP-A and LP-B) is selected to for supply for functioning of the 
LP circuitry in the SCM. Shuttle valve failure is a common point failure with 
serious implications. Such failure will lead to the closure of all DCVs and 
eventual closure of key LP valves in the tree like the production wing valve 
(PWV), production master valve (PMV) …etc. 
Loss of power from the subsea electronic module (SEM) (is the third in the 
ranking. This is not surprising as the SEM serves as the central power and 
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signal processing unit in the SCM. A loss of power in the SEM automatically 
means a total loss in the operation of the SEM. This required a retrieval and 
replacement of the SCM unit.  
Again, the top 25% in the criticality ranking of key contributors to SCM’s 
potential functional failure reveals the following: 
• Severe leakage from HP DCV  
• Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve 
• Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit 
• SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure 
• Loss of HP Accumulation  
• Total Loss of signal from the SEM module  
• Severe leakage from LP DCV 
• Loss of HP hydraulic filtration 
 
The next one in the ranking is F2- SCM check valve cracks open at a lower 
pressure. Typically, a check valve is installed in the SCM housing for pressure 
compensation and prevent the ingress of seawater into the module chamber. As 
water depth increases, the probability of failure of this component increases. 
Failure of this component is critical to the operation of the SCM as an unwanted 
ingress of water into the increases would cause a loss of insulation to the 
electrical system, contamination of the hydraulic system and eventual failure of 
the entire system. 
Another failure mode in this band is the Loss in HP accumulation. This is 
potentially caused by a loss in the HP-accumulator pre-charge. It could also be 
caused by a blocked line in the system due to contaminated fluid or a related 
cause. Next to this is the loss of signal from the subsea electronic module 
(SEM). The SEM is responsible for gathering all SCM internal parameters 
including those of the well downhole instrumentation and relaying same to the 
topside console. Loss of this signal could have severe impact in the short or 
long term operation of the system.  
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Still in the 25% range is severe leakage in LP DCV. This happens to be a 
common failure in the LP system of the SCM and are known to cause issues 
like the accidental delatching and closure of the corresponding valves in the 
tree system under control. 
Very salient but critical failure in this band is loss I filtration of the HP system. 
Fluid cleanliness is very important in subsea control systems. The SCM, for 
example is required to be flushed clean and operated with hydraulic fluid that 
has been cleaned to NAS 1638 class or better. HP and LP Hydraulic headers in 
the SCM are mounted with filters to ensure the required level of cleanliness. 
Filters are installed in systems to ensure the flow of clean fluids for smooth 
control operations. In subsea, filters may have a bypass path. The bypass is 
normally a secondary path past the filter in case of a blockage. This would 
normally have a higher cracking pressure than the filter side implemented using 
a check valve. This configuration directs the flow of fluid to the filter side. If the 
filter is blocked, this leads to a pressure build-up and a re-direction of the fluid to 
the by-pass.  
The last 10% in the ranking among the thirty failure modes are: 
• Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow 
• Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring 
• Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring 
This does not necessarily mean that the risk associated with these ones are 
trivial. It is just that in the ranking among all the thirty, these ones are slightly 
lower I terms of the probability of occurrence and immediate consequence.  
At the lowest end of the raking is the Loss in monitoring of the SCM internal 
temperature. Though this parameter is important, the loss in monitoring of the 
parameter is not that critical to the operation of the SCM. All tree DCVs will 
remain in their original position at the loss of this signal. This is similar to the 
F29-Loss in the monitoring of the SCM internal pressure. Though, this signal is 
very important in prescribing the state of the SCM unit, a loss monitoring of this 
may not require an immediate retrieval and repair as production is not distorted. 
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4.5.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis: 
A sensitivity analysis of the SCM failure modes is conducted below by 
eliminating one risk factor at a time. The effect of the risk factors elimination is 
evaluated by assessing the ranking of the failure modes.  The elimination 
reveals the most significant and the least significant risk factors in the 
evaluation. The ranking results from the risk elimination are shown in table 21 
while the sensitivity results are shown in table 22. 
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Table 21 Fuzzy TOPSIS SCM Failure modes sensitivity analysis 
 
Full 
Ranking
Ranking 
Without R1
Ranking 
Without R2
Ranking 
Without R3
Ranking 
Without R4
Ranking 
Without R5
Ranking 
Without R6
Ranking 
Without R7
Ranking 
Without R8
Ranking 
Without R9
Ranking 
Without R10
3 2 9 3 6 4 1 5 2 2 5
4 11 2 4 2 3 8 2 3 11 2
6 6 8 6 8 7 7 3 6 4 7
13 9 12 13 13 12 12 9 12 21 13
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
8 5 10 8 3 8 13 10 7 13 9
5 8 4 5 5 5 3 7 5 6 4
7 4 5 7 7 6 10 8 9 5 6
2 3 3 2 4 2 5 4 4 3 3
10 7 7 10 10 10 11 12 10 8 11
9 14 6 9 9 9 4 11 8 7 10
18 18 17 18 20 19 17 20 18 14 19
12 10 11 12 12 13 9 13 16 10 12
14 15 14 14 14 14 14 14 15 12 16
19 20 19 19 21 18 18 21 17 18 18
11 12 16 11 11 11 6 6 11 9 8
21 24 22 21 24 22 21 15 19 23 27
22 28 24 22 23 24 22 16 20 24 22
16 16 15 16 16 16 16 18 13 17 15
26 25 26 26 29 27 25 26 24 19 28
17 17 18 17 18 17 19 19 14 16 17
23 22 20 23 17 23 26 23 27 20 24
25 21 23 25 28 28 23 25 23 28 29
15 13 13 15 15 15 15 17 21 15 14
27 26 27 27 25 29 27 27 25 26 21
20 19 21 20 19 20 20 22 22 22 20
24 23 25 24 22 21 24 24 26 25 26
28 27 28 28 26 26 28 28 28 27 23
29 29 29 29 27 25 29 29 29 29 25
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Failure Modes
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit 
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration
Severe leakage from HP DCV 
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module 
Severe leakage from LP DCV
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration
Loss of HP Accumulation 
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve
Loss of LP accumulation
Loss of SCM pressure compensation
HP DCV fails to open on command 
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line 
LP selector valve fails to open 
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position
LP DCV fails to open on command
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor 
LP selector valve spuriously closes
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow
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Table 22 – Sensitivity analysis results for the Fuzzy TOPSIS evaluation 
Correlation Performed Value of correlation 
Correlation between ranking without R1 and 
ranking without R2 
0.931034 
Correlation between ranking without R2 and 
ranking without R3 
0.971969 
Correlation between ranking without R3 and 
ranking without R4 
0.969744 
Correlation between ranking without R10 and 
ranking without R1 
0.912792 
Correlation between ranking without R5 and 
ranking without R8 
0.949722 
Correlation between ranking without R9 and 
ranking without R2 
0.911902 
Correlation between ranking without R3 and 
ranking without R8 
0.970634 
Correlation between ranking without R2 and 
ranking without R10 
0.935039 
Correlation between ranking without R2 and 
ranking without R7 
0.913237 
The above sensitivity result confirms that severe leakage in the HP is the most 
critical failure in the SCM across the respective risk factors. Its worthy of note 
that SCM HP system is responsible for wells chemical injection, control of the 
surface controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV) including flow control 
valves (FCVs)/inflow control valves (ICVs) for multiple level completions. It is 
not uncommon for the control HP system to be dependent on the LP system for 
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fluid supply. This means that if the LP supply, accumulation or filtration system 
fails, the entire control system fails and leads to a total loss in production.  
It is also important to note that in an E-H SCM, the process of opening and 
closing of valves is controlled by the multiplexing activity occurring in the 
subsea electronic module (SEM). The SEM is also responsible for the retrieval 
and transmittal of wells condition monitoring data to the topside controls 
interface. Hence, a failure in this unit means a complete failure in the directing 
and control of the SCM valves/fluid as well as a loss in data retrieval and 
transmission. Though the ranking doesn’t show the SEM failure as an overriding 
failure mode with the highest ranking, it is worthy of mention that the SEM 
failure is quite critical to the functioning of the entire system. 
A complete failure of the SEM requires a retrieval and replacement of the 
subsea control module (SCM), which comes with a huge due to the requirement 
for a diver intervention for shallow waters, ROV in deep waters, cost of 
intervention vessel, cost of the replacement SCM, personnel and other 
miscellaneous logistics and associated cost. 
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5 SCM Failure mode evaluation using stochastic inputs 
The process of selecting the most critical failures in a subsea control module 
(SCM) introduces less confidence in the results due to the probability of 
subjectivity in the data obtained.  
This chapter introduces an extension of the popular technique of order 
preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) for SCM failure modes 
evaluation that requires both technical and non-technical info. The unavailability 
of data demands the use of expert opinions in the evaluations. The 
methodology considers stochastic inputs (statistical distributions). The 
technique has been implemented in a numerical tool and a case study 
performed successfully applied in offshore wind turbine evaluations (Kolios 
2014). This illustrates the applicability of the simulation method allowing for a 
sensitivity analysis of the methodology, selection of statistical distributions and 
the weighing of the experts opinion based on their perceived experience or 
knowledge of the subject. (Mateo 2012) identifies a number of MCDM 
processes which are suitable for the use in the renewable energy industry, 
including the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty 1980), Weighted Sum 
and Weighted Product Method (WSM & WPM), Technique for Order or 
Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) (Hwang 1981), Preference 
Raking Organization Method for Enrichment Evaluation (PROMETHEE) (Brans 
1985 and Brans 1992) and Elimination Et Choix Traduisant la Realite Method 
(ELECTRE) (Benayoun 1966). These methods have been in use over the years 
in operational research and lately in application for engineering systems as a 
result of their robustness and transparency. 
 The analysis takes stochastic rather than deterministic inputs for the decision 
matrices as well as the weight factor with results obtained from experts’ survey.  
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5.1 Deterministic TOPSIS Algorithm 
Technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) 
methodology as shown in section 4.3 is based on a strategy that the solution 
should be closest to a positive ideal solution and farthest to the negative ideal 
solution (Yoon 1995).   
In the deterministic TOPSIS, the rating and weight values considered are crisp 
values. However, for most real life situations, real values are not enough to 
model the situations since human judgements are vague and difficult to 
estimate with exact numerical figures. To resolve the ambiguity that normally 
arises from human judgements, fuzzy concepts have been applied in a lot of 
cases to enhance the results obtained from the analysis. 
To resolve the ambiguity frequently arising in information from human 
judgments, fuzzy set theory has been incorporated in many MCDM methods 
including TOPSIS. In fuzzy TOPSIS all the ratings and weights are defined by 
means of linguistic variables. Although it is a non-complex method of multi 
criteria decision making TOPSIS still has its deficiencies, i.e. despite using the 
Euclidean distance algorithm it doesn’t consider the correlation of attributes. 
The method generally fixes weight coefficients using expert investigation and it 
is more difficult to determine weights when using larger matrices. 
A key disadvantage of most variations of TOPSIS, as well as MCDM methods in 
general, that have been so far suggested is the fact that qualitative or semi-
quantitative data that are collected through surveys and questionnaires should 
be represented through one or a limited number of values that will serve as 
inputs to the calculations. For example, a case of making observations for two 
variables with results (1, 2, 3, 6, 9) and (5,5,5,5,5), a representation of the 
observations with a mean value is misleading as it would reduce both data sets 
to be represented by the value 5 with no further information regarding the 
spread of the values been taken into account. 
The methodology developed in this paper is an extension of TOPSIS in the way 
that input variables are considered stochastically as statistical distributions that 
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are derived by best fit of the data collected for each value in the decision matrix 
and weight vector. Stochastic input data will allow Monte Carlo simulations to 
perform numerous iterations of analysis in order to quantify results and identify 
the number of cases where the optimum solution will prevail, i.e. there is a pi 
probability that option Xi will rank first. Figure 56 illustrates the methodology that 
is proposed, which has been modelled in a numerical tool and validated 
numerically in MathWorks Matlab and Visual Basic. 
 
Figure 56  - Steps for stochastic input analysis 
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Multi criteria decision making methods can become as advanced and 
complicated as the resources that are allocated allow so, but without sufficient 
thought being put into the collection and processing of input data, especially 
when considering qualitative attributes, the results of the analysis can become 
of no much use. In order to capture the correct data for the study in question, 
two main aspects must be included; the weight vector assigned to the  
importance of each risk criterion and the decision matrix marking alternatives 
against the specified criteria. In order to make all input data uniform and easy to 
process the questionnaire may employ a Likert scale for marking the relevant 
values. With this technique, the responder specifies a level of agreement or 
disagreement to the concept under study, using one of a number of positions on 
a Likert scale (often specifying as highest being most critical). A 1 to 10 scale is 
used to rank the failure modes against risks criteria. Depending on the nature of 
the criterion it can be either positive (10 representing the most risky). Weights 
influence significantly the ranking results and are based on the practical 
engineering expertise of the decision makers; consequently, the more  
experienced the decision makers are, the more objective the result. Relevant 
generic studies from (Bonner 2002 and Baumann 2013) have shown the effect 
of considering level of expertise of participants towards successful prediction of 
survey outcomes. Further, results from previous studies of the authors have 
shown that expertise weighting is significantly important to the derived results 
and hence its effect should be investigated based on perceived levels of the 
survey participants (Kolios 2013). 
5.2 Case Study – Evaluation of SCM critical failure modes 
The failure modes considered in this evaluation were those obtained from the 
conventional FMECA and the fuzzy TOPSIS evaluation conducted in chapters 3 
and 4 in this report. The top 30 failure modes used in the analysis are listed in 
section 4.5.3. Data for this evaluation were obtained from a systematic survey 
obtained using questionnaires with twenty five (25) participants. At the end of 
the painstaking process, ten (10) complete results were obtained from the 
 161 
experts representing a 40% participation from the total of questionnaires sent 
out.  
On a scale of 1 to 5 or the weight evaluation for VL, L, M, H and VH 
respectively, the weight evaluation for the risk factors of the processed 
questionnaires is as shown in figure 57. 
 
Figure 57  Importance weight evaluation for Stochastic Analysis 
Tables 23 present the mean values while table 24 gives the standard deviations 
of the data for the failure modes of the processed questionnaire.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 mean std min max mode
Occurrence associated with water depth, R1 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4.9 0.316 4 5 5
 Occurrence under normal operation, R2 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4.6 0.516 4 5 5
Occurrence under extreme conditions, R3 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 3.7 0.483 3 4 4
Direct Cost of failure, R4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 3.7 0.675 3 5 4
Indirect cost of failure, R5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4.7 0.483 4 5 5
Failure impact on environment, R6 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 3.5 0.527 3 4 3
Fatality associated with failure, R7 2 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 4 3 2.7 0.675 2 4 3
Risk to business – non-financial, R8 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.3 0.483 3 4 3
Detectability, R9 5 4 4 5 4 3 4 4 5 5 4.3 0.675 3 5 4
Redundancy, R10 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4.5 0.527 4 5 4
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Table 23 Mean values of ratings from the processed questionnaire 
 
 
  
 
 
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
ID
F1 1.8 5.4 6.9 6.4 7 1.3 1.1 2.5 1.9 7
F2 6.4 1.7 6.6 4 6.9 3 1 1.5 6 3.9
F3 2.4 4.1 6.4 6.3 7 1.5 1 2.3 1.2 6.8
F4 1.4 3.2 6.5 5.1 5.1 1.2 1 2.9 6.8 6.2
F5 2 3.6 6.3 5.4 6.6 6.2 1.1 5 2.5 5.6
F6 1.1 2.9 6 2 5.1 1.8 1.1 1.9 6.4 5.6
F7 4.3 1.6 6.1 4.7 6.3 1.4 1.1 3.4 2.9 5.2
F8 2.1 1.9 6.5 4.2 6 4 1.1 4.7 2.4 5.5
F9 2.4 2 6.9 4.4 6.9 3.9 1.1 4.2 2.5 5.6
F10 2.4 1.8 6.6 4.6 6.9 2.3 1.1 4 2.1 5.6
F11 4.7 1.6 6.6 4.7 6.6 1 1.1 2.9 2.6 5.4
F12 1.9 1.5 6.6 4.6 6.1 1 1.1 2.1 1.7 5.2
F13 1.7 1.3 6.7 4.7 6.9 1 1.1 5.4 1.8 5.3
F14 2.2 1.6 6.7 4.5 6 1.1 1.1 2.3 1.1 5.7
F15 2.1 2.1 6.3 4.7 5.9 1 1.1 2 2 4.3
F16 3.1 5.8 6.6 4.5 6.9 1 1 4 2.8 4.6
F17 2 2 6.3 4.7 5.8 1.1 1 1.8 2.1 5.3
F18 2.4 1.9 5.8 4.3 5.8 1.1 1 1.5 1.9 5
F19 2.3 2 5.4 4.4 5.4 1.8 1.1 1.3 2.3 4.3
F20 1.5 2 6.6 4.5 5.5 1.8 1.1 1.4 1 4.4
F21 1.8 2 6.5 4.6 5.7 1.7 1.1 1.6 2.1 4.1
F22 1.1 1.5 6.3 2.3 5.4 3 1.1 2.1 1.2 4.4
F23 1 1.1 6 4.2 5.8 1 1.1 1.7 1.3 4.3
F24 1.1 1 6.3 4.3 5.8 1.1 1.1 4.1 1.9 3.6
F25 1.2 1.6 6.4 3.1 6 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.5 3.5
F26 1.3 1.5 6.7 3.1 5.3 1.1 1.1 1.9 1.3 3.6
F27 1.3 1.5 6.4 2.6 4.7 1.1 1.1 1.8 1.4 3.9
F28 1.2 1.6 6.7 2.9 4.9 1.1 1.1 2.1 1.6 3.4
F29 1.3 2 6.8 2.7 4.3 2 1.1 2.2 1.5 3.6
F30 1.3 1.6 6.2 2.8 4.1 1 1.1 1.9 1.7 3.1
mean values
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Table 24  Standard deviation values of ratings from the processed questionnaire 
  
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10
0.421637 0.516398 0.316228 0.516398 0 0.483046 0.316228 1.080123 0.316228 0
0.699206 0.823273 0.516398 0 0.316228 1.699673 0 0.971825 0 0.316228
0.843274 0.994429 0.516398 0.483046 0 0.971825 0 0.948683 0.421637 0.421637
0.516398 0.788811 0.527046 0.737865 0.316228 0.421637 0 0.316228 0.421637 0.421637
0.942809 0.843274 0.483046 0.699206 0.516398 0.421637 0.316228 0 0.707107 0.516398
0.316228 0.994429 0.816497 0 0.316228 1.549193 0.316228 0.875595 0.516398 0.843274
0.483046 0.699206 0.737865 0.483046 0.483046 0.516398 0.316228 0.516398 0.737865 0.421637
0.875595 1.197219 0.527046 0.421637 0 0 0.316228 0.483046 0.516398 0.971825
1.074968 1.154701 0.316228 0.516398 0.316228 0.316228 0.316228 0.421637 0.527046 0.699206
0.843274 0.788811 0.516398 0.516398 0.316228 0.483046 0.316228 0 0.316228 0.699206
0.674949 0.699206 0.516398 0.674949 0.516398 0 0.316228 0.316228 0.516398 0.516398
0.567646 0.527046 0.516398 0.516398 0.316228 0 0.316228 0.316228 0.483046 0.788811
0.674949 0.674949 0.483046 0.674949 0.316228 0 0.316228 0.843274 0.421637 0.483046
0.918937 0.516398 0.483046 0.707107 0 0.316228 0.316228 0.674949 0.316228 0.483046
0.567646 0.567646 0.674949 0.483046 0.316228 0 0.316228 0 0.471405 0.483046
0.316228 0.421637 0.516398 0.527046 0.316228 0 0 0 0.421637 0.843274
0.666667 0.942809 0.674949 0.674949 0.421637 0.316228 0 0.421637 0.567646 0.483046
0.699206 0.875595 0.421637 1.05935 0.421637 0.316228 0 0.527046 0.875595 0.816497
0.483046 0.816497 0.699206 0.843274 0.516398 0.421637 0.316228 0.483046 0.674949 0.483046
0.527046 0.666667 0.516398 1.080123 0.527046 0.421637 0.316228 0.516398 0 0.516398
0.918937 0.942809 0.707107 0.843274 0.483046 0.483046 0.316228 0.516398 0.737865 0.316228
0.316228 0.527046 0.483046 0.483046 0.516398 0 0.316228 1.100505 0.632456 0.699206
0 0.316228 0.816497 0.918937 0.421637 0 0.316228 0.483046 0.948683 0.674949
0.316228 0 0.823273 0.823273 0.421637 0.316228 0.316228 0.737865 1.286684 0.966092
0.421637 0.843274 0.699206 0.737865 0 0.316228 0.316228 0.421637 0.849837 0.527046
0.483046 0.707107 0.483046 0.737865 0.483046 0.316228 0.316228 0.567646 0.674949 0.966092
0.483046 0.707107 0.843274 0.699206 0.948683 0.316228 0.316228 0.632456 0.699206 1.197219
0.421637 0.843274 0.483046 0.875595 0.316228 0.316228 0.316228 0.567646 0.699206 0.516398
0.483046 0.816497 0.421637 0.823273 0.483046 0 0.316228 0.421637 0.707107 0.516398
0.483046 0.843274 0.918937 0.788811 0.316228 0 0.316228 0.316228 0.948683 0.316228
Standard Deviation Values
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Table 25 shows the results and ranking of the SCM failure modes based on 
arithmetic mean and standard deviation evaluation. The table is such that 
ranking 1 represents the most critical failure, followed by 2 in that order.  
Table 25 - Top10 most critical SCM failure modes based on stochastic evaluation 
ranking 
Failure Modes Ranking 
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure 1 
Severe leakage from HP DCV  2 
Loss of SCM pressure compensation 3 
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve 4 
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration 5 
Severe leakage from LP DCV 6 
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration 7 
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module  8 
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit  9 
Loss of LP accumulation 9 
The above ranking here provides a correlation coefficient of 73.5% to the results 
obtained from the SCM failure modes fuzzy TOPSIS analysis. Table 26 
provides a comparison between the results of the critical failures obtained from 
the fuzzy TOPSIS analysis and that of input evaluation.  
Table 26 – Top10 most critical failure modes based on Fuzzy TOPSIS ranking 
Failure Modes 
Fuzzy TOPSIS 
ranking 
Severe leakage from HP DCV  1 
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve 2 
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit  3 
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure 4 
Loss of HP Accumulation  5 
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module  6 
Severe leakage from LP DCV 7 
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration 8 
Loss of LP accumulation 9 
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve 10 
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The analysis reveals that nine (9) out of the top ten (10) most critical failures 
modes obtained from the fuzzy TOPSIS analysis are also obtained from the 
stochastic evaluation. These critical failure modes are listed below: 
• Severe leakage from HP DCV  
• Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve 
• Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit  
• SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure 
• Loss of HP Accumulation  
• Total Loss of signal from the SEM module  
• Severe leakage from LP DCV 
• Loss of HP hydraulic filtration 
• Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve 
The result also further confirms that directional control valves (DCVs) and the 
subsea electronic modules (SEM) are two of the most critical components in the 
subsea control module (SCM). In summary, the stochastic simulation provides a 
very strong additional validation to the conventional FMECA and fuzzy TOPSIS 
evaluation performed on the subsea control module (SCM) most critical failure 
modes as shown in chapters 3 and 4 of this report.   
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6 Comparative Analysis between All-Electric and the  
Electro-hydraulic SCM 
6.1 Background of study 
Subsea control systems fundamentally open and close valves in a typical 
subsea production system. They are also responsible for choke control, 
intelligent valves control and delivery of condition monitoring data to the topside 
control units. From the 1960s, the control system has evolved from the direct 
control systems to the electro-hydraulic systems and recently the all-electric 
systems all in a bit for a faster response time and efficient control for longer tie-
back distances.  
The offshore oil and gas industry currently uses the electro-hydraulic (EH) 
control subsea system as the main system for the control of hydrocarbon and 
other fluids in subsea field developments (Theobald 2005).  However, there has 
been a lot of interest in all-electric controls concept. This led to a project study 
in Cranfield University in 2004 that compared the Cameron all-electric system 
with the conventional electro-hydraulic subsea control system (Theobald 2005).  
This study was assembled by key players in the oil and gas industry – BP and 
Cameron. This study modelled a 4-well cluster.  
The evolution of the all-electric control system eliminates the requirement of the 
topside hydraulic power unit (HPU), reduces the size of the control umbilical 
with huge merits in CAPEX, OPEX and the environment. The all-electric 
controls is principally built around three key components, namely: 
1. The power regulation and communication module (PRCM) 
2. The electric subsea control module (eSCM)  
3. The electric actuator (EA) 
In this chapter, a comparative analysis comparing the risk performance EH 
SCM and the all-electric SCM is being performed.  
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6.2 The All-electric control system 
The all-electric subsea control system comes in various variants. Some are 
battery-operated while others are powered directly from a topside supply. 
Typical components of the all-electric system are (Lopez 2005): 
• Surface units  
- Electrical power Unit (EPU) 
- Surface power line modem 
- Communication controller 
• Subsea Controls 
- Power regulator 
- Subsea power line modem 
- Electric Subsea Control Module (eSCM) 
• Surface to Subsea Elements 
- Power and signal cable (coaxial) 
- Subsea power connector (wet mateable) 
 
Figure 58 shows the Cameron 1st generation all-electric subsea controls 
architecture. The system has no batteries, no hydraulics and no subsea 
accumulators. High voltage DC power in the range of 6Kv DC is being delivered 
subsea and consumption in typically in kilowatts. DC power has been preferred 
to AC for economic reasons, as AC power is uneconomical for long offset 
distances. The system uses seawater as the return path. This reduces the 
diameter of the power cable and increases the available power to the system. 
This is a common application typically applied in the power industry.  
A key part of the all-electric subsea system is the electric tree system. The 
system uses a fail-safe-close electrical actuator system. The actuator is made 
 168 
up of a drive motor and a clutch motor. The drive motor is responsible for 
forcing a valve open against a closing spring. Once the valve is open, the motor 
stops and the clutch motor ensures that the valve remains in the open position 
using a friction-based mechanism. The architecture is such that in the open 
position, the drive motor is fully unloaded. Only a small amount of power 
(<100w) is required to hold the valve in position of normal operations. An 
interruption in the electrical supply causes the valve to move to a safe closed 
position, with the closing of the spring. The principle of –fail-safe-close at the 
loss of power provides the safety requirements for well applications. The 
electrical choke, on the other hand, is a fail as-is system. It remains at its last 
know position if power is lost from the system.  
 
 
Figure 58  First generation all-electric technology concept 
The system high bandwidth allows for the transfer of large of condition 
monitoring data to and from the topside units even for complex subsea 
architecture. Depending on design requirements, the eSCM can control up to 32 
electrical actuators. For increased reliability and availability, all key components 
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of the system like the PSU, modems and motor controllers are designed for 
self-protection against short-circuiting.  The eSCM also provides interface for 
tree interface and other 3rd part control units.  
The use of fibre optics for communication in the all-electric system enables 
communication to very long distances. However, a repeater system is 
sometimes required when very long distances. Repeater systems covering up 
to 13km or more are commercially available. These systems are very reliable 
and offer speeds far above those required by the subsea systems.  
Similar to the EH system, valve and choke operation for this system is initiated 
at the topside MCS. The signal is transmitted through the fibre optics link and 
delivered to the specified PRCM. The PRCM on receipt of the command, 
requests sufficient power from the topside, regulates it and transmits same to 
the eSCM after a few seconds of stabilisation. The eSCM then drives the 
actuator until the sensor indicator shows that the valve is open to its maximum 
aperture. The drive power then reduces and the actuator is held open with a 
minimal held power typically 1% of the drive power. In the idle mode (without 
operation of valve or choke), the eSCM only needs sufficient power to keep the 
actuator open and to for running of diagnostics and delivery of system readings. 
Higher power is only required for actuator open sequences.  
 
6.3 The advantages of the All-electric system. 
The all-electric system also addresses some health, safety and environmental 
(HSE) concerns. Hydraulic fluids and associated equipment’s are eliminated. 
Similarly, equipment’s required for the storage, pumping, pressurisation, filtering 
and disposal of the fluids are also eliminated with a significant benefit. 
Personnel contact with the fluid, slippage, deck spillage during handling or 
leakage are also eliminated. The absence of high pressure accumulator bottles 
and lines on the topside lso brings a huge HSE advantage.  
In summary, key merits of the all-electric system over the conventional electro-
hydraulic system are listed below: 
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• Enhanced HSE. The elimination of the HPU system and the associated 
fluid including their storage systems leads to improved HSE. 
• Higher reliability - The all-electric system brings about faster response 
time and reduced failure points. 
• Reduced cost. Umbilical geometry is simplified and size reduced. 
Hydraulic infrastructure and consumption is eliminated for both subsea 
and topside units. 
• Technology merits: The all-electric system is less  sensitive to water 
depth and tie-back distances,  offers faster and better choke operations 
and lower consumption   
6.4 The All-electric SCM 
The electrical Subsea Control Module (eSCM) provides all the required power 
for the opening and closing of valves on the associated subsea equipment 
(figure 59). It is also responsible for receiving and delivery of data to the topside 
system and vice versa. Interfaces with the entire subsea production system for 
actuator control, emergency shutdown/production shutdown control including all 
subsea data/housekeeping management.  
 
Figure 59 All-electric subsea controls showing the eSCM, courtesy Cameron 
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Valve actuation from the eSCM does not require control fluids as in the EH Mux 
systems, providing environmental friendliness. The e-SCM is supplied with a 
stabilised direct current (DC) coming from the power and regulation control 
module (PRCM). One PRCM serves up to eight e-SCMs. Each PRCM power is 
delivered using a dedicated coaxial cable tied directly from the topside.  The 
system allows for simultaneous actuators operation of several valves so far it is 
within the power limits of the system.  
Latest standards such as IWIS and ISIS are in use for the eSCM system.      
The eSCM typically contains the following components: 
• Ethernet switch/router 
• Power supply 
• Central processing Unit/controller 
• Current monitor – Low/High 
• Power switch controller 
• Switches 
• Process shutdown controller 
 
6.5 The EH and all-electric SCM Risk assessment Comparative 
Analysis 
The risk factors being considered in this evaluation are listed below. These 
criteria are based on industry concern on the need to improve the delivery of 
subsea controls from the electro-hydraulic (EH) system (Thebald 2005, 
Bouquier 2007, Akker 2009).  
1. Occurrence (O) 
2. CAPEX (C) 
3. OPEX (P) 
4. Environment (E) 
5. Technology (T) 
6. Schedule (S) 
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The occurrence (O) factor evaluates the probability of failure in the two systems 
system. System failure in subsea developments are highly undesirable as the 
smallest intervention typically runs into millions of dollars. The cost factors 
evaluate the expenditure associated with implementing the electro-hydraulic 
system in comparison to the all-electric SCM option. This is split into the 
CAPEX (C) and OPEX (P) components, CAPEX being cost associated with the 
development and implementation of the system while OPEX are those required 
for the running of the system.  
Environment (E) evaluates the associated risk to the environment and 
environmental regulations relating to the implementation of the system. The 
technology (T) factor looks at the ease of implementation of the system, its 
robustness, efficiency and acceptability including access to competent 
resources for its deployment. The schedule (S) factor looks into the risk in terms 
with the associated time line required to plan, design, construct and deploy the 
system for a typical subsea projects. Some projects are heavily schedule-
dependent. This factor looks at the challenges associated with meeting a typical 
subsea development schedule. 
 
6.5.1 Characterisation of Experts 
The all-electric subsea controls is relatively new in the offshore oil and gas 
industry with few data recorded on its operations. Five industry experts were 
used for this evaluation. Three of these industry experts came from the OEM 
firms for these systems while two were from the operator’s side. The average 
experience of these experts is ten years in the industry. This represents a 
substantial experience in the profession to be assessed as being credible to 
provide an expert info that could be used for the evaluation. 
The evaluation was also carried out through a face-to-face evaluation. This was 
to ensure that every answer provided had a credible and objective reasons 
behind the evaluation. It however added to the project cost as these experts 
were located in various continents of the world. The approach was again 
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adopted so that the associated results is not skewed to a non-objective 
reasoning. 
 
6.5.2 The comparison evaluation between EH SCM and eSCM 
A TOPSIS methodology is applied in the comparative analysis between the EH 
SCM and the eSCM. The steps shown in chapter four is being adopted for this 
evaluation. The alternatives being evaluated are: 
• A1  - The Electro-hydraulic SCM and  
• A2  - The all-electric SCM 
The risk factors being considered for the evaluation are: 
R1 – Occurrence (O) 
R2  - Capex (C) 
R3 – Opex (P) 
R4  - Environment (E) 
R5 – Technology (T) 
R6 – Schedule (S) 
The linguistic scale used for the weight evaluation is shown below: 
Table 27  Linguistic scale for the importance of each risk factor 
Linguistic variable Corresponding triangular fuzzy number 
Very Low (VL) (0.0, 0.0, 0.1) 
Low (L) (0.0, 0.1, 0.3) 
Medium (M) (0.3, 0.5, 0.7) 
High (H) (0.7, 0.9, 1.0) 
Very High (VH) 0.9, 1.0, 1.0) 
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The linguistic scale used in rating the alternatives against the risk factors is as 
shown below: 
Table 28 Linguistic variables for the rating of the alternatives against the risk factors 
Linguistic Variable Corresponding TFN 
Very Low (VL) (0, 0, 1) 
Low (L) (0, 1, 3) 
Medium Low (ML) (1, 3, 5) 
Medium (M) (3, 5, 7) 
Medium High (MH) (5, 7, 9) 
High (H) (7, 9, 10) 
Very High (VH) (9, 10, 10) 
 
The experts used the scale in table 27 to evaluate the importance of each risk 
factor and the result is as shown table 29. 
Table 29  Importance weight of the risk factors 
 
 
The experts also used the scale shown in table 28 to rate the alternatives 
against each of the risk factors and the result is as shown in table 30 below. 
 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
Occurrence (O) VH H VH VH VH
CAPEX (C ) M H M H VH
OPEX (P) H H H M H
Environment (E) H H VH H VH
Technology (T) H H VH H H
Schedule (S) M H H M M
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Table 30  Rating of the alternatives using the linguistic scale 
 
 
Applying the tables 27 and 28 to tables 29 and 30, the fuzzy decision matrix and 
fuzzy weights of the alternatives are as shown in table 31:   
Table 31  Fuzzy decision matrix of the SCMs showing weights of the risk factors 
 
 
Next, the normalised fuzzy decision matrix for the SCM alternatives is shown in 
table 32: 
D1 D2 D3 D4 D5
A1 MH H H H VH
A2 M H H MH H
A1 H MH H H H
A2 M H M MH M
A1 VH MH H VH H
A2 L ML M ML L
A3 M H MH M M
A4 L ML L M L
A1 MH M H H M
A2 L M H M ML
A1 ML M L ML L
A2 L H ML M L
Schedule (S)
ENVIRONMENT (E)
OCCURRENCE (O)
CAPEX (C)
OPEX (P)
Technology (T)
OCCURRENCE (O) CAPEX (C) OPEX (P) Environment (E) Technology (T) Schedule (S)
Weight WO Weight WC Weight Wp Weight WE Weight WT Weight WS
(0.9, 0.98, 1.0) (0.3, 0.76, 1.0) (0.3, 0.82, 1.0) (0.7, 0.94, 1.0) (0.7, 0.92, 1.0) (0.3, 0.66, 1.0)
A1 (5.0, 8.8, 10) (5, 8.6, 10) (5.0, 9.0, 10)) (3, 6.2, 10) (3.0, 7.0, 10) (0.0, 2.6, 7.0)
A2 (3.0, 7.8, 10) (3.0, 6.2, 10) (0.0, 2.6, 7.0) (0.0, 2.2, 7.0) (0.0, 6.6, 10) (0.0, 3.8, 10)
Alternatives
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Table 32 Normalised Fuzzy decision matrix of the SCMs showing weights of the risk 
factors. 
 
Applying the weights, the weighted normalised fuzzy decision matrix of the SCM 
alternatives are shown in table 33: 
Table 33  Weighted normalised Fuzzy decision matrix of the SCM alternatives. 
 
The fuzzy positive ideal solution (FPIS) and fuzzy negative ideal solutions 
(FNIS) are obtained as shown below: 
A* = [(1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1)] 
A- = [(0.27, 0.27, 0.27), (0.09, 0.09, 0.09), (0.0, 0.0, 0.0), (0.0, 0.0, 0.0), 
(0.0, 0.0, 0.0), (0.0, 0.0, 0.0)] 
The distance of the alternatives to the FPIS and FNIS is then evaluated using 
the vertex method. The distance to the positive ideal solution is shown in table 
34: 
Table 34  Distance from the positive ideal solution. 
 
OCCURRENCE (O) CAPEX (C) OPEX (P) Environment (E) Technology (T) Schedule (S)
Weight WO Weight WC Weight Wp Weight WE Weight WT Weight WS
(0.9, 0.98, 1.0) (0.3, 0.76, 1.0) (0.3, 0.82, 1.0) (0.7, 0.94, 1.0) (0.7, 0.92, 1.0) (0.3, 0.66, 1.0)
A1 (0.5, 0.88, 1.0) (0.5, 0.86, 1.0) (0.5, 0.9, 1.0) (0.3, 0.62, 1.0) (0.3, 0.7, 1.0) (0.0, 0.26, 0.7)
A2 (0.3, 0.78, 1.0) (0.3, 0.62, 1.0) (0.0, 0.26, 0.7) (0.0, 0.22, 0.7) (0.0, 0.66, 1.0) (0.0, 0.38, 1.0)
Alternatives
A1 (0.45, 0.86, 1.0) (0.15, 0.65, 1.0) (0.15, 0.74, 1.0) (0.21, 0.58, 1.0) (0.21, 0.64, 1.0) (0.0, 0.17, 0.70)
A2 (0.27, 0.76, 1.0) (0.09, 0.47, 1.0) (0.0, 0.21, 0.70) (0.0, 0.21, 0.70) (0.0, 0.61, 1.0) (0.0, 0.25, 1.0)
Schedule (S)OCCURRENCE (O) CAPEX (C) OPEX (P) Environment (E) Technology (T)Alternatives
O* C* P* E* T* S* d
+
d (A1, A*) 0.33 0.53 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.77 1.89
d (A2, A*) 0.44 0.61 0.75 0.76 0.62 0.72 2.56
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Similarly, the distance to the negative ideal solution is also evaluated as shown 
in table 35: 
Table 35  Distance from the negative ideal solution 
 
Finally, a correlation coefficient of the alternatives and ranking is then evaluated 
and the result is shown in table 36 
Table 36  SCM Correlation coefficient and ranking 
  CCi Ranking 
Electro-hydraulic SCM (A1) 0.52 1 
All-Electric SCM (A2) 0.45 2 
 
Tables 34 and 35 demonstrate the closeness of the two alternatives to the 
associated risks. In table 34, the distance on the probability of failure 
occurrence (O) for the electro-hydraulic system (EH) is 0.33 compared to 0.44 
for the all-electric system showing that the occurrence (O) for the electro-
hydraulic system is perceived to be higher. In the same way, the CAPEX (C), 
OPEX (P), Environmental risk (E) and Technology risk (T) are all closer to the 
FPIS. These values eventually lead to a higher value of correlation coefficient 
for the electro-hydraulic (EH) SCM. 
The above result shows that EH SCM, with a correlation coefficient of 0.52 has 
a comparatively higher risk than the all-electric SCM (eSCM). This 
demonstrates that the eSCM is a less risky technology and would probably be 
the technology of the future. This is particularly due to its huge CAPEX savings, 
efficiency, OPEX and performance. 
 
O- C- P- E- T- S- d-
d (A1, A
-
) 0.55 0.62 0.72 0.68 0.70 0.42 2.02
d (A2, A
-
) 0.51 0.57 0.42 0.42 0.68 0.60 2.09
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6.6 Summary of Evaluation 
The requirement for extraction of hydrocarbon from harsh and unconventional 
offshore terrain prescribes the need for innovative techniques for efficiency as 
well as capital benefits. The all-electric system proves to be a potential 
candidate for this replacement and solution.  
The all-electric system demonstrates enormous potential for replacing the EH 
system as it offers improvements in system availability, reliability and operability 
which leads to a significant CAPEX and OPEX savings while addressing key 
HSE issues in the offshore oil and gas production.  
In this analysis, the conventional EH SCM was compared to the all-electric SCM 
(eSCM). The analysis was based on six key criterion, Failure occurrence (O), 
Capex (C), Opex (P), Environment (E), Technology (T) and schedule (S) for 
delivery.  The above evaluation shows that the eSCM deployment is less risky 
than the conventional SCM. Undoubtedly, the eSCM offers a significant merits 
in performance for deep, ultra-deep waters and long step-out distance as 
execution commands are delivered in seconds and condition monitoring data 
are delivered in much less time that time to the topside control systems than 
those of the EH system. The elimination of hydraulics and entire circuitry from 
the eSCM system brings in improved reliability and a significant HSE 
advantage.  The all-electric choke concept powered by eSCM offers the 
operator an ability to return to any desired position within seconds in the choke 
system during operations. This is not practical with the current EH choke 
system as it takes minutes if not hours to do this.  
As the oil and gas business pushes its limits to the deep and ultra-Deepwater 
domain, the incremental advantages of the eSCM becomes a big factor. The 
tougher environmental regulations coming in from the governments’ local 
authorities also make the eSCM an attractive option over the conventional EH 
SCM considering the HSE and reliability merits involved.   
In summary, though the above analysis demonstrates a huge benefit to the 
electro-hydraulic option, there still room for more analysis to be performed using 
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more criteria. One of the key limitations in this analysis is that quite a few 
engineers worldwide have worked on the all-electric system, so it was quite 
difficult sourcing for the right experts to respond to the survey.  
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7 Discussions 
7.1 OREDA SCM Data evaluation and validation 
OREDA is the oil and gas industry reliability baseline database.  Its main 
purpose is to collect and exchange reliability data among the participating 
companies and act as ‘The Forum’ for co-ordination and management of 
reliability data collection within the oil and gas industry. The OREDA JIP has 
established a comprehensive database with reliability and maintenance data for 
exploration and production equipment from a wide variety of geographic areas, 
installations, equipment types and operating conditions.  
Offshore subsea and topside equipment are primarily covered, but onshore 
equipment is also included. The data are stored in a database, and specialised 
OREDA software and guidelines have been developed to collect, retrieve and 
analyse the information. This enables participating companies to comply with 
the ISO 14224 standard. 
It provides the Vehicle to meet the need for subsea reliability performance for oil 
& gas industry, and is managed through the OREDA project organisation 
sponsored by the following 10 oil companies with worldwide operations namely 
(Ostebo 2001): 
• BP 
• Chevron 
• ENI/Agip 
• TotalFinaEl 
• ExxonMobil 
• Norsk Hydro 
• PPCON 
• Shell 
• Statoil and  
• Texaco 
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OREDA’s main purpose is to collect and exchange reliability data among the 
participating companies and act as ‘The Forum’ for co-ordination and 
management of reliability data collection within the oil and gas industry.Data 
collection is done by: 
• Collection and sharing of OREDA®-type data into the joint OREDA-
industry database in accordance with annual data collection plans in the 
JIP 
• Secondly, performing additional OREDA®-type data collection as 
required within each company, which later can be fed into an updated 
industry database. 
The following equipment’s are covered in the OREDA reliability database – 
Control systems (including topside controls, subsea control module, umbilicals), 
flowlines, manifolds, production risers, running tools, wellhead and Xmas trees, 
templates and subsea pumps.  OREDA makes it possible to extract and 
analyse failures with some defined similarities, calculate variables like failure 
rates, downtime, trends and perform benchmarking. The subsea database is 
used by the participating companies to record their real life data on their subsea 
experience. This provides a sound platform for the exchange of subsea info 
among participating companies and the users. 
The analysis was conducted based on data obtained from OREDA based on 
subsea installations located in water depths ranging from shallow water 22m to 
deepwater 1300m in a combination of satellite, manifold templates  and 
clustered well developments. A total of 7,480 subsea control modules were 
used in the analysis in fields covering the North Sea, Gulf of Mexico (GoM), the 
West African waters, Guinean gulf, Adriatic Sea and West of Shetland. Again, a 
combination of driverless and diver-assist systems were analysed. Below is a 
summary: 
• No of SCM – 69 
• Number of components analysed - 7480 
• Water depth: 22 – 1300m 
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• Location: North Sea. GoM, Gulf of Guinea, West of Shetland and West 
Africa 
Table 37 shows a count of the various components that were used in the 
analysis. This included the SCM accumulator system, the chemical injection 
couplings, filters, power/signal couplers, power supply units (PSU), module 
base plates, hydraulic couplings, solenoid control valves, subsea electronic 
module (SEM) including other miscellaneous valve and components.  
Table 37 Total number for the SCM components analysed
SCM Components
No of 
Components
No of Failures No of Critical Failures
Accumulator - subsea 464 2 0
Chemical injection coupling 130 0 0
Filter 586 1 0
Hydraulic coupling 1218 6 2
Module base plate 457 4 4
Other 453 16 10
Power supply unit 304 0 0
Power/signal coupler 1262 5 1
Solenoid control valve 1629 66 35
Subsea electronic module 605 258 100
Unknown 13 0 0
Valve, check 138 2 1
Valve, other 221 7 1
Total 7480 367 154
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The analysis showed that the subsea electronic module has the highest number 
of failures as 42.7% of the component failed representing a whopping 70.30% 
of the entire number of failures recorded during the period of the failure survey. 
This is closely followed by the SCM solenoid valves in which a total of 66 failed 
representing a total of 17.98% failure during the same period. A summary of the 
number of SCM component failures as analysed from the OREDA database is 
shown in figure 60. 
 
 
Figure 60  SCM Components failure. 
 
The analysis also revealed the subsea electronic module (SEM) as the primary 
culprit for critical failures in the SCM. As shown in figure 61, the SEM had a total 
of 64.94% of the SCM critical failures. Critical failures in the SCM are failures 
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that lead to loss in production from that well. Normally, this will involve a 
retrieval, repair and replacement or an outright replacement of the faulty SCM.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 61  SCM critical failures. 
The analysis also shows that the solenoid control valves as having the second 
highest critical failures in the SCM. These are the LP and HP directional control 
valves (DCVs) responsible for the control of the production tree valves including 
the surface controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV), the intelligent control 
and chemical injection valves.  
 
 
The above analysis from OREDA validates the fuzzy TOPSIS analysis results 
shown in section 7.1 including those obtained from the stochastic inputs in 
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chapter five (5). The fuzzy TOPSIS analysis showed that the three most critical 
failure modes in the SCM are: 
• Severe leakage in HP DCV 
• Severe leakage in LP shuttle valve and 
• Loss of power from the SEM unit 
The HP DCV controls the surface controlled subsurface safety valve (SCSSV), 
a primary well control barrier. It also controls the downhole intelligent control 
valves. These two functions are very critical to the operation of any production 
well as failure leads to shutdown and eventual loss in production. This confirms 
that the SEM and the solenoid control valves (HP and LP) are the most critical 
failures in the subsea control module (SCM).  
 
7.2 SCM FMECA and Fuzzy TOPSIS analysis 
In Chapters 3 and 4, a reliability analysis of the SCM was made using FMECA 
and the multi-criteria Fuzzy TOPSIS methodology. These evaluations were 
based on thirty (30) most critical failure modes deducted from a comprehensive 
and detailed failure modes and effect criticality analysis (FMECA) conducted for 
the subsea control module (SCM). The study was based on a tree-mounted 
SCM for control of hydrocarbon fluids from a production well. A summary of the 
results is as shown in tables 38. 
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Table 38  SCM failure modes showing ranking from FMECA and Fuzzy TOPSIS 
evaluation. 
 
Based on table 38, a correlation between the FMECA criticality rankings and 
those obtained from fuzzy TOPSIS analysis is shown in figure 62.  
Failure Modes Failure ID FMECA Ranking Fuzzy TOPSIS Ranking
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 3 1
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 2 2
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 1 3
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 6 4
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 3 5
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 5 6
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 7 7
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 10 8
Loss of LP accumulation F11 9 9
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 12 10
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 19 11
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 14 12
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 13 13
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 7 14
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 19 15
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 14 16
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 17 17
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 10 18
LP selector valve fails to open F15 17 19
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 16 20
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 23 21
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 19 22
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 24 23
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 19 24
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 27 25
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 25 26
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 27 27
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 26 28
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 29 29
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 30 30
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Figure 62  Correlation between the SCM FMECA and the fuzzy TOPSIS evaluation 
A correlation coefficient of 93.5% is obtained between the two methods. From 
both evaluations, we see that the top 10% most critical failure modes are: 
• Severe leakage in HP DCV 
• Severe leakage in LP shuttle valve and 
• Loss of power from the SEM unit 
The HP DCV is responsible for the control of the well SCSSV, a primary safety 
barrier in the well production tubing. The HP DCV is also responsible for the 
control of the intelligent well control valves (ICVs) which are responsible for 
production isolation in multi-zone intelligent well completions, reduction in 
unwanted water and gas production, minimisation of well intervention and 
enhancement of well productivity. The HP DCV is also responsible for methanol 
and other flow assurance chemical injections to the well stream. These 
functions in a typical production tree system, makes the HP DCV a very critical 
part of the SCM.  
The LP shuttle valve is the entry point for the two redundant LP lines coming 
from the control umbilical. Most tree valves are LP-driven. A severe leakage at 
the LP shuttle valve means a loss in all LP control functions in the production 
tree system and invariable a loss in well control.  
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Very critical and with virtually an overriding function is the SEM unit. The SCM 
DCV valves are solenoid-driven with electrical power coming from the SEM unit. 
This implies that a loss in power from the SEM unit leads to a loss in both LP 
and HP functions including a total loss in signal delivery to and from the topside 
unit.   
Similarly, the bottom 10% of the evaluation shows the following the failure 
modes listed below with a ranking correlation of 96%. 
• Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow 
• Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring 
• Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring 
A loss in the internal temperature of the subsea control module, much like any 
other failure mode is important. However, a loss in this signal does not 
automatically lead to a loss in production or a requirement for the retrieval and 
re-installation of the SCM. In the loss of this signal, other parameters could be 
deductively used to determine the status of the internals of the SCM. This also 
applies to some extent to loss in the internal pressure monitoring of the SCM. 
The SCM may continue operations until such a time that a retrieval and re-
installation is properly planned. The monitoring in the HP return flow is very 
important during the operation of the SCM. This gives an indication of the extent 
to which the valve is opened or closed. A significant process change as a result 
of a loss in this signal will require a retrieval and re-installation of a new or 
replacement SCM.  
 
7.3 Subsea Control Module Reliability – A case Study 
This study is based on an FPSO development with subsea completion wells 
installed in a remote Deepwater in West-Africa. The field control philosophy is 
electro-hydraulic (E-H). The tree system is installed on a well producing 
approximately ten thousand barrels of oil per day (10,000 bopd). The SCM was 
installed in an enhanced horizontal tree system (EHXT) for well control on a 
satellite configuration with a direct tie-back to the processing facility. The field 
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layout had five wells, XT_P1, XT_P2, XT_P3, XT_G1 and XT_W1, the first 
three being producer wells while the fourth and fifth were gas injection and 
water injection wells respectively. 
The SCM mounted on XT_P1 was recovered to a well intervention vessel as a 
result of a subsea control failure after some months of production from the well. 
Water ingress was noticed from the topside control unit. Without replacement, 
the SCM subsea electronic module (SEM) failed after a while. Being a dual-
redundant sub-system, the controls operation was switched to the second 
channel utilising the second SEM, which eventually failed leading to a complete 
loss of communication to the topside units, well shut-in and total loss in 
production from the well. The case study illustrates the importance of SCM and 
how the failure of a subsea control module (SCM) component affects the 
reliability of the entire subsea production system. It also reveals the sensitivity 
and interconnectivity in relative dependence on how the failure of one 
component affects the failure of the next sub-system or component and its 
overall significance to the SCM system reliability. Details of the operator has 
been masked for confidentiality reasons.  
 
7.3.1 The Field concept and architecture 
The field concept was such that five subsea wells were on a tie-back to spread-
moored FPSO in about 800metres water depth (see figure 63). FPSO concepts 
are particularly preferred options for remote and deep water developments as 
they eliminate the need for laying long expensive pipes to onshore facilities. 
Again, they are relative quicker to mobilise and less demanding for 
decommissioning purposes. The ability to move and reuse the FPSO in a new 
location at the end of a field life also offers a huge CAPEX advantage.  
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Figure 63  Field Layout under case study 
There were three producer wells in the field XT_P1, XT_P2 and XT_P3, one 
water injection well XT_W1 and one gas injection well XT_G1. The field has an 
optimum daily production of 24,000barrels of oil per day tied back to an FPSO 
with a storage capacity of 500,000barrels, located at average step-out distance 
of 2000m from the wells. 
The tree system in the field was of Enhanced horizontal (EHXT) type designed 
in accordance with API 6A and API 17D and had a design life of 15years based 
on the field production profile. Based on a production bore of 5.1/8’’ and an 
annulus bore of 2.1/16’’, the 5,000psi horizontal tree provides the primary 
control of produced fluids from the subsea well and monitoring of temperature 
and pressure. It also allows for a safe execution of well workover and 
intervention of the well as it connects to the wellhead with a HT-H4 hydraulic 
connector. The tree was modular built, comprising of the choke valve block, 
wing valve block, spool body, isolation sleeve, wellhead connector, process 
pipe work and the tree frame. The tree 18 ¾ 10,000psi HT-H4 connector 
provides the pressure containment and structural strength for connection to the 
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subsea wellhead. The tree to wellhead interface is sealed with a VX gasket 
which is retained hydraulically.  
The tree master valve block (MVB) had a concentric stepped internal profile for 
the tubing hanger, integral production and annulus master valves and annulus 
access valve. A wing block that houses the rest of the valves is bolted to the 
treehead. The tree upper connection was a standard 18 ¾ outer diameter H4 
mandrel profile, which allows for the landing of a BOP stack on top of the tree. 
The tree has a front-mounted ROV panel with class4 rotary valve overrides 
based on ISO13628-8. Due to flow assurance considerations like hydrate, wax, 
emulsion…etc., and considering the low seabed temperature, the tree is also 
insulated. Control of the tree is achieved with an SCMMB-mounted subsea 
control module.  
 
7.3.2 The Field SCS philosophy 
Starting from the topside, the subsea control system (SCS) is made up of the 
electrical power unit (EPU), hydraulic power unit (HPU) and the master control 
station (MCS). An uninterruptible power supply (UPS) provides and maintains 
power for the complete SCS units in redundant configuration (see figure 64). 
Each UPS unit is equipped with inverter, rectifier and a standard sized battery 
bank. The SCS provides a comprehensive power, control and monitoring 
starting from the surface interface to all the subsea installed equipment. 
Acquired data is displayed in the topside HMI, allowing for proper monitoring of 
the entire system. The MCS, located topside had a dual redundant operating 
system operating. The system is equipped with dual redundant programmable 
logic controllers to allow for the monitoring and control of the EPU functions 
including the ESD system 
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Figure 64  The Field SCS architecture 
 
The HPU provides the hydraulic supply to the field routed through a topside 
umbilical termination unity (TUTU) to a dynamic umbilical. The control fluid from 
the HPU is maintained at a cleanliness level of SAE AS 4059C Class 6B-F or 
better. The HPU supply is regulated and monitored from the operator’s 
workstation in the control room. 
A common dynamic umbilical delivers power, control and chemical injection 
functions from the topside umbilical termination assembly (TUTU) and electrical 
junction boxes to a 6-port subsea distribution unit (SDU) on the seabed. The 
umbilical contains 2-off LP lines plus a spare, 2-off HP lines plus a spare, 
methanol injection and other chemical injection lines for flow assurance 
purposes. The topside tie-in is such that the dynamic umbilical runs down to an 
umbilical termination assembly (UTA) located at the seabed while hydraulic and 
electrical flying leads tie-in the UTA to the SDU.  
On the other end also, a hydraulic flying lead (HFL) in combination with a pair of 
EFLs in redundancy connects the SDU to each of the out-going infield static 
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umbilicals to the trees. Finally, the HFL at the end of the infield umbilical UTA is 
connected to the tree MQC while the EFLs are directly connected to the SCM. 
The control philosophy in the field is Communication on Power (COP), closed 
loop electro-hydraulic (E-H) with the control fluid returning to the topside HPU 
during depressurisation. This means that the same cable carries a combination 
of power and communication signals. The signal for control execution is 
multiplexed at the SCM SEM. The SEM is also responsible for power regulation 
and for energising of the solenoid-based DCVs responsible for the control of the 
LP/HP tree valves, downhole intelligent control including condition monitoring 
downhole pressure and temperature (DHPT) values. 
 
7.3.3 The SCM  
The subsea control module (SCM) is a part of the subsea tree system, normally 
mounted on a SCMMB (see figure 65) and responsible for the control and 
monitoring of subsea mounted equipment in a subsea production system (SPS).  
 
Figure 65  SCM mounted on the SCMMB showing interconnections in the SPS 
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Figure 65 also shows the SCM interconnections with the tree system and other 
SPS components. The SCM is retrievable and re-installable with the aid a multi-
purpose tool in conjunction with a work-type remote operated vehicle (ROV). 
The installation operation is guidelineless and requires the latch of the SCM to 
the SCMMB during the operation using the ROV.  
The SCM contains two redundant SEM, all purged and filled with inert nitrogen 
at 1bar (14.5psi) pressure. The SCM serves two key functions. First is the 
delivery of all LP/HP control functions while the second is the acquisition of 
subsea data and delivery of same to the topside units. Filters are provided in 
the SCM LP and HP headers to ensure that only clean fluids get into the control 
circuitry. 
The SCM had thirty two function valves delivering LP, choke and HP functions. 
Self-sealing male hydraquad couplers provided at the baseplate of the SCM 
mated automatically with their female halves mounted in the SCMMB. Each 
hydraulic output function has a separate DCV. The DCVs were 2-way, 3 
position types operated by integral solenoid valves in the DCV valve module. 
The solenoid valves all had low power consumption (<10watts). The functional 
valves were electrically pulsed, but hydraulically latched open such that the 
piloted DCVs remain in their current position when the electrical signal is 
eliminated. As shown in figure 66, the hydraulic latch comes from the LP pilot 
supply used for opening of the functional valves. In the event of loss in power 
and communication to the SCM, the LP functions remain as-is. In the event of 
loss in LP supply from the umbilical, all LP function valves in the tree will fail to 
their safe position. This way all actuators move to their fail safe positions. In the 
same way, the LP choke remains as-is for loss of power and communication to 
the choke DCV in the SCM. The operation of the HP functional valves is quite 
similar to that of the LP functions. However, its hydraulic supply comes from 
dual redundant HP lines.  
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Figure 66  The SCM Architecture 
7.3.4 The failure mode analysis 
This case study is meant to illustrate how the interconnectivity between failure 
modes, the associated severity, the importance of detection in subsea control 
module reliability and a requirement for good IMR practise in the offshore 
subsea industry. This is depicted in figure 67. 
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Figure 67  Case study – The failure mode analysis 
The SCM on the XT_P1 well was working fine for about three years before the 
observation of a water ingress in the operator controls console.  
The control fluid used in the operation was water-based transaqua fluid. The 
SCM die-electric fluid is immiscible with seawater and transaqua. Ingress 
introduces a different conductivity in the SCM chamber and being of higher 
density, displaces the die-electric fluid. Monitoring of the ingress is performed 
with the aid of electrodes pairs mounted at calibrated points within the SCM 
housing. The change in conductivity in the chamber closes the electrical circuit 
of the electrode at that level, which is connected to an amplification system that 
corresponds to the level of ingress. This introduces an analogue signal which is 
converted to a digital signal and transmitted to the topside through the SCM-
mounted SEM unit.  
The ingress of water into an SCM contaminated the chamber die-electric fluid, 
caused an upward displacement of the SCM fluid and initiated corrosion on the 
exposed hydraulic and electrical couplers. The ingress grew steadily. Two years 
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after, the tree subsea electronic module (SEM-A) signal was lost and reported 
as faulty in the operators console. Based on designed, the system automatically 
switched to channel B, making use of SEM-B for powering the tree system for 
control of hydrocarbon flow from the well. The ingress rose to 95% percentage 
and in twenty eight (28) days, a failure in SEM-B was observed. This led to a 
completed loss of well control and the whole system packed up leading to a 
shutdown of the well. 
The two suspects for the water ingress into the SCM were: 
• Seawater ingress through the SCM housing and 
• Internal leakage through the hydraulic system 
 
The SCM housing is equipped with a check valve system. This is a directional 
valve that only allows flow in only one direction. Based on this, flow is only 
allowed from the SCM to the seawater and not the reverse. On retrieval of the 
SCM to the workshop, the check valves were taken off the SCM housing for 
inspection and testing. The check valve had no indication of damage for the 
time spent subsea, but had signs of contamination. They were then tested and 
one was found to be mal-functional.  
The SCM housing was taken off for inspection of the system internal 
components. The components were found to be in a rusty state, a clear 
indication of water ingress as against the oil-based die-electric chamber fluids. 
Marine growths were also found around the couplers. Logically, it was 
concluded that a failure in one of the check valves may have caused a gradual 
ingress of seawater into the SCM chamber. An ingress of seawater causes a 
gradual upward displacement of the die-electric fluid initiating corrosion in the 
internals. It is also believed that the failure was partial as it took about two years 
for the two SEMs in the SCM to fail. 
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Interestingly, the spare SCM available had some components that needed 
replacement. The parts had to be air-freighted to the country for the 
replacement of the faulty units. The spare system was quickly was tested and 
loaded out to a standby well support vessel for the retrieval of the faulty one and 
installation of the spare SCM. The whole exercise took approximately 12days 
for the well to be restored back to normalcy, leading to a huge loss in terms of 
deferred production, cost of hiring a well support vessel and additional cost for 
the fixing of the spare SCM.   
 
7.3.5 Loss Associated with the SCM failure 
The SCM is the heart of a subsea production system; hence its failure normally 
results in very significant losses. The water ingress into the SCM led to the 
following losses: 
Associated Loss Cost 
Direct Cost of replacement SCM $900,000.00 
Cost of hiring a Well support vessel $2,400,000.00 
Cost of deferred production for two weeks $12,000,000.00 
Personnel, tools and associated Logistics Cost $290,000.00 
Total $15,590,000.00  
 
In total, the failure led to an estimated total loss of over $15m. Quite a huge 
sum considering the expected production from the well and other associated 
operation losses. 
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7.3.6 Lessons Learnt: 
A water ingress into the subsea control module (SCM) led to a corrosion in 
the internals of the SCM. This led to a failure of the two SEM units and 
eventually a total failure of the SCM and loss in production. Below are the 
lessons from the analysis: 
1. Failure modes in a subsea control module are inter-related. A failure in 
one component may lead to a failure in another component or sub-
system. Failure in the check valve here led to a failure in the SEM units. 
2. The check valve is a very important component of the SCM as its failure 
leads to a direct ingress of seawater into the SCM system. 
3. The SEM plays an overriding role in the operation of the SCM. A loss in 
power or signal from the SEM, means a total failure or collapse of the 
entire system. 
4. Good spare philosophy is very important in subsea projects. A timely 
change of the SCM would have saved the huge associated cost/losses. 
5. A robust field IMR policy is key in running an offshore oil and gas field. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 201 
8 Conclusion, Recommendation and Further Work 
8.1 Conclusion 
Deepwater oil and gas development is both challenging and risky with a huge 
demand for reliability, safety and positive economic matrix. Today, subsea is the 
preferred technology for deepwater oil and gas discoveries due to its huge 
technical and economic merits. Subsea control module (SCM) plays a very 
crucial role for this delivery but highly challenged due to the demand for its 
reliability.  
This research was focussed on the reliability analysis of the tree-mounted 
electro-hydraulic (E-H) subsea control module (SCM) for oil and gas production.  
Tools for evaluating systems/components reliability were analysed. The 
analysis revealed that understanding failure mode and mechanisms is very 
fundamental for achieving optimum system reliability and FMECA filled this gap 
due to its ability to not only identify the failure, but also map the failure modes to 
the causes, effects, associated components and provides a mitigation strategy.  
A comprehensive component-based FMECA of the SCM was conducted and 
narrowed down to the 30 most critical failure modes in the SCM. A criticality 
assessment and ranking was also performed using the conventional RPN 
technique.  
As part of this research, a comprehensive review was performed on the use of 
FMECA including its application to the offshore subsea industry. Its gaps and 
limitations were also explored. This revealed that the major gap in FMECA is its 
risk priority modelling as reflected in the unscientific crisp results that emanate 
from conventional RPN evaluations. To close the identified gaps in the FMECA, 
various tools were analysed and the multi-criteria fuzzy TOPSIS methodology 
was applied in evaluating the reliability of the SCM due to its robustness and 
huge associated merits.  
The FMECA result revealed the failures modes listed in table 39 as the top 20% 
most critical failure modes in the SCM.  
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Table 39  Top 20% most critical failure modes in the SCM 
SCM Critical Failure Modes Ranking 
• Severe leakage in HP DCV 1 
• Severe leakage in LP shuttle valve 
and 
2 
• Loss of power from the SEM unit 
 
3 
• Loss of HP Accumulation  4 
• Total Loss of signal from the SEM 
module 
5 
• SCM housing check valve cracks 
open at lower pressure 
6 
 
A similar evaluation conducted using the fuzzy TOPSIS and the stochastic input 
strategy revealed that the above failure modes were also the top 20% most 
critical failure modes in the SCM with an overall correlation coefficient of 93.5% 
from an analysis which was conducted on the 30 most critical failure modes of 
the SCM.  
In further validation of these analyses, the industry de-facto reliability database, 
OREDA, was also used in analysing the reliability of the SCM. The result 
showed that the SEM and the solenoid controlled valves are the most critical 
components in the SCM as they contribute to over 80% of the critical failures in 
the SCM.  
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Figure 68  A validation of the fuzzy TOPSIS results with OREDA analysis 
The OREDA results validate the results obtained from the FMECA evaluation, 
fuzzy TOPSIS analysis and the stochastic modelling as the results also 
produced the most critical failure modes which were all directly associated with 
two components of the SCM (see figure 68).  
 
8.2 Novelty/Contribution of the PhD Study 
Below is a list of novelty/contribution to knowledge developed during this 
research project: 
1. Development of a multi-criteria TOPSIS framework for the reliability 
assessment of the SCM using unconventional parameters. A novel 
technique and first ever performed. 
2. Development and implementation of a novel stochastic model for 
assessing the criticality of the subsea control module (SCM) failure 
modes. 
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3. Component-based analysis of SCM failure modes including criticality 
assessment using the fuzzy TOPSIS methodology, stochastic modelling 
and validation using the OREDA database. 
4. Fuzzy TOPSIS assessment of the SCM reliability using weighted criteria 
obtained using expert opinion. A productive, but time consuming 
exercise. 
5. An exhaustive failure modes identification of the subsea control module 
and evaluation using unconventional parameters such as water depth, 
fatality, environment, direct cost, indirect cost…etc.  
6. An innovative comparative analysis of the all-electric and E-H 
multiplexed subsea control modules (SCMs) using the multi-criteria fuzzy 
TOPSIS methodology. 
 
8.3 Recommendation and further work/plan 
A lot of work has gone into this research study on the underlying reasons for the 
failure of the subsea control module (SCM). However, it is believed that more 
work in this area has the potential to reveal a lot more on the reliability of the 
SCM. The following are recommended as further work to this research: 
1. The fuzzy TOPSIS evaluation in this research revealed how 
unconventional parameters closely affect the reliability assessment of the 
SCM in a more realistic manner. It also offered an insight into the 
underlying causes of failure in the SCM. There is a need for a more 
expanded analysis of these risk factors in evaluating the reliability of the 
system. 
2. This research revealed that the subsea electronic module (SEM) and the 
solenoid controlled valves are the two most critical components that 
require attention for a reliable SCM during oil and gas production. A 
deeper study in the operability and system mechanisms of these two 
systems will reveal a lot more on improving the SCM system reliability. 
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3. As at today, the all-electric SCM system remains the potential 
replacement to the commonly used electro-hydraulic SCM. Though the 
oil and gas industry is relatively conservative, further work on the 
comparative analysis would convince the operators to move in this 
direction. It is recommended that the parameters for the evaluation be 
expanded to include other variables that may be useful for operators 
assessment before choice 
4. The framework developed in this study could be extended for the 
evaluation of other complex systems like the blowout preventer (BOP) 
used in hydrocarbon drilling and completion operations. This will further 
validate the usefulness of the model. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Possible RPN Values for O, S and D on a 10-point scale 
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Appendix B – Key Definitions 
 
 Availability is defined as the probability that a system is in an 
operational state (i.e. percentage of time a system will be operational 
relative to the overall time period under consideration).  
Availability =  ­®¯°­®¯°j­®®± 
 
 A control system is a device or set of devices to manage, command, 
direct or regulate the behaviour of other devices or systems. 
 Failure is an event in which any part of an equipment or machine does 
not perform according to its operational specification. Failures are 
classified into several categories: dependent failure, non-critical failures, 
critical failure, random failure, etc 
Failure Mechanism is the basic material behavior that resulted in the 
failure.  
 Failure Mode is defined as the way an item of equipment fails to function 
as intended. 
 Failure rate is the average rate at which failure occurs, and may be 
constant or vary with time. 
 Maintainability is defined as the probability that a particular repair is 
performed within a given time. 
 Redundancy is the duplication of critical components or functions of a 
system with the intention of increasing the system availability. 
 Reliability the ability of a system or component to perform its required 
functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time. 
 
 Subsea is a term used to refer to equipment, technology, and methods 
employed to explore, drill, and develop oil and gas fields that exist below 
the sea bed.  
 Umbilical – An assembly of hydraulic hoses, electrical cables or optic 
optics cables used in controlling subsea systems from an offshore 
platform or floating vessel.  
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Appendix C – Rating of the ten experts for all the risk factors 
 
Failure Modes ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 L L L VL VL L L L L L
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 VH VH H VH VH H MH VH H H
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 L L L L L M L L L M
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 VL L VL L VL L VL VL L VL
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 VL ML ML ML ML VL VL L VL L
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 M M MH MH M M M M M MH
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 L L L ML ML ML ML VL VL VL
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 VL L M ML ML ML ML VL ML VL
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 VL L ML ML ML ML ML VL L ML
Loss of LP accumulation F11 M MH MH MH M MH H MH M M
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 VL VL L L L L L ML L L
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 VL VL VL VL ML L L L L L
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 VL VL ML ML ML ML ML L VL L
LP selector valve fails to open F15 ML ML VL L L L L L L L
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 M ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 VL L VL L L ML ML L L L
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 M L L L L ML ML L L L
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 ML ML L L L L ML L L L
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 VL L L VL VL VL VL L L L
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 VL VL ML ML ML L VL VL VL L
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 VL VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 VL VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 VL VL L L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 VL L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 VL L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 VL VL L L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 VL L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 VL L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Occurrence associated with water depth 
R1   
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Failure Modes ID D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 MH H MH H H H MH MH MH MH
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 VL VL VL VL L ML ML L L VL
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 ML M MH MH MH MH ML ML ML MH
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 M M M ML ML ML ML L L M
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 M L L M M M M M M M
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 M L M L M L ML L L M
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 VL L VL L VL L VL ML VL L
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 M L M VL L L VL VL VL VL
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 M L M VL VL L VL L VL L
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 VL L VL ML ML L VL L VL L
Loss of LP accumulation F11 VL L VL L VL L VL ML VL L
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 VL L VL L VL L VL L VL L
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL ML L VL
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 VL L VL L VL L VL L L L
LP selector valve fails to open F15 L VL ML ML L L L L L L
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 H H H H H H MH MH H H
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 VL VL ML ML ML ML VL VL L L
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 VL VL ML ML L ML VL VL L L
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 VL L ML ML L ML VL VL L L
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 VL L ML ML L L VL L L L
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 VL VL ML ML ML ML VL VL L L
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 VL VL L L L L L VL VL VL
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 VL VL VL VL VL VL L VL VL VL
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 VL ML L ML L VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 VL ML L L L VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 VL ML L L L VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 VL ML L L ML VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 VL ML L ML ML L VL L VL L
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 VL L L ML ML VL VL VL VL VL
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Failure Modes ID
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH H VH VH
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 VH H H H VH VH VH H VH VH
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 VH H VH H VH H VH H H H
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 VH H VH H VH H VH H VH H
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 VH H H H VH H H H VH H
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 VH H MH MH VH H MH H VH H
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 VH H MH H VH H MH H VH H
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 VH H H H VH H VH VH VH H
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 VH VH VH H VH VH VH VH VH VH
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 VH VH H H VH VH H H VH VH
Loss of LP accumulation F11 VH VH H H VH VH H H VH VH
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 VH VH H H VH VH H H VH VH
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 VH VH H H VH VH VH H VH VH
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 VH VH H H VH VH VH H VH VH
LP selector valve fails to open F15 H VH MH H H VH VH H H VH
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 VH VH H H H VH VH H VH VH
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 H VH H H MH VH VH H H VH
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 H H MH H MH H H H H H
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 VH H MH MH MH MH MH MH MH H
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 VH VH H H VH VH H H VH VH
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 VH VH MH H VH VH H H VH VH
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 VH H H H VH H H H VH H
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 VH MH H H VH MH H H VH MH
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 VH MH MH H VH VH H H VH VH
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 VH VH MH H VH VH VH H H H
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 VH VH VH H VH VH VH H VH H
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 VH VH VH H VH VH VH H MH MH
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 VH VH VH H VH VH VH H VH H
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 VH VH VH H VH VH VH H VH VH
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 VH VH VH H VH VH MH H MH MH
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Failure Modes ID
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 VH VH H VH VH H H H H H
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 M M M M M M M M M M
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 VH H H VH H H H VH H H
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 M H H H MH MH MH M MH MH
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 M MH MH MH H H H MH H H
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 L L L L L L L L L L
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 MH M M MH MH M MH MH MH MH
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 MH M M M M M M M MH M
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 MH M M M M M M MH MH MH
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 MH M M MH M MH M MH MH MH
Loss of LP accumulation F11 MH MH MH ML MH MH MH M MH MH
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 MH MH M M MH M MH M MH MH
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 MH MH MH MH MH M MH ML MH MH
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 MH MH M MH M M MH ML MH MH
LP selector valve fails to open F15 MH MH MH M MH M MH M MH MH
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 MH MH M M M M MH M MH MH
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 MH MH MH M MH MH MH ML MH MH
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 MH MH L M MH M MH ML MH MH
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 MH MH M ML MH M MH ML MH MH
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 MH MH MH L MH MH MH ML MH MH
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 MH MH MH ML MH MH MH ML MH MH
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 L L L L L ML L ML ML L
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 MH MH M L MH M MH M M M
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 MH MH MH ML MH M MH ML M M
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 L M ML L M M ML ML ML ML
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 L M ML L M M ML ML ML ML
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 L M L L L L ML ML ML ML
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 L M ML L M M L L ML ML
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 L M L L M L L ML ML ML
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 L M ML L L M ML L ML ML
R4
 230 
 
Failure Modes ID
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 VH VH H VH VH VH VH VH VH VH
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 MH MH H MH MH MH MH MH MH MH
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 H H H VH VH VH VH H VH VH
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 MH MH H MH MH MH MH MH MH MH
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 VH VH H H VH H H H H H
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 H H H H H H H H H H
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH H
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH H
Loss of LP accumulation F11 H H H VH VH H VH VH VH VH
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 H H H H H H H H VH H
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 VH H VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 H H H H H H H H H H
LP selector valve fails to open F15 H H H H MH H H H H H
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 VH VH H VH VH VH VH VH VH VH
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 H H H MH MH H H H H H
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 H H H H MH MH H H H H
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 H MH H H MH MH MH MH MH H
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 MH MH H H MH MH MH H H H
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 MH H H H MH H MH H H H
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 MH MH MH H H H H MH MH MH
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 H H MH MH H H H H H H
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 H H MH MH H H H H H H
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 H H H H H H H H H H
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 MH MH MH H H H MH MH MH MH
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH L
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 MH M MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 M M M MH MH MH M M M M
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 M M M MH M M M M M M
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Failure Modes ID
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 VL L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 H H M L L L L L L L
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 VL L M L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 VL VL L L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 H H VH H H H H VH H H
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 L L H L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 L L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 M M M M M M M M M M
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 M M M M M M M M M ML
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 L L L L ML ML ML L L L
Loss of LP accumulation F11 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP selector valve fails to open F15 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 VL VL L L L L L L L L
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 VL VL L L L L L L L L
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 VL VL L L L L L L L VL
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 L L L L L L L L L L
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
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Failure Modes ID
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of LP accumulation F11 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP selector valve fails to open F15 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
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Failure Modes ID
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 L VL M L M M L L L L
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 VL M L L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 L L VL L M M L L L L
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 ML ML L ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 VL VL VL VL L ML ML ML L L
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 M M M M ML ML ML ML ML ML
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 M M MH M MH MH MH MH MH MH
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 M M M M MH MH M M M M
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 M M M M M M M M M M
Loss of LP accumulation F11 ML L ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 L L L L L L L L ML L
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 MH MH VH MH MH MH VH MH MH MH
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 L L M L L L ML L L L
LP selector valve fails to open F15 L L L L L L L L L L
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 M M M M M M M M M M
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 L L L VL VL L L L L L
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 L VL L L L VL L VL VL VL
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 L VL VL L L VL VL VL VL VL
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 L VL VL L L VL L VL VL VL
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 L VL L L L L L VL VL VL
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 L L L M VL L M L VL VL
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 L VL L L L VL L L L VL
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 MH M MH M M M ML ML M MH
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 VL VL L L VL VL VL VL VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 ML VL L L L L L L L VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 L L VL L L VL ML L L VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 L ML L L L VL ML L L L
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 L L ML L L L ML L L L
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 L L VL L L L L L L L
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Failure Modes ID
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 L L L L L VL L L L L
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 H H H H H H H H H H
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 VL VL VL VL L L VL VL VL VL
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 H VH VH VH H VH VH VH VH VH
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 ML M L L L L ML ML L L
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 H VH VH VH H H H H H VH
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 ML M ML ML L L ML L M ML
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 L L L L L ML ML ML L ML
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 ML ML ML ML L L L L ML L
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 L L L L L L L L L ML
Loss of LP accumulation F11 ML L ML ML ML ML ML L L L
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 L L VL VL VL L L L L L
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 VL VL L L L L L L L L
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP selector valve fails to open F15 VL ML L L L L L L L L
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 ML ML ML L ML ML ML ML ML L
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 L L L L L L L ML ML VL
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 L M L L L L L VL VL VL
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 L M L L L ML L L L L
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 L ML VL L L L ML ML VL L
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 VL ML VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 VL M VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 L M VL VL VL VL VL ML M VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 L VL VL VL VL VL ML ML VL VL
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL ML
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 VL VL VL L L VL VL VL VL ML
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 VL L VL ML L L L VL VL VL
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 VL L VL VL VL VL VL ML L L
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 ML VL ML ML VL VL VL VL VL L
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Failure Modes ID
Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit F1 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH
SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure F2 M M M M ML M M M M M
Total Loss of signal from the SEM module F3 VH VH VH VH H VH VH VH VH H
Loss of LP hydraulic filtration F4 H VH H H H H H VH H H
Severe leakage from HP DCV F5 H H MH H MH MH H H H MH
Loss of HP hydraulic filtration F6 VH H VH H MH MH MH MH MH MH
Loss of HP Accumulation F7 MH MH H H MH MH MH MH MH MH
Severe leakage from LP DCV F8 H VH VH H M MH MH MH MH MH
Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve F9 H H H H M MH MH H H H
Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve F10 H M H H MH MH H H H H
Loss of LP accumulation F11 H H MH H MH MH MH H MH MH
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line F12 H H MH H MH M MH H MH M
Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header F13 MH MH H H H MH MH MH MH MH
Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line F14 MH MH MH H H H H H H H
LP selector valve fails to open F15 M M M M MH M MH MH M M
Loss of SCM pressure compensation F16 M M H H MH M MH M M M
HP DCV fails to open on command F17 MH MH H H MH MH MH MH H MH
LP DCV fails to open on command F18 H H M M MH MH MH MH H M
HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F19 M M M M M M M MH MH MH
HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F20 M M M M MH MH MH MH M M
LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position F21 M M M M M M MH M M M
Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor F22 MH M M MH H M M M M M
LP selector valve spuriously closes F23 M M M M M M M M H MH
LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position F24 ML ML M M ML ML ML ML M H
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure F25 M ML M M ML ML ML ML M M
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure F26 ML ML M M ML ML ML ML M H
Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow F27 ML M H M M ML ML ML ML H
Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow F28 ML ML ML M M M M ML ML ML
Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring F29 ML M ML ML M ML M M M M
Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring F30 ML ML ML ML ML ML M ML ML ML
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Appendix D – Results of the SCM Failure modes survey: 
Subsea Control Module (SCM) – FMECA and Fuzzy TOPSIS evaluation 
PhD RESEARCH Questionnaire 
School: SOE, Cranfield University, United Kingdom 2013/14 
 Student: C105147 
Results – Expert1 
Foreword: 
With increasing move into deeper waters, access to evaluation data becomes 
more difficult. This necessitates the use of experts operational knowledge in 
assessment of SCM reliability.  
You have been chosen to participate in this survey because you are identified 
as an expert in the Subsea oil and gas industry. It will take about 20minutes to 
complete. Your professional answers will be quite useful in this evaluation.  
Information obtained here is strictly for research purposes. No propriety 
information is being solicited. At the end, you will have access to the outcome of 
this research. Thank you. 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction: 
Failure of subsea 
control module (SCM) is a 
big issue in the 
offshore oil and gas 
industry. This survey is being conducted as part of a research to understand the 
failure modes, failure mechanisms, causes and effects of the SCM in its 
application to deep and ultra-deepwater oil and gas production.   
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The SCM being considered here are those mounted on a subsea Xmas tree 
with the main aim of controlling the tree valves, chemical injection system, 
downhole functions control and delivery of condition monitoring data from the 
tree and downhole instrumentations to the topside units.  
This is a fallout from a comprehensive analysis performed on the SCM 
subsystems and components failure modes, causes and effects. 
There are two sections in the questionnaire: 
In section one, the importance or weight of each risk factor (criterion) on SCM 
reliability will be assessed. In second two, the impact of each risk factor 
(criterion) is rated against a corresponding SCM failure mode.  
Section 1 
Risk factors to be considered in the analysis are listed below: 
Risk Factors 
R1  - Occurrence associated with water depth     
R2  - Occurrence under normal operation    
R3  - Occurrence under extreme conditions    
R4 - Direct Cost of failure     
R5  -  Indirect cost of failure    
R6  - Failure impact on environment    
R7  - Fatality associated with failure  
R8  - Risk to business – non-financial 
R9  - Detectability  
R10 -  Redundancy 
 
The weighting Legend: 
VL – Very Low       L – Low      M – Medium     H – High      VH – Very High 
Each of the questions below reflect the importance weight of the risk factors 
above in evaluating the reliability of a tree-mounted subsea control module 
(SCM) for its role in the production of oil and gas. Please tick ‘x’ against the 
corresponding value for each of the questions. 
 238 
 
 
1. SCM installed subsea is exposed to several hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. How 
significant is SCM failure occurrence associated with water depth (R1)? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
2. SCM subjected to normal design operating conditions (R2) still fail and sometimes in their 
early life. How important is SCM failure under normal operations (R2) to evaluating SCM 
reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
3. Sometimes SCM sometimes operate in conditions that are outside their design operational 
boundaries. How important is SCM failure under these extreme operations (R3) to 
evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
4. SCM component failure leads to loss in revenue as the part/subsystem system may require 
repair or outright changeout. What is the importance of this direct cost (R4) of this 
component/subsystem in assessing SCM reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
5. SCM failures leads to indirect cost (R5) in terms deferred production, cost for offshore 
repair vessel rental…etc. How significant is this to making SCM more reliable. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
6. Failure in SCM functionality may have some impact on the environment in terms of control 
fluid leakage to the sea, oil spillage…etc. How important is this environmental impact (R6) 
in assessing SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
7. Loss in SCM functionality might lead to loss of life. How significant is fatality (R7) 
consideration in designing SCM for reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
8. Some SCM failures lead to non-financial business impact (R8) to the business 
owner/operator,  like loss in reputation…etc. How important is this in evaluating SCM 
reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
9. Some SCM failures are easy to detect while others are not. How important is the ability to 
detect failure (R9) on SCM reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
10. Some components in the SCM are duplicated in redundancy (R10) as safeguard in case of 
failure. How important is redundancy in SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
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Section 2 
In this section of the questionnaire, the rating/influence of the risk factors against the 
respective SCM failure modes is being evaluated. Below is a list of the risk factors to 
be evaluated against the failure modes.  
Risk Factors 
R1  - Occurrence associated with water depth     
R2  - Occurrence under normal operation    
R3  - Occurrence outside design boundaries    
R4 - Direct Cost of failure     
R5  -  Indirect cost of failure    
R6  - Failure impact on environment    
R7  - Fatality associated with failure  
R8  - Risk to business – non-financial 
R9  - Detectability  
R10 -  Redundancy 
 
The rating legend is also shown below: 
The rating Legend: 
VL – Very Low   L – Low   ML – Medium Low 
 M – Medium 
MH – Medium High  H – High   VH – Very High  
 
Failure Modes, Fi 
F1 - Loss of power supply from the SEM Unit  
F2 - SCM housing check valve cracks open at lower pressure 
F3 - Total Loss of signal from the SEM module  
F4 - Loss of LP hydraulic filtration 
F5 - Severe leakage from HP DCV  
F6 - Loss of HP hydraulic filtration 
F7 - Loss of HP Accumulation  
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F8 - Severe leakage from LP DCV 
F9 - Severe leakage on the LP Shuttle valve 
F10 - Severe leakage on the HP shuttle valve 
F11 - Loss of LP accumulation 
F12 - Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next HP supply line 
F13 - Severe leak in the LP common hydraulic header 
F14 - Shuttle valve fails to change over to the next LP supply line  
F15 - LP selector valve fails to open  
F16 - Loss of SCM pressure compensation 
F17 - HP DCV fails to open on command  
F18 - LP DCV fails to open on command 
F19 - HP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position 
F20 - HP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position 
F21 - LP DCV fails to shut on demand from the open position 
F22 - Loss of monitoring signal from the water ingress sensor  
F23 - LP selector valve spuriously closes 
F24 - LP DCV shuts spuriously from the open position 
F25 - Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP supply pressure 
F26 - Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP supply pressure 
F27 - Loss of electronic monitoring of the LP return flow 
F28 - Loss of electronic monitoring of the HP return flow 
F29 - Loss of the SCM internal pressure monitoring 
F30 - Loss of the SCM internal temperature monitoring 
 
This section evaluates how each failure mode is affected by the risk factors. 
Experts are expected to fill the boxes in the table below with the relevant values 
(VL, L, ML, M, MH, H, VH). 
  
Risk Factors 
 
Failure 
Modes 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
R4 
 
R5 
 
R6 
 
R7 
 
R8 
 
R9 
 
R10 
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F1 L L L VL VL L L L L L 
F2 VH VH H VH VH H MH VH H H 
F3 L L L L L M L L L M 
F4 VL L VL L VL L VL VL L VL 
F5 VL ML ML ML ML VL VL L VL L 
F6 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F7 M M MH MH M M M M M MH 
F8 L L L ML ML ML ML VL VL VL 
F9 VL L M ML ML ML ML VL ML LV 
F10 VL L ML ML ML ML ML VL L ML 
F11 M MH MH MH M MH H MH M M 
F12 VL VL L L L L L ML L L 
F13 VL VL VL VL ML L L L L L 
F14 VL VL ML ML ML ML ML L VL L 
F15 ML ML VL L L L L L L L 
F16 M ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML 
F17 VL L VL L L ML ML L L L 
F18 M L L L L ML ML L L L 
F19 ML ML L L L L ML L L L 
F20 VL L L VL VL VL VL L L L 
F21 VL VL ML ML ML L VL VL VL L 
F22 VL VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL 
F23 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F24 VL VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL 
F25 VL VL L L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
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F26 VL L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F27 VL L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F28 VL VL L L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F29 VL L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F30 VL L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
 
Expert 2 – Section1 
 
1. SCM installed subsea is exposed to several hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. How significant is SCM 
failure occurrence associated with water depth (R1)? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
2. SCM subjected to normal design operating conditions (R2) still fail and sometimes in their early life. How 
important is SCM failure under normal operations (R2) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
3. Sometimes SCM sometimes operate in conditions that are outside their design operational boundaries. How 
important is SCM failure under these extreme operations (R3) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
4. SCM component failure leads to loss in revenue as the part/subsystem system may require repair or outright 
changeout. What is the importance of this direct cost (R4) of this component/subsystem in assessing SCM 
reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
5. SCM failures leads to indirect cost (R5) in terms deferred production, cost for offshore repair vessel 
rental…etc. How significant is this to making SCM more reliable. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
6. Failure in SCM functionality may have some impact on the environment in terms of control fluid leakage to the 
sea, oil spillage…etc. How important is this environmental impact (R6) in assessing SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
7. Loss in SCM functionality might lead to loss of life. How significant is fatality (R7) consideration in designing 
SCM for reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
8. Some SCM failures lead to non-financial business impact (R8) to the business owner/operator,  like loss in 
reputation…etc. How important is this in evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
9. Some SCM failures are easy to detect while others are not. How important is the ability to detect failure (R9) 
on SCM reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
10. Some components in the SCM are duplicated in redundancy (R10) as safeguard in case of failure. How 
important is redundancy in SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
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Expert2 – Section2  
  
Risk Factors 
 
Failure 
Modes 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
R4 
 
R5 
 
R6 
 
R7 
 
R8 
 
R9 
 
R10 
F1 MH H MH H H H MH MH MH MH 
F2 VL VL VL VL L ML ML L L VL 
F3 ML M MH MH MH MH ML ML ML MH 
F4 M M M ML ML ML ML L L M 
F5 M L L M M M M M M M 
F6 M L M L M L ML L L M 
F7 VL L VL L VL L VL ML VL L 
F8 M L M VL L L VL VL VL VL 
F9 M L M VL VL L VL L VL L 
F10 VL L VL ML ML L VL L VL L 
F11 VL L VL L VL L VL ML VL L 
F12 VL L VL L VL L VL L VL L 
F13 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL ML L VL 
F14 VL L     VL       L VL L VL L L L 
F15 L VL ML ML L L L L L L 
F16 H H H H H H MH MH H H 
F17 VL VL ML ML ML ML VL VL L L 
F18      VL      VL ML ML L ML VL VL L L 
F19 VL L ML ML L ML VL VL L L 
F20 VL L ML ML L L VL L L L 
F21 VL VL ML ML ML ML VL VL L L 
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F22 VL VL L L L L L VL VL VL 
F23 VL VL VL VL      VL VL L VL VL VL 
F24 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F25 VL ML L ML L VL VL VL VL VL 
F26 VL ML L L L VL VL VL VL VL 
F27 VL ML L L L VL VL VL VL VL 
F28 VL ML L L ML VL VL VL VL VL 
F29 VL ML L ML ML L VL L VL L 
F30 VL L L ML ML VL VL VL VL VL 
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Expert3 – Section1 
 
 
Expert3 – Section2 
  
Risk Factors 
 
Failure 
Modes 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
R4 
 
R5 
 
R6 
 
R7 
 
R8 
 
R9 
 
R10 
1. SCM installed subsea is exposed to several hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. How significant is SCM 
failure occurrence associated with water depth (R1)? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
2. SCM subjected to normal design operating conditions (R2) still fail and sometimes in their early life. How 
important is SCM failure under normal operations (R2) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
3. Sometimes SCM sometimes operate in conditions that are outside their design operational boundaries. How 
important is SCM failure under these extreme operations (R3) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
4. SCM component failure leads to loss in revenue as the part/subsystem system may require repair or outright 
changeout. What is the importance of this direct cost (R4) of this component/subsystem in assessing SCM 
reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
5. SCM failures leads to indirect cost (R5) in terms deferred production, cost for offshore repair vessel 
rental…etc. How significant is this to making SCM more reliable. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
6. Failure in SCM functionality may have some impact on the environment in terms of control fluid leakage to the 
sea, oil spillage…etc. How important is this environmental impact (R6) in assessing SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
7. Loss in SCM functionality might lead to loss of life. How significant is fatality (R7) consideration in designing 
SCM for reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
8. Some SCM failures lead to non-financial business impact (R8) to the business owner/operator, like loss in 
reputation…etc. How important is this in evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
9. Some SCM failures are easy to detect while others are not. How important is the ability to detect failure (R9) 
on SCM reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
10. Some components in the SCM are duplicated in redundancy (R10) as safeguard in case of failure. How 
important is redundancy in SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
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F1 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH H VH VH 
F2 VH H H H VH VH VH H VH VH 
F3 VH H VH H VH H VH H H H 
F4 VH H VH H VH H VH H VH H 
F5 VH H H H VH H H H VH H 
F6 VH H MH MH H VH H MH VH H 
F7 VH H MH H VH H MH H VH H 
F8 VH H H H VH H VH VH VH H 
F9 VH VH VH H VH VH VH VH VH VH 
F10 VH VH H H VH VH H H VH VH 
F11 VH VH H H VH VH H H VH VH 
F12 VH VH H H VH VH H  H VH VH 
F13 VH VH H H VH VH VH H VH VH 
F14 VH VH H H VH VH VH H VH VH 
F15 H VH MH H H VH VH H H VH 
F16 VH VH H H H VH VH H VH VH 
F17 H VH H H MH VH VH H H VH 
F18 H H MH H MH H H H H H 
F19 VH H MH MH MH MH MH MH MH H 
F20 VH VH H H VH VH H H VH VH 
F21 VH VH MH H VH VH H H VH VH 
F22 VH H H H VH H H H VH H 
F23 VH MH H H VH MH H H VH MH 
F24 VH MH MH H VH VH H H VH VH 
F25 VH VH MH H VH VH VH H H H 
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F26 VH VH VH H VH VH VH H VH H 
F27 VH VH VH H VH VH VH H MH MH 
F28 VH VH VH H VH VH VH H VH H 
F29 VH VH VH H VH VH VH H VH VH 
F30 VH VH VH H VH VH MH H MH MH 
 
Expert4 – Section1 
 
1. SCM installed subsea is exposed to several hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. How significant is SCM 
failure occurrence associated with water depth (R1)? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
2. SCM subjected to normal design operating conditions (R2) still fail and sometimes in their early life. How 
important is SCM failure under normal operations (R2) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
3. Sometimes SCM sometimes operate in conditions that are outside their design operational boundaries. How 
important is SCM failure under these extreme operations (R3) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
4. SCM component failure leads to loss in revenue as the part/subsystem system may require repair or outright 
changeout. What is the importance of this direct cost (R4) of this component/subsystem in assessing SCM 
reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
5. SCM failures leads to indirect cost (R5) in terms deferred production, cost for offshore repair vessel 
rental…etc. How significant is this to making SCM more reliable. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
6. Failure in SCM functionality may have some impact on the environment in terms of control fluid leakage to the 
sea, oil spillage…etc. How important is this environmental impact (R6) in assessing SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
7. Loss in SCM functionality might lead to loss of life. How significant is fatality (R7) consideration in designing 
SCM for reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
8. Some SCM failures lead to non-financial business impact (R8) to the business owner/operator,  like loss in 
reputation…etc. How important is this in evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
9. Some SCM failures are easy to detect while others are not. How important is the ability to detect failure (R9) 
on SCM reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
10. Some components in the SCM are duplicated in redundancy (R10) as safeguard in case of failure. How 
important is redundancy in SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
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Expert4 – Section2 
  
Risk Factors 
 
Failure 
Modes 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
R4 
 
R5 
 
R6 
 
R7 
 
R8 
 
R9 
 
R10 
F1 VH VH H VH VH H H H H H 
F2 M M M M M M M M M M 
F3 VH H H VH H H H VH H H 
F4 M H H H MH MH MH M MH MH 
F5 M MH MH MH H H H MH H H 
F6 L L L L L L L L L L 
F7 MH M M MH MH M MH MH MH MH 
F8 MH M M M M M M M MH M 
F9 MH M M M M M M MH MH MH 
F10 MH M M MH M MH M MH MH MH 
F11 MH MH MH ML MH MH MH M MH MH 
F12 MH MH M M MH M MH M MH MH 
F13 MH MH MH MH MH M MH ML MH MH 
F14 MH MH M MH M M MH ML MH MH 
F15 MH MH MH M MH M MH M MH MH 
F16 MH MH M M M M MH M MH MH 
F17 MH MH MH M MH MH MH ML MH MH 
F18 MH MH L M MH M MH ML MH MH 
F19 MH MH M ML MH M MH ML MH MH 
F20 MH MH MH L MH MH MH ML MH MH 
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F21 MH MH MH ML MH MH MH ML MH MH 
F22 L L L L L ML L ML ML L 
F23 MH MH M L MH M MH M M M 
F24 MH MH MH ML MH M MH ML M M 
F25 L M ML L M M ML ML ML ML 
F26 L M ML L M M ML ML ML ML 
F27 L M L L L L ML ML ML ML 
F28 L M ML L M M L L ML ML 
F29 L M L L M L L ML ML ML 
F30 L M ML L L M ML L ML ML 
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Expert5 – Section1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. SCM installed subsea is exposed to several hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. How significant is SCM 
failure occurrence associated with water depth (R1)? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
2. SCM subjected to normal design operating conditions (R2) still fail and sometimes in their early life. How 
important is SCM failure under normal operations (R2) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
3. Sometimes SCM sometimes operate in conditions that are outside their design operational boundaries. How 
important is SCM failure under these extreme operations (R3) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
4. SCM component failure leads to loss in revenue as the part/subsystem system may require repair or outright 
changeout. What is the importance of this direct cost (R4) of this component/subsystem in assessing SCM 
reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
5. SCM failures leads to indirect cost (R5) in terms deferred production, cost for offshore repair vessel 
rental…etc. How significant is this to making SCM more reliable. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
6. Failure in SCM functionality may have some impact on the environment in terms of control fluid leakage to the 
sea, oil spillage…etc. How important is this environmental impact (R6) in assessing SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
7. Loss in SCM functionality might lead to loss of life. How significant is fatality (R7) consideration in designing 
SCM for reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
8. Some SCM failures lead to non-financial business impact (R8) to the business owner/operator, like loss in 
reputation…etc. How important is this in evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
9. Some SCM failures are easy to detect while others are not. How important is the ability to detect failure (R9) 
on SCM reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
10. Some components in the SCM are duplicated in redundancy (R10) as safeguard in case of failure. How 
important is redundancy in SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
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Expert5 – Section2 
  
Risk Factors 
 
Failure 
Modes 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
R4 
 
R5 
 
R6 
 
R7 
 
R8 
 
R9 
 
R10 
F1 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH 
F2 VH VH H VH VH VH VH VH VH VH 
F3 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH 
F4 MH MH H MH MH MH MH MH MH MH 
F5 H H H VH VH VH VH H VH VH 
F6 MH MH H MH MH MH MH MH MH MH 
F7 VH VH H H VH H H H H H 
F8 H H H H H H H H H H 
F9 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH H 
F10 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH H 
F11 H H H VH VH H VH VH VH VH 
F12 H H H H H H H H VH H 
F13 VH H VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH 
F14 H H H H H H H H H H 
F15 H H H H MH H H H H H 
F16 VH VH H VH VH VH VH VH VH VH 
F17 H H H MH MH H H H H H 
F18 H H H H MH MH H H H H 
F19 H MH H H MH MH MH MH MH H 
F20 MH MH H H MH MH MH H H H 
 252 
F21 MH H H H MH H MH H H H 
F22 MH MH MH H H H H MH MH MH 
F23 H H MH MH H H H H H H 
F24 H H MH MH H H H H H H 
F25 H H H H H H H H H H 
F26 MH MH MH H H H MH MH MH MH 
F27 MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH L 
F28 MH M MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH 
F29 M M M MH MH MH M M M M 
F30 M M M MH M M M M M M 
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Expert6 – Section1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. SCM installed subsea is exposed to several hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. How significant is SCM 
failure occurrence associated with water depth (R1)? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
2. SCM subjected to normal design operating conditions (R2) still fail and sometimes in their early life. How 
important is SCM failure under normal operations (R2) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
3. Sometimes SCM sometimes operate in conditions that are outside their design operational boundaries. How 
important is SCM failure under these extreme operations (R3) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
4. SCM component failure leads to loss in revenue as the part/subsystem system may require repair or outright 
changeout. What is the importance of this direct cost (R4) of this component/subsystem in assessing SCM 
reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
5. SCM failures leads to indirect cost (R5) in terms deferred production, cost for offshore repair vessel 
rental…etc. How significant is this to making SCM more reliable. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
6. Failure in SCM functionality may have some impact on the environment in terms of control fluid leakage to the 
sea, oil spillage…etc. How important is this environmental impact (R6) in assessing SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
7. Loss in SCM functionality might lead to loss of life. How significant is fatality (R7) consideration in designing 
SCM for reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
8. Some SCM failures lead to non-financial business impact (R8) to the business owner/operator, like loss in 
reputation…etc. How important is this in evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
9. Some SCM failures are easy to detect while others are not. How important is the ability to detect failure (R9) 
on SCM reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
10. Some components in the SCM are duplicated in redundancy (R10) as safeguard in case of failure. How 
important is redundancy in SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
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Expert6 – Section2 
  
Risk Factors 
 
Failure 
Modes 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
R4 
 
R5 
 
R6 
 
R7 
 
R8 
 
R9 
 
R10 
F1 VL L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F2 H H M L L L L L L L 
F3 VL L M L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F4 VL VL L L VL VL VL VL VL V 
F5 H H VH H H H H VH H H 
F6 L L H L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F7 L L L L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F8 M M M M M M M M M M 
F9 M M M M M M M M M ML 
F10 L L L L ML ML ML L L L 
F11 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F12 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F13 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F14 L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F15 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F16 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F17 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F18 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F19 VL VL L L L L L L L L 
F20 VL VL L L L L L L L L 
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F21 VL VL L L L L L L L VL 
F22 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML 
F23 ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML 
F24 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F25 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F26 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F27 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F28 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F29 L L L L L L L L L L 
F30 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
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1. SCM installed subsea is exposed to several hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. How significant is SCM 
failure occurrence associated with water depth (R1)? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
2. SCM subjected to normal design operating conditions (R2) still fail and sometimes in their early life. How 
important is SCM failure under normal operations (R2) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
3. Sometimes SCM sometimes operate in conditions that are outside their design operational boundaries. How 
important is SCM failure under these extreme operations (R3) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
4. SCM component failure leads to loss in revenue as the part/subsystem system may require repair or outright 
changeout. What is the importance of this direct cost (R4) of this component/subsystem in assessing SCM 
reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
5. SCM failures leads to indirect cost (R5) in terms deferred production, cost for offshore repair vessel 
rental…etc. How significant is this to making SCM more reliable. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
6. Failure in SCM functionality may have some impact on the environment in terms of control fluid leakage to the 
sea, oil spillage…etc. How important is this environmental impact (R6) in assessing SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
7. Loss in SCM functionality might lead to loss of life. How significant is fatality (R7) consideration in designing 
SCM for reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
8. Some SCM failures lead to non-financial business impact (R8) to the business owner/operator, like loss in 
reputation…etc. How important is this in evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
9. Some SCM failures are easy to detect while others are not. How important is the ability to detect failure (R9) 
on SCM reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
10. Some components in the SCM are duplicated in redundancy (R10) as safeguard in case of failure. How 
important is redundancy in SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
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Risk Factors 
 
Failure 
Modes 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
R4 
 
R5 
 
R6 
 
R7 
 
R8 
 
R9 
 
R10 
F1 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F2 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F3 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F4 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F5 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F6 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F7 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F8 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F9 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F10 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F11 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F12 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F13 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F14 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F15 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F16       VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F17 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F18 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F19 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F20 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
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F21 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F22 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F23 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F24 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F25 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F26 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F27 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F28 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F29 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F30 VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
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1. SCM installed subsea is exposed to several hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. How significant is SCM 
failure occurrence associated with water depth (R1)? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
2. SCM subjected to normal design operating conditions (R2) still fail and sometimes in their early life. How 
important is SCM failure under normal operations (R2) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
3. Sometimes SCM sometimes operate in conditions that are outside their design operational boundaries. How 
important is SCM failure under these extreme operations (R3) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
4. SCM component failure leads to loss in revenue as the part/subsystem system may require repair or outright 
changeout. What is the importance of this direct cost (R4) of this component/subsystem in assessing SCM 
reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
5. SCM failures leads to indirect cost (R5) in terms deferred production, cost for offshore repair vessel 
rental…etc. How significant is this to making SCM more reliable. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
6. Failure in SCM functionality may have some impact on the environment in terms of control fluid leakage to the 
sea, oil spillage…etc. How important is this environmental impact (R6) in assessing SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
7. Loss in SCM functionality might lead to loss of life. How significant is fatality (R7) consideration in designing 
SCM for reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
8. Some SCM failures lead to non-financial business impact (R8) to the business owner/operator, like loss in 
reputation…etc. How important is this in evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
9. Some SCM failures are easy to detect while others are not. How important is the ability to detect failure (R9) 
on SCM reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
10. Some components in the SCM are duplicated in redundancy (R10) as safeguard in case of failure. How 
important is redundancy in SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
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Risk Factors 
 
Failure 
Modes 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
R4 
 
R5 
 
R6 
 
R7 
 
R8 
 
R9 
 
R10 
F1 L VL M L M M L L L L 
F2 VL M L L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F3 L L VL L M M L L L L 
F4 ML ML L ML     ML     ML     ML    ML    ML   ML 
F5 MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH MH 
F6 VL VL VL VL L ML ML ML L L 
F7 M M M M ML ML ML ML ML ML 
F8 M M MH M   MH   MH    MH    MH    MH   MH 
F9      M      M      M      M   MH   MH     M     M      M    M 
F10     M      M     M     M    M    M     M     M      M    M 
F11 ML L ML ML ML ML ML ML ML ML 
F12 L L L L L L L L ML L 
F13 MH MH VH MH MH MH VH MH MH MH 
F14 L L M L L L ML L L L 
F15 L L L L L L L L L L 
F16 M M M M M M M M M M 
F17 L L L VL VL L L L L L 
F18 L VL L L L VL L VL VL VL 
F19 L VL VL L L VL VL VL VL VL 
F20 L VL VL L L VL L VL VL VL 
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F21 L VL L L L L L VL VL VL 
F22 L L L M VL L M L VL VL 
F23 L VL L L L VL L L L VL 
F24 MH M MH M M M ML ML M MH 
F25 VL VL L L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F26 ML VL L L L L L L L VL 
F27 L L VL L L VL ML L L VL 
F28 L ML L L L VL ML L L L 
F29       L      L      ML      L       L       L     ML       L       L       L 
F30       L      L       
VL 
     L       L       L      L       L       L       L 
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1. SCM installed subsea is exposed to several hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. How significant is SCM 
failure occurrence associated with water depth (R1)? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
2. SCM subjected to normal design operating conditions (R2) still fail and sometimes in their early life. How 
important is SCM failure under normal operations (R2) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
3. Sometimes SCM sometimes operate in conditions that are outside their design operational boundaries. How 
important is SCM failure under these extreme operations (R3) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
4. SCM component failure leads to loss in revenue as the part/subsystem system may require repair or outright 
changeout. What is the importance of this direct cost (R4) of this component/subsystem in assessing SCM 
reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
5. SCM failures leads to indirect cost (R5) in terms deferred production, cost for offshore repair vessel 
rental…etc. How significant is this to making SCM more reliable. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
6. Failure in SCM functionality may have some impact on the environment in terms of control fluid leakage to the 
sea, oil spillage…etc. How important is this environmental impact (R6) in assessing SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
7. Loss in SCM functionality might lead to loss of life. How significant is fatality (R7) consideration in designing 
SCM for reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
8. Some SCM failures lead to non-financial business impact (R8) to the business owner/operator, like loss in 
reputation…etc. How important is this in evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
9. Some SCM failures are easy to detect while others are not. How important is the ability to detect failure (R9) 
on SCM reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
10. Some components in the SCM are duplicated in redundancy (R10) as safeguard in case of failure. How 
important is redundancy in SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
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Risk Factors 
 
Failure 
Modes 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
R4 
 
R5 
 
R6 
 
R7 
 
R8 
 
R9 
 
R10 
F1 L L L L L VL L L L L 
F2 H H H H H H H H H H 
F3 VL VL VL VL L L VL VL VL VL 
F4 H VH VH VH H VH VH VH VH VH 
F5 ML M L L L L ML ML L L 
F6 H VH VH VH H H H H H VH 
F7 ML M ML ML L L ML L M ML 
F8 L L L L L ML ML ML L ML 
F9 ML ML ML ML L L L L ML L 
F10 L L L L L L L L L ML 
F11 ML L ML ML ML ML ML L L L 
F12 L L VL VL VL L L L L L 
F13 VL VL L L L L L L L L 
F14 VL VL VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F15 VL ML L L L L L L L L 
F16 ML ML ML L ML ML ML ML ML L 
F17 L L L L L L L ML ML VL 
F18 L M L L L L L VL VL VL 
F19 L M L L L ML L L L L 
F20 VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
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F21 L ML VL L L L ML ML VL L 
F22 VL ML VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F23 VL M VL VL VL VL VL VL VL VL 
F24 L M VL VL VL VL VL ML M VL 
F25 L      VL VL VL VL VL ML ML VL VL 
F26 VL L VL VL VL VL VL VL VL ML 
F27 VL VL VL L L VL VL VL VL ML 
F28 VL L VL ML L L L VL VL VL 
F29 VL L VL VL VL VL VL ML L L 
F30 ML VL ML ML VL VL VL VL VL L 
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1. SCM installed subsea is exposed to several hydrostatic and hydrodynamic forces. How significant is SCM 
failure occurrence associated with water depth (R1)? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
2. SCM subjected to normal design operating conditions (R2) still fail and sometimes in their early life. How 
important is SCM failure under normal operations (R2) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
3. Sometimes SCM sometimes operate in conditions that are outside their design operational boundaries. How 
important is SCM failure under these extreme operations (R3) to evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
4. SCM component failure leads to loss in revenue as the part/subsystem system may require repair or outright 
changeout. What is the importance of this direct cost (R4) of this component/subsystem in assessing SCM 
reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
5. SCM failures leads to indirect cost (R5) in terms deferred production, cost for offshore repair vessel 
rental…etc. How significant is this to making SCM more reliable. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
6. Failure in SCM functionality may have some impact on the environment in terms of control fluid leakage to the 
sea, oil spillage…etc. How important is this environmental impact (R6) in assessing SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
7. Loss in SCM functionality might lead to loss of life. How significant is fatality (R7) consideration in designing 
SCM for reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
8. Some SCM failures lead to non-financial business impact (R8) to the business owner/operator, like loss in 
reputation…etc. How important is this in evaluating SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
9. Some SCM failures are easy to detect while others are not. How important is the ability to detect failure (R9) 
on SCM reliability? 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
 
10. Some components in the SCM are duplicated in redundancy (R10) as safeguard in case of failure. How 
important is redundancy in SCM reliability. 
VL              L            M              H             VH    
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Risk Factors 
 
Failure 
Modes 
 
R1 
 
R2 
 
R3 
 
R4 
 
R5 
 
R6 
 
R7 
 
R8 
 
R9 
 
R10 
F1 VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH VH 
F2 M M M M ML M M M M M 
F3 VH VH VH VH H VH VH VH VH VH 
F4 H VH H H H H H VH H H 
F5 H H MH H MH MH H H H MH 
F6 VH H VH H MH MH MH MH MH MH 
F7 MH MH H H MH MH MH MH MH MH 
F8 H VH VH H M MH MH MH MH MH 
F9 H H H H M MH MH H H H 
F10 H M H H MH MH H H H H 
F11 H H MH H MH MH MH H MH MH 
F12 H H MH H MH M MH H MH M 
F13 MH MH H H H MH MH MH MH MH 
F14 MH MH MH H H H H H H H 
F15 M M M M MH M MH MH M M 
F16 M M H H MH M MH M M M 
F17 MH MH H H MH MH MH MH H MH 
F18 H H M M MH MH MH MH H M 
F19 M M M M M M M MH MH MH 
F20 M M M M MH MH MH MH M M 
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F21 M M M M M M MH M M M 
F22 MH M M MH H M M M M M 
F23 M M M M M M M M H MH 
F24 ML ML M M ML ML ML ML M H 
F25 M ML M M ML ML ML ML M M 
F26 ML ML M M ML ML ML ML M H 
F27 ML M H M M ML ML ML ML H 
F28 ML ML ML M M M M ML ML ML 
F29 ML M ML ML M ML M M M M 
F30 ML ML ML ML ML ML M ML ML ML 
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